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ABSTRACT
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE LEGAL STATUS OF POLITICAL PARTIES
SEPTEMBER 1995
PAUL R. PETTERSON, B.A., ST. LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jerome M. Mileur
American political parties, throughout their history,
have functioned as central institutions of governance and
democracy. While their legislative and policy making role
remains vital today, their identity as a link between
citizens and government has changed markedly in this
century. A major reason for their shifting electoral role
has been the emergence of state governments as active
regulators of the political process in the Progressive Era.
Since the late 1960's, the U.S. Supreme Court has
adjudicated a series of disputes involving this legalized
electoral environment, becoming in the process a major
interpreter of the legal status of political parties. The
absence of any reference to parties in the text of the
Constitution has given the justices of the Court
significant authority in structuring the constitutional
status of parties. The dissertation examines the ideas
which have guided the exercise of that authority, and
explores their implications for the American party system
and American democracy.
v
Analysis of Court opinions involving ballot access,
party organization\nomination procedures, campaign finance,
and patronage reveals two opposing schools of thought among
the justices of the Court. One viewpoint envisions politics
as a "natural order" nurtured by wide party competition and
access to the electoral arena, and perverted by many state
regulations. A contrasting vision sees politics as a
"constructed order" nurtured by stable party competition
and best preserved by state regulation. These differing
ideas of party politics are reflected in the justices'
conceptions of political competition and choice, party
structure and functions, judicial standards of review, and
the proper role of government in the electoral process.
The political implications of these contending
viewpoints extend beyond the purely judicial realm, shaping
the future of the American electoral system and efforts to
build stronger parties. An analysis of these schools of
thought using a set of "strong party\responsible party"
attributes concludes that, while the "natural order" offers
parties some increase in autonomy, neither viewpoint offers
a clear road to stronger parties. The quest for party
renewal must ultimately be as political as it has been
judicial. In addition, these opinions reflects a broader,
continuing debate over whether democracy is best understood
as expression (access, competition) or governance
(legislative representation, stability)
.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION- POLITICAL PARTIES, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE
CHARACTER OF AMERICAN POLITICS
The Legal Status of Parties: Contested Institutions
Since their inception, political parties have played
an important role in American politics and government,
structuring the electoral process and the legislative
branch, as well as serving as a source of policy ideas and
political appointees. Unlike the legislature, executive,
and judiciary, however, parties were not included in the
governmental design of the Constitution; they have evolved
out of the pressures of politics, without any explicit
constitutional guidelines or pedigree. As a result, issues
of party structure and electoral procedures have elicited
ongoing debate among politicians, legislators, and judges,
as well as political scientists; the changing legal status
of parties reflects this lack of a clear constitutional
framework. This dissertation analyzes these debates about
parties and the electoral process by examining the opinions
of the United States Supreme Court, the most important
modern interpreter of the parties' legal status.
The legal status of parties in the U.S. began in some
uncertainty, as noted above, in their absence from the
nation's founding document. The Constitution is silent on
their role in the legal structure of the government. The
absence of parties may be characterized not simply as an
oversight, but as a "hostile silence", if one examines the
1
views of party held by many of the Constitution's
authors. 1 As a result, the first parties evolved outside
the constitutional structure and were, for the most part,
unknown to the law until the latter part of the nineteenth
century. With regard to electoral procedures, only voter
registration came under the purview of state laws, and such
laws were largely confined to the New England states until
the second half of the nineteenth century. 2
The absence of legal regulation of parties during most
of the nineteenth century can be explained in part by their
dominance in the political system. Joel Silbey has
characterized the period from the 1830 's to the 1890 's as
the "party era" in American politics, a time when partisan
imperatives controlled and shaped political action. 3 Many
of the party organizations during this era were themselves
dominated by small groups of individuals, who controlled
1 On the views of parties held by the Founders, see
Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of
Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 17 80-1840
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1969) .
2 Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, Democracy And
The American Party System (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956) ,
p. 319. For a detailed treatment of registration history
through the Progressive Era, see Joseph P. Harris,
Registration of Voters In The United States (Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution, 1929)
.
3 Joel H. Silbey, "The Rise and Fall of American
Political Parties, 1790-1993", in The Parties Respond:
Changes In American Parties And Campaigns, 2nd ed., ed. L.
Sandy Maisel (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 3-18.
For a fuller presentation of this argument, see Joel H
Silbey, ThP American Political Nation, 1 838-1893 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1991)
.
the distribution of patronage jobs and the selection of
party candidates for office. Particularly after the Civil
War, many of these party organizations developed into
political "machines" which effectively managed the politics
of their locality or state, resulting in extensive graft,
vote fraud and other corrupt practices. This corruption was
the subject of increasing protest in the last decades of
the nineteenth century, calling the legitimacy of this
party-dominated political process into question. 4
These protests against "machine" corruption soon bore
fruit; the vacuum of government oversight of parties was
filled by extensive state regulation of parties and many of
their electoral activities, especially during the
Progressive era early in the twentieth century. 5 Among the
reforms instituted were the secret ballot, the direct
primary, party organization and registration statutes,
civil service reform and corrupt practices acts. These
regulations occurred mainly at the state level (civil
service and corrupt practices laws were enacted at the
federal level) and were treated as questions of policy,
4 For a broad historical background on "machines" and
political "bosses", see Alexander B. Callow, Jr., ed., The
City Boss In America: An Interpret ive Reader (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1976) ; Silbey, Political Nation .
5 See in particular Leon Epstein, "Parties As Public
Utilities", chap. 6 in Politica] Parties In The American
Mold (Madison: University Of Wisconsin Press, 1986)
.
3
rather than as constitutional issues. 6 While these
regulations did not always achieve their desired effects,
their lasting impact has been profound: they made
governments an active and important participant in the
structuring of partisan politics and the electoral process.
As with many other contentious political issues, the
status of parties and electoral procedures, and the role of
government in electoral and party affairs, have become
judicial issues as well. Since the late 1960's, a series of
U.S. Supreme Court opinions has frequently overturned, and
occasionally upheld, statutes governing ballot access,
party organization, primaries, and campaign finance; the
practice of patronage has also been dramatically limited.
Grounding their opinions in the individual rights to vote
and to associate, derived from the First, Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution, the justices have
carved out constitutional protection for party activities,
while preserving a continuing role for government in the
electoral process
.
As a result of their opinions on party and electoral
disputes, the justices of the Court have become major
interpreters of the legal status of parties, establishing a
6 At this point in time, the constitutional guarantees
of free speech and association in the Bill of Rights had
yet to be applied to the states through "incorporation" by
means of the Fourteenth Amendment. Free speech guarantees
were first applied to the states in Git low v. New York , 268
U S 652 (1925) , and the freedom of association was not
clearly enunciated by the Supreme Court until its decision
-in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
significant degree of constitutional protection for party
autonomy. Like the politicians, judges, and thinkers before
them, however, the justices have no indisputable
constitutional role for parties on which they can base
their decisions. While the First and Fourteenth Amendment
guarantee of associational freedom, the Fifteenth Amendment
guarantee of the right to vote, and the Tenth Amendment
protection of state government powers do establish
significant parameters for the justices, the complexity of
the resulting jurisprudence in these areas reflects the
degree to which the justices shape the character of these
broad guarantees in their application to specific issues.
Most importantly, none of these constitutional guarantees
enshrine explicit roles for parties as institutions in the
political process.
Faced with statutes and constitutional provisions
whose meaning is often subject to interpretation, and a
lack of a clear "place" for parties in the constitutional
system, the justices must rely in part on their own
judgments about the structure of parties and electoral
procedures in a democratic system, a reliance which
subjects parties to a "continuous founding". While
precedent will build up weight, it may be contested, and
the continuing role of state authority over parties and
elections guarantees that future legislative and judicial
arguments over the nature of parties and the political
process are not foreclosed.
5
This absence of firm constitutional guidelines on
parties creates a continuing opportunity for judicial
interpretation. This dissertation explores judicial
interpretations of parties and the electoral process
through a critical analysis of U.S. Supreme Court opinions
in party and election disputes. The goal of the analysis is
not to attempt causal explanations of particular decisions,
on the model of judicial behavior studies, but instead to
explicate the understandings of parties and the electoral
process contained in the Justices' discourse, their "giving
of reasons" for their decisions. 7 In addition, judging
various regulations of parties and the electoral process
within the parameters of constitutional guarantees of
association and voting (as well as statutory law) creates
an opportunity for the justices to consider broader
questions about the nature of democracy .
Supreme Court opinions are useful in understanding
such debates about parties, the electoral process, and the
nature of democracy because, practically, they represent
the voice of a defining institution of American democracy.
They are the Constitution's view of our parties and of our
7 For an example of judicial behavior studies, see
Harold J. Spaeth and Saul Brenner, eds . , Studies In U.S.
Supreme Court Behavior (New York: Garland Publishing,
1990) The approach used here is derived from a broader
study of liberal ideas in the Court's jurisprudence by
Roqers M Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional La
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). The author is
indebted to the model
.
6
electoral system as seen by the Court. 8 The opinions are
of interest because they are, as one scholar put it, "a
relatively untapped mine of American political thought". 9
In addition to majority opinions, this dissertation also
focuses on dissenting and concurring opinions, despite the
fact such opinions do not carry large weight in legal
precedent. From an analytical standpoint, however, these
"minority" opinions are particularly relevant in tracing
conflicting currents of thought among the justices.
An analysis of the constitutional understandings of
parties enunciated by the Supreme Court, while valuable in
itself, needs to be placed in context in order to evaluate
its implications for the political system as a whole. This
dissertation critiques these constitutional understandings
from an institutional perspective, employing a group of
"strong party attributes" as evaluative criteria. These
interrelated attributes, which consist of (1) the linkage
of citizens and government, (2) the contesting of
8 The ideas are not necessarily the personal views of
the justices, but their interpretation of the Constitution
on the matters at hand. Justice Potter Stewart expresses
this distinction in his dissent in Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23 (1968) . Stewart puts it thusly: "It is thought by a
great many people that the entire electoral college system
of presidential selection set up by the Constitution is an
anachronism in need of major overhaul [footnote omitted] .
As a citizen I happen to share that view. But thi s Court
must follow the Constitution as it is written..." (emphasis
mine). Williams , 393 U.S. at 61 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
9 H L Polhman, ed., Political Thought And The
American Judiciary (Amherst: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1993)
,
p. xi
.
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elections, (3) the management of political conflict, and
(4) the guidance of government and public policy, are
derived from the literature on parties, particularly from
the work of Larry Sabato and James Ceaser. 10 The justices'
understandings will also be evaluated in light of the
"responsible party" model, a particularly important variant
of the more general "strong party" model. 11
The remainder of this chapter explains the
methodological approach and likely theoretical and
practical significance of the dissertation, and concludes
by reviewing the existing literature on the legal status of
parties. Chapters 2-5 analyze the justices' opinions in
ballot access, party organization/nominating procedures,
campaign finance, and patronage cases, examining particular
elements of the electoral system. The concluding chapter
reviews the findings and explores their implications for
the jurisprudence of the Court, the future shape of
parties, and American electoral politics.
10 Larry J. Sabato, The Party's Just Begun: Shaping
Political Parties For America's Future (Glenview, IL: Scott
Foresman, 1988) , and James Ceaser, Reforming The Reforms-. A
Critical Analysis Of The Presidential Selection Process
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1982).
11 The "responsible party" model has a much greater
concern with the programmatic function of parties. For
analyses of the multifaceted nature and active history of
the "responsible party" perspective, see Austin Ranney, The
Doctrine of Responsible Pa rty Government: Its Origins and
Present State (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962);
John Kenneth White and Jerome M. Mileur, eds . , Challenges
To Party Government (Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1992)
.
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Methodology of the Study
The methodological approach employed in this
dissertation is textual analysis of Supreme Court opinions
and related documentary evidence in party-related cases
before the Court. The analysis focuses on the justices'
understandings of three important issues in the electoral
process: the scope of political competition and voter
choice, particularly among parties; the functions and
structure of parties; and the role of government in
structuring the parties and the electoral system. The
analysis also examines the standards of review adopted in
these cases, as the choice of a review standard can be
closely related to, and strongly affect, the substantive
concerns of a judicial decision. Standards of review
represent the level of scrutiny that judges will employ in
evaluating the constitutionality of government or private
actions, and range along a spectrum, based on the level of
justification required for the action at issue to be judged
constitutional
.
In broad terms, at one end of this spectrum is the
"strict scrutiny" standard, which requires that governments
show a "compelling state interest" to be at stake in the
actions at issue. This standard was first clearly
enunciated by the Court in NAACP v. Alabama .
12 At the
12 NAACP , 357 U.S. 449 (1958). This standard is most
consistently 'used by the modern Court when a "suspect
classification" (such as race) is implicated ma
particular statute or action; when such a classification is
other end of the spectrum is the "minimal scrutiny"
standard, which requires only that government show a
reasonable and legitimate purpose for its actions and
statutes. Both of these standards often employ a balancing
approach to adjudicate between the constitutional rights
and governmental interests involved.
The standards chosen by particular justices in the
cases examined here frequently reflect each justice's
attitude toward government action in the electoral process.
Two groupings of justices are found: (1) "natural order"
justices, who are generally suspicious of government action
in the electoral process, typically employ a "strict
scrutiny" standard of review, and demand strong
justification for government intrusions on constitutional
rights; and (2) "constructed order" justices, who generally
give government greater leeway in the electoral process,
and usually hold governments to the milder "minimal
scrutiny" standard or give their interests greater weight
under the "strict scrutiny" standard. The standards used by
the justices are very much intertwined with their
substantive positions in this area of the law.
involved, the statute is frequently found to be
"invidiously discriminatory". As the cases here will
demonstrate, however, the presence of such a classification
is not necessary to trigger "strict scrutiny"; other rights
in a "preferred position" under the Constitution, such as
First Amendment guarantees, often draw such scrutiny from
the Justices. The "preferred position" of certain
constitutional rights was first enunciated by Justice
Harlan Fisk Stone in the famous "Footnote Four" in United
States v. Carolene Products Company , 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
10
The issues noted above are chosen for the range of
questions they raise. They encompass the major dilemmas
with which the justices must wrestle and provide a wide yet
focused observational guide to the territory of the Court's
opinions. This analysis should clarify how the justices
understand parties and the electoral process, going beyond
the legal standards of "freedom of association" and
"compelling state interest" to underlying policy positions
and arguments
.
13
The first issue considered, the scope of political
competition and voter choice, involves the nature of
democracy. How far should party competition be encouraged?
How much voter choice should be promoted? What is the
connection, if any, between statutory structures and the
scope of party competition and voter choice? These are
ultimately questions about the scope of democracy.
The second issue, the functions of parties, involves
the structure of electoral democracy. Who should parties
represent in the political process? What viewpoints should
they represent? Should democracy be within, as well as
between, the parties? Should parties play an important rol
in nominating candidates, or in supplying government
personnel? These considerations involve the role of partie
13 An interesting and recent example of how the
Court's opinions can be fruitfully analyzed for deeper
philosophical positions and arguments is Andrew Stark,
"Corporate Electoral Activity, Constitutional Discourse,
and Conceptions of the Individual", American Political
Science Review 86 (September 1992): 626-37.
11
m structuring a democratic electoral process and
democratic governance.
The third issue, the proper role of government in
managing the electoral process, involves questions of
authority and who should govern the structure of politics.
Should the state have wide ranging legal authority to
structure the process? Or should the state intervene only
to prevent blatant discrimination? These questions embody
concerns about the state's role in promoting electoral
order and stability.
The final issue, the choice and application of
judicial standards used to evaluate these cases, sheds
light on the justices' viewpoints about the more
substantive issues. What standards should the state
statutes, or party challenges, have to meet? While this
seems like an internal and legalistic dilemma, the choices
made have a profound impact on the issues at hand, because
whoever is given the heavier burden of proof (or the
benefit of the doubt) by these standards is placed at a
significant disadvantage (or advantage)
.
The broader concern driving this dissertation is that
the interpretations of the justices influence the strength
or weakness of parties as institutions. Efforts to
strengthen political parties have been frequent and
contentious in political science over the last fifty years;
one need only refer to the 1950 APSA report Towards A More
Responsible Two Party System , the controversy that
12
surrounded it, and the continuing desire of more recent
scholars to "renew" political parties. 14 While this
"strong-party" argument is by no means the only view of
parties among political scientists, it is taken as a
yardstick of evaluation because it has set the terms of
debate over parties and electoral politics. With the
frequent laments over the current state of parties and
electoral politics more generally, it is appropriate to
consider how the justices' interpretations support or
hinder the objective of stronger parties. 15
The need for stronger political parties has been
contested in both political science scholarship and
practical politics for decades, yet the views of the
justices on these matters have only begun to be explored in
a systematic way. To understand the justices'
interpretations in this wider institutional context, they
are critiqued using a series of "strong party attributes"
14 American Political Science Association (APSA)
Committee On Political Parties, Towards A More Responsible
Two Party System (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1950). For a
series of contemporary views on party government, see White
and Mileur, eds
.
, Challenges . Some notable third party
efforts in this century, particularly the Progressive
campaigns of 1912, 1924 and 1948, can also be characterized
as efforts to build new parties in response to the
perceived weaknesses of the Republican and Democratic
parties .
15 Two prominent examples of this pessimistic view of
parties and elections are E.J. Dionne, Why Americans Hate
Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), and Benjamin
Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, Politics By Other Means : The
Declining Importance Of Elect inns In America (New York:
Basic Books, 1990) .
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as evaluative criteria. These attributes are derived from
literature on parties, particularly the work of James
Ceaser and Larry Sabato. The four attributes that concern
us, and some of the questions they raise for those
attempting to assess their condition, are as follows-.
I. The Linkage of Citizens and Government
A. How open are parties to citizen
participation?
B. Do citizens have incentives for supporting
parties?
C. Are parties accountable to the public?
D. Is the electoral process seen as
legitimate?
II. The Contesting of Elections
A. What choice of candidates do the parties
provide?
B. Are parties competitive in contesting
elections?
C. Do parties have sufficient resources to
nominate candidates, place them on the
ballot, and aid their campaigns
financially?
III. The Management of Political Conflict
A. Do the parties successfully aggregate
differing political interests?
B. Do the parties enable needed political
change?
IV. The Guidance of Government And Public Policy
A. Do the parties offer policy platforms?
B. Are these positions promoted by the elected
officeholders of the party?
C. Do parties staff and guide the government?
These attributes of linkage, contesting of elections,
conflict management, and governance focus the
dissertation's broader critique, as they cover the broad
themes of democracy, stability and governing capacity that
are at the heart of any effort to evaluate the existing
democratic system or the parties within such a system.
The interpretations of the justices are also critiqued
from the perspective of the "responsible party" model, an
14
important variant of the "strong party" model. Those who
advocate for "responsible parties" believe that parties
should take clear and differentiated policy stances,
nominate candidates who share those stances, and work to
enact those policies when their nominees are elected to
office. In sum, they believe that the primary function of
parties should be programmatic and governance
-oriented, not
simply electoral. As the dissertation reveals, some
justices appear to share this concern with the policy
function of parties.
With regard to the method of analysis, the author
believes textual analysis is the most appropriate method to
use, since the dissertation deals with an institutional
body where words and ideas are central to its work and are
its lingua franca
. As Rogers M. Smith has noted,
while legal discourse is produced by distinctively
socialized elites, it expresses significant strains in
American political thought as a whole, if for no other
reason than that judicial decision-making both
reflects and structures broader political and economic
activit ies . . . the behavior of political actors, and of
the institutions they construct and participate in, is
influenced in part by the nature and adequacy of the
ideas they possess, and the basic ideas of a given
period and group often have a discernible structure,
which may be articulated in revealing fashion by the
political writers of the day. 16
The central contention of the dissertation is that the
Court has experienced an ongoing internal debate about the
nature and structure of electoral democracy, a debate that
is driven by different understandings of the purposes of
16 Smith, Liberalism , p. 6.
15
parties and the electoral process. The question of what
institution (parties or government) should have the
authority to define the nature and structure of electoral
democracy is also contested by the justices of the Court.
One school of thought, which is here called the "natural
order", emphasizes the importance of party competition and
citizen participation, and values the programmatic function
of parties, all of which are seen as natural phenomena that
are only impeded by government statutes. In this view, a
widely diverse, competitive multiparty system is seen as
natural, an innate quality of politics that is disturbed by
the artifice of statute. 17 The opposing school of thought,
called here the "constructed order", emphasizes the
effectiveness of the major parties and values their
electoral function, which government is seen as preserving
by its statutory framework. In this view, the current party
system is seen as the evolutionary product of the
democratic political process addressing legitimate
political needs, an historical construction of legislative
politics that should be respected and protected.
The dissertation finds that these two "schools of
thought" have been consistently championed by particular
justices, and that these justices have thereby played a
17 This view is similar to James Madison' s argument
that competition between numerous interests is a natural
part of politics, particularly in a large republic. James
Madison, Essay Number 10, in Alexander Hamilton, James
Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (Chicago:
Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), pp. 49-53.
major role in shaping the evolution of the Court's view in
this area. It also finds that the justices are divided not
only in their understanding of parties and electoral
politics, but also with regard to the nature of democratic
politics in a federal system. The justices' positions in
the cases reflect differing visions of the nature of
American federalism, the "natural order" giving more
deference to national interests and the "constructed order"
favoring the interests of the states. These divisions are
sometimes moderated, but are consistently present in the
long run. The continuation of these coherent, but
frequently divergent, perspectives on the Court bespeaks
continued uncertainty in the constitutional jurisprudence
of parties, elections and democracy. This is not, however,
uncertainty born of directionless confusion, but of clear
division among the justices. 18
Significance: Why Examine the Justices' Views?
The study of judicial interpretations regarding
political parties and the electoral process offers
theoretical and practical insights of interest to students
of parties, public law, and American politics generally.
18 The distinction is an important one. Two clear
perspectives implies a shifting "balance of power" between
them; potential litigants, politicians, and the public can,
by analyzing the justices' views, perceive with some
certainty which holds the balance at a particular time. A
Court without direction, on the other hand, will leave
those who will be affected by its rulings wandering m the
wilderness, unsure of what to expect next.
17
The main contribution of this dissertation lies in its
exploration of how justices of the Supreme Court understand
the purposes of parties and the structure of electoral
politics, knowledge which will provide deeper insight into
how the Court is likely to react to parties in the future
(and view changes in the structure and fortunes of
parties)
.
As Lee Epstein and Charles Hadley note, "it
is... an intriguing and important enterprise for us to come
to understand the way our least political branch of
government has treated our most political entities". 19
Improving our understanding of the justices'
interpretations is made more significant by the growing
role and authority of the Court in this area of the law.
Even though the Court has returned authority to the
parties, and thus reduced state authority, it is the Court
itself which has taken on the most new authority and
involvement . The Court has now become a third active and
important shaper of parties and the electoral process in
our system, and scholarship needs to examine how the
justices view these institutions. In addition,
understanding the deeper arguments about the purpose of
parties and their role in American governance yields a more
useful and powerful understanding of the legal status of
19 Lee Epstein and Charles Hadley, "On the Treatment
of Political Parties in the U.S. Supreme Court", Journal
Politics 52 (May 1990): 414.
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American parties than would a simple descriptive analysis
of the Court's decisions.
This dissertation also adds another level to our
understanding of the modern "administrative state" that
helped to produce much of modern party regulation. Sidney
Milkis argues that President Franklin Roosevelt undercut
the role of parties as part of his drive to transcend
politics and expand "national administrative
capacities". 20 This type of national managerialism carries
a propensity to work against the authority of state
governments and to encourage the kind of conflicts
witnessed in many of the parties cases. The justices' views
in these cases helps us to comprehend one facet of their
understanding of the "administrative state"
.
Finally, there are important practical insights to be
drawn from this dissertation. A deeper analysis of how one
major institution of American governance (parties and the
electoral system) has been understood and influenced by
another (the Supreme Court) is valuable in and of itself,
but it also yields many collateral insights that are
relevant to the practical debates over the health of
political parties in the 1990' s. Although party
20 Sidney M. Milkis, "Programmatic Liberalism and
Party Politics: The New Deal Legacy and the Doctrine of
Responsible Party Government", in White and Mileur, eds ,
Challenges , pp. 104-132. This theme is treated more fully
in Milkis, The President And The Parties: The
Transformation Of Tdp American Party Svsf-pm Since The New
Deal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993)
.
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institutions have adapted to the modern realities of
"candidate-centered" politics by becoming highly effective
resource and service providers, their power is strongly
circumscribed by the direct primary and other Progressive
Era reforms that remain in place, and public attitudes
toward the major parties continue to be skeptical or
dismissive. 21 The dissatisfaction with the Republicans and
Democrats is most notably reflected in the number of
significant third party presidential candidates in recent
decades. 22 This mix of successful adaptation, continued
limitation, public dissatisfaction and third party
challenges has provoked many of the disputes heard by the
justices, and their decisions have in turn shaped the
evolution of these phenomena. 23 A better understanding of
the justices' views will help us to chart their current and
future impact on the evolution of parties and the American
electoral system.
21 On the successful adaptations of modern parties,
see John F. Bibby, "State Party Organizations: Coping and
Adapting", and Paul S. Herrnson, "The Revitalization of
National Party Organizations", in Maisel, The Parties
Respond
, pp. 21-44 and 45-68. On the continuing legal
limits facing parties and public dissatisfaction with
parties, see Silbey, "Rise and Fall", 3-18.
22 George Wallace in 1968, John Anderson in 1980, and
Ross Perot in 1992.
23 The justices' decisions have been particularly
important, for example, in easing the ballot access proce;
for third party presidential candidates; see the
description of the Williams and Anderson decisions in the
literature review.
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Literature Review
Since the late 1960's, the justices of the Court have
handed down opinions in a wide range of disputes involving
parties and the electoral process. They have ruled on the
constitutionality of various filing fees, signature
requirements, ballot access deadlines, primary voting
statutes, delegate selection procedures, campaign finance
regulations, and patronage practices. While most of these
decisions will be examined in depth in the following
chapters, a brief sketch of some of the leading opinions
will help to place the literature review which follows in
context, by providing a glimpse of the general direction of
the majority decisions and the standards of review they
employ
.
24
One of the earliest decisions by the justices in this
area was Williams v. Rhodes , decided in 1968. George
Wallace's independent campaign for the presidency brought
suit against Ohio's ballot access laws, claiming that the
early filing requirements and the organizational
requirements imposed on minor parties violated the freedom
of association of his supporters. The majority of justices,
employing a "strict scrutiny" standard of review, found
that the Ohio regulations did infringe on the freedom of
association of Wallace and his supporters (without a
sufficiently compelling state interest) and invalidated the
24 Synopses of other cases are provided in the
literature review, as needed.
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law. They made particular note of how the major parties
were advantaged by such statutes. 25 At least at the
presidential level, the justices began to open up access to
the electoral arena for minor parties.
In 1975, the justices took on the question of whether
Illinois could compel the national Democratic Party to seat
delegates at its 1972 convention who were chosen by
procedures established in Illinois law instead of those of
the Democratic Party. In their Cousins v. Wigoda opinion,
the majority ruled that the national Democratic Party has
the right to decide how delegates to its convention are
chosen, and refused to seat the delegates chosen by
Illinois-specified procedures. Employing a "strict
scrutiny" standard of review, the justices began to provide
greater freedom for parties to structure their nomination
processes
.
26
This party freedom was strengthened in 1981 by the
majority opinion in Democratic Party of the United States
v. Wisconsin ex rel La Follette , usually referred to as the
La Follette decision. The national Democratic Party brought
suit against Wisconsin's "open primary law" in an effort to
enforce Party Rule 2A, which mandated that all bound
delegates to the Democratic National Convention be chosen
in primaries open only to Democratic voters. The majority
25 Williams , 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
26 Cousins v. Wigoda , 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
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ruled in favor of the Party, on the grounds that the state
cannot restrict the national Party's freedom of association
in the absence of a compelling state interest. 27 La
Follette employs a "balancing of interests" standard of
review that is somewhat more moderate than "strict
scrutiny"
.
The justices revisited the issue of ballot access, in
particular for third party presidential candidates, in
their 1983 opinion in Anderson v. Celebrezze . The 1980
independent presidential campaign of John Anderson brought
suit against Ohio's early filing deadline, on the grounds
that it limited the freedom of voters to associate with
Anderson. Employing a combination of "strict scrutiny" and
a three part "balancing test" as a standard of review, the
majority opinion invalidated the Ohio law. 28 Once again,
the justices' ruling invalidated barriers to minor party
access to the ballot.
The freedom of parties to structure their own
nominating procedures was reaffirmed in the 1986 majority
opinion in Tashi ian v. Republican Party of Connecticut . The
Connecticut Republican Party's 1984 effort to open some of
its primary contests to unaffiliated voters was opposed by
the State of Connecticut, which had a law mandating that
all primaries be open only to registered party members. The
" Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin
ex rel La Follette , 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
28 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
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majority of justices ruled in favor of the Republican
effort, thereby overruling the state law, using a "strict
scrutiny" standard of review. 29 While this was a closely
divided decision (5-4) , it reenforced the justices'
direction in Cousins and La Follette
.
As the above highlights suggest, the general direction
of the majority of justices has been toward expanding the
ability of parties to structure their own affairs,
especially nominating procedures, as well as toward
expanding the ability of minor party presidential
candidates to have access to the ballot. While the
dissertation and some of the literature reviewed below note
that the justices' overall jurisprudence is more mixed in
terms of its impact on parties, the general direction of
the majority in recent decades has expanded the rights of
major and minor parties. In so doing, the majority of their
opinions have employed a combination of "strict scrutiny"
and "balancing of interests" standards of review to protect
party freedom of association.
Most of the scholarly literature on the legal status
of parties and the Supreme Court has appeared in law
reviews, and is complemented by a small but active
political science literature on the topic. This literature
is characterized by three major approaches which, though
not mutually exclusive, have fairly distinctive concerns.
29 Tashiian v. Reoub.i -i r^n Party of Connecticut, 479
U.S . 208 (1986)
.
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The most common approach is analysis of the legal standards
and doctrines employed by the justices. A second focuses
upon the legal and political impacts of the justices'
decisions. The third and least common approach attempts to
place the justices' decisions in larger historical or
theoretical perspectives. The findings of each of these
approaches are examined in turn in this section; the
historical/theoretical is most relevant to the approach of
this dissertation.
Legal Analysis
The major focus of scholars using the legal analysis
approach to the justices' decisions is the doctrine of
freedom of association as applied to parties. Their views
on the use of this doctrine by the justices can be divided
into three types of "responses" to the justices'
jurisprudence: (1) approval with friendly proposals for
modification, (2) qualified approval with some misgivings,
and (3) strong disapproval. While many prod the justices on
particular points, most of these scholars approve of the
Court's general direction; strong dissent is in the
scholarly minority.
Stephen Gottlieb offers one of the most positive views
of freedom of association. Gottlieb examines the legal
status of parties, including the Tashiian case and a
California dispute that later reached the Court, and argues
for a continued expansion of the party freedom of
association defended by the justices. 30 He does, however,
call for the justices to shift their standard of review
from "balancing of interests" to identifying the most
appropriate decisionmaker, which Gottlieb sees as the
critical issue in these disputes. Citing political science
literature on the probable corruptions of the legislative
branch, he argues that the justices provide a service by
defending the party's right to decide how they should
organize themselves and nominate their candidates for
office. 31 The question of who should exercise authority
over party affairs is Gottlieb's central concern.
Charles Gardner Geyh, in an extensive examination of
the La Follette case and its implications, also takes a
positive view of the justices' decisions through La
Follette
.
Geyh argues that La Follette cannot be understood
solely in terms of the "balancing of interests" standard of
review stated by the justices. Instead, the rhetoric of the
opinion reflects as much concern with which "actor" (the
30 The California dispute involved a challenge by
major party adherents in California to state statutes
specifying a detailed organizational structure for parties
and their procedures, as well as a state ban on preprimary
endorsements. The Supreme Court struck down all of these
statutes in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Committee , 489 U.S. 214 (1989), further reinforcing party
freedom of association.
31 Stephen Gottlieb, "The Courts And Party Reform"
(paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA, September
1985) . The justices have yet to explicitly adopt the "most
appropriate decisionmaker" standard noted here, though
analysis of their opinions certainly reveals they are aware
of the question.
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state of Wisconsin or the national Democratic Party) is the
best decision maker in the nomination process, and with
national versus state interests, as it does concern for a
traditional balance of interests. He argues that the
Court's stated standard of review is not fully reflective
of its actions, and should change. 32 Both Geyh and
Gottlieb appear to recognize the justices' deeper arguments
over the level of authority that parties should have over
their own functions.
Andrew Pierce also takes issue, in a supportive way,
with the stated legal standards employed by the justices.
In an examination of the justices' treatment of issues
related to presidential nominations, Pierce argues that the
Court should explicitly disavow the "political question"
doctrine of noninterference, so as to approach party rights
solely from a freedom of association perspective. He also
contends, based on the opinions of the justices, that the
use of the "state action" doctrine in relation to
presidential nominations is no longer viable. 33 Pierce
32 Charles Gardner Geyh, "It's My Party And I'll Cry
If I Want To: State Intrusions Upon The Associational
Freedoms Of Political Parties - Democratic Party of the
United States v. Wisconsin ex rel La Follette " , Wisconsin
Law Review 1983: 1 (1983), pp. 211-40.
33 The "political question" doctrine had been used in
earlier Court opinions as the main justification for
letting the political process, not the Justices, decide a
dispute. Decisions like Cousins departed from this doctrii
by grounding noninterference in freedom of association;
Pierce is simply urging that departure be made _ explicit
.
contrast, the "state action" doctrine had justified
judicial intervention in party affairs in the past, most
27
sees the jurisprudence in this area as a bit unclear, and
he encourages the justices to adopt freedom of associatior
as the uniform standard of decision in the future. 34
Though he ultimately shares Geyh and Gottleib's concern
with authority, he sees a clear use of freedom of
association as the most appropriate standard for deciding
questions of party and electoral affairs.
Arthur M. Weisburd reaches conclusions similar to
Pierce's. In an examination of Court decisions involving
nominating methods, Weisburd traces the history of the
"state action" doctrine in relation to these disputes and
finds that the Court's use of freedom of association has
essentially negated the doctrine in relation to parties.
Given that demise, freedom of association should provide
parties with wide-ranging freedom in nominating methods,
bringing any existing state restrictions into doubtful
constitutionality. 35 Weisburd, Pierce, Geyh, and Gottlieb
are unified in their general support for the Court's
notably in the "white primary cases" that culminated in
Smith v. Allwright , 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Pierce suggests
that, in light of the new freedom of association
precedents, this should also be clearly disavowed. Given
the importance of Smith to issues of racial bias in the
electoral process, however, the doctrine is likely to be
limited rather than fully disavowed.
34 Andrew Pierce, "Regulating Our Mischievous
Factions: Presidential Nominations And The Law", Kentucky
Law Journal 78, no. 2 (1989-90), pp. 311-75.
35 Arthur M . Weisburd, " Candidate Making And The
Constitution: Constitutional Restraints On And Protection
Of Party Nominating Methods", Southern California Law
Review 57 (January 1984), pp. 213-81.
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approach to party autonomy and authority over party affairs
in the Cousins /LaFollette /Tashi ian line of cases.
Julia Guttmann is typical of the second scholarly
response. While she adopts a positive view of freedom of
association, she is also troubled by the Court's
application of the doctrine. Focusing on decisions
involving primary elections, Guttmann argues that the
courts have yet to articulate a unified doctrine on state
regulation of primaries, and proposes the adoption of a
doctrine of "collective freedom of association" to fill
that gap. She argues further that the Court's current
approach to deciding cases in this area, most specifically
the LaFollette case, virtually guarantees that freedom of
association claims will always be successful against
competing claims of compelling state interests, and that
the justices have taken freedom of association too far in
this approach. Like the scholars in the first group,
Guttmann contends that the Court should clarify its
standards; unlike them, she also contends that the
"balance" of freedom of association has shifted too far in
favor of parties. 36 For Guttmann, states still have a role
to play in exercising authority over party affairs.
Brian L. Porto similarly takes issue with the Court's
application of freedom of association, specifically the
36 Julia Guttmann, " Primary Elections And The
Collective Right Of Freedom Of Association", Yale Law
Journal 94 (November 1984), pp. 117-37.
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standards applied in ballot access decisions. Focusing on
the ballot access cases decided since Anderson v.
Celebrezze, Porto argues that the Court has been
overprotective of the two party system by applying a more
lenient "balancing of interests" standard to these
disputes, to the detriment of third parties and independent
candidates. 37 He argues that the Court should return to
the clearer "strict scrutiny" standard it enunciated in
Williams v. Rhodes , a standard that would better protect
interests outside the two major parties. Porto's analysis,
like Guttmann's, takes issue with the application of
freedom of association to parties, but Porto argues for
more (rather than less) protection of parties, particularly
minor parties. 38 Unlike the scholars above, Porto's
central concern is with the ability of minor parties to
compete in the political process, rather than with
authority over party affairs.
In addition to nomination and ballot access cases, the
justices' patronage decisions have also sparked scholarly
37 As Chapter Two will discuss in detail, many of the
post-Anderson decisions which Porto examines uphold state
regulations and limit ballot access for minor parties and
candidates. Munro v. Socialist Worker's Party , 479 U.S. 189
(1986) upholds a Washington State requirement of a 1%
primary vote total for access to the general election
ballot, while Burdick v. Takushi , 112 S. Ct . 2059 (1992)
upholds a Hawaii ban on write-in votes.
38 Brian L. Porto, "The Constitution And The Ballot
Box: Supreme Court Jurisprudence And Ballot Access For
Independent Candidates" (paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association,
Providence, Rhode Island, November 12-14, 1992)
.
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commentary. The three majority opinions on patronage in
recent decades have all been decidedly hostile to the
practice. The justices have blocked patronage-based
dismissals in the Cook County, Illinois Sheriff's
Department; blocked similar dismissals of Assistant Public
Defenders in Rockland County, New York; and prohibited the
use of partisan considerations in hiring, promotion,
transfer, and dismissal decisions by the state of
Illinois. 39 Much of the literature on these decisions is
uncomfortable with the way in which the justices have
dismissed government arguments in their application of
freedom of association and speech to patronage issues.
A brief commentary by Louis Cammarosano, for example,
notes the confusion in lower court patronage decisions that
followed the Elrod and Brant i decisions, and argues that
the Court needs to adopt a more balanced approach in
dealing with patronage issues. Seeing the justices'
decisions as too ant i -patronage, he calls for a
"structured, logical framework" that emphasizes a balancing
test between First Amendment deprivations and the practical
benefits of patronage. Like Porto and Guttmann, Cammorosano
asks the Court to adjust its applications, but his concern
39 The cases noted are Elrod v. Burns , 427 U.S. 347
(1976); Brant i v. Finkel , 445 U.S. 507 (1980); and Rutan v.
Republican Party of Illinois , 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
31
is with the proper role of party affiliation in staffing
the government
.
40
In contrast to these relatively friendly critiques, a
third group of scholars explicitly disapproves of the
Court's use of freedom of association on the grounds that
the Court's posture regarding party and electoral issues
should be one of strict noninterference, not only with the
parties but also with the states. This is particularly
evident with regard to patronage issues. One scholar,
Martin H. Brinkley, examines the patronage decisions of the
Court and lower courts and finds them to be "a morass of
confusion and doubt". Brinkley asserts that the Court's
recent "appropriate requirement" standard for evaluating
patronage cases has only created huge uncertainty, and
faults the Rutan Court in particular for consistently
downplaying the importance of governmental interests. He
argues for more attention to the "positive" aspects of
patronage, and gives a strong defense of state interests in
the political process. 41 Like Cammorosano, he is concerned
40 Louis Cammarosano, "Application Of First Amendment
To Political Patronage Employment Decisions", Fordham Law
Review 58 (October 1989), pp. 101-16.
41 Martin H. Brinkley, "Note: Despoiling The Spoils-.
Rutan v. Reeublican Party Of Illinois ", North Carolina Law
Review 69 (March 1991), pp. 719-40. The "appropriate
_
requirement" standard asserts that partisan affiliation can
be a consideration in personnel decisions only if such
affiliation is an "appropriate requirement" for the
position or duties in question.
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with the appropriateness of partisan affiliation in
government staffing.
Daniel Lowenstein is the most skeptical of the legal
analysts who take issue with the Court's jurisprudence.
Lowenstein takes a much more critical view of the Court's
recent party jurisprudence than most other scholars,
contending that the Court went too far in its Tashiian
decision. Lowenstein argues at length that parties should
go to the public and the political process, not the courts,
to resolve their disputes. He views conflicts like those in
Connecticut ( Tashi ian ) and California (Eu) not as party
versus state disputes, but as intraparty disputes. The
justices of the Court, in Lowenstein' s view, handled
earlier cases properly, but went astray with Tashi ian .
While his skeptical view is not shared
by most scholars, it represents an important counterpoint
to their views. 42 Lowenstein argues that questions of
authority should be resolved by the political process, not
the courts, and should not automatically favor the party as
the best decisionmaker.
As the preceding review reflects, most "legal
analysts" accept the basic notion of freedom of
association, but suggest various modifications of standards
and\or application. They are united, however, in their
42 Daniel Lowenstein, "Constitutional Rights Of Major
Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry" (paper presented at
the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Washington, D.C., 1988).
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primary focus: the legal doctrines and standards involved.
Many discuss the political ramifications of their
arguments, particularly the question of authority over
party affairs, but their analytic eye is on the law. A
number of other scholars, on the other hand, pay greater
attention to the impact of the Justices' decisions on
parties and the political process, the large majority
approaching the analysis from a "proparty" perspective
close to the "natural order" school of thought.
Impact Analysis
Most students of parties who examine the justices'
decisions on party and electoral issues for their practical
impact on parties share a preference for building stronger
political parties. As a result, they have generally
applauded the decisions of the Court as an important step
towards "party renewal". In their view, the increased
authority and autonomy that have been granted to parties
through the freedom of association doctrine will enable
parties to grow stronger as institutions. While some of
these analysts are very sanguine about the possibilities
opened by the justices' decisions, others take a more
cautious view of their impact and note the limitations
imposed by the balance of power on the Court, practical
politics, and public opinion.
Kay Lawson, an advocate for "party renewal", sees the
Court's freedom of association decisions as having very
34
positive implications for parties. In an analysis of the
effects of state laws on parties, Lawson argues that
"litigation is slow and costly, but it is one of the most
promising routes for freeing parties of excessive state
regulation". She applauds the Court's decisions, especially
its rejection of the "public interest" arguments offered by
state governments. She contends that the Court's decisions
provide parties with greater potential freedom to help
themselves . 43
In The Party's Just Begun , Larry Sabato argues that
parties can best make the decisions affecting them, and
should be left to do so, as the Court (if not all the
states) appears to be arguing. Sabato' s key contention is
identical to Lawson' s: the Court decisions are an important
tool for enabling party renewal. 44 In a similar vein,
David E. Price argues that party regulation is only one of
the reasons for party decline, but is a particularly
important one because it can be reversed . He contends that
the constitutional, as well as practical, case for
dismantling many of these laws is strong. Price seems to
share the optimism of Lawson and Sabato that parties will
be more free to plot their own course because of the
43 Kay Lawson, "How State Laws Undermine Parties", in
A. James Reichley, ed., Elections American Style
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 240-
60 .
44 Sabato, The Party's Just Begun.
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Court's decisions. 45 The ability of parties to have the
authority to shape their own functions is a central concern
of these analysts, as it is for Gottlieb and other legal
analysts
.
Leon Epstein, like Price, Sabato, and Lawson, focuses
on the broad impact of the Court's party freedom of
association jurisprudence; however, he is less sanguine
than they about the expansion of that freedom and its
impact on "party renewal". In an analysis of the Court's
Tashj ian opinion and a survey of state party officials
regarding its impact, Epstein argues that the Court is
reluctant to expand the reach of freedom of association
past certain parameters, and that state parties have made
few changes or challenges to state law as a result of
Tashi ian
. Though he favors strong parties, Epstein is
skeptical of how much the Court's decisions will accomplish
to that end. 46
A number of scholars have focused specifically on the
ramifications and impact of the Court's patronage
decisions. Cynthia Grant Bowman, for example, examines
patronage in Chicago and cites both that city's experience
and other literature to dispute the claims of some scholars
45 David E. Price, Bringing Back The Parties
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1984); see in particular chap.
5, "Parties And The Law", pp. 121-44.
46 Leon Epstein, "Will American Political Parties Be
Privatized?", Journal Of Law And Politics 2 (Winter 1989),
pp. 239-74.
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that patronage has been a strong and positive force in
politics. The heart of Bowman's argument is a critique of
the concerns and arguments expressed in Justice Antonin
Scalia's dissent in Rutan. She finds Scalia's contentions
unfounded, arguing that many cities have learned to live
with the Court's recent standards without undue hardship or
confusion. While she favors the majority view of the Court,
Bowman is not arguing from the "proparty" position of many
scholars; she is more concerned with questions of
government administration. 47
Historical\Theoretical Analysis
In contrast to focusing on legal standards and
doctrine, or on the practical impact of the decisions, a
number of scholars have attempted to place the decisions of
47 Cynthia Grant Bowman, "We Don't Want Anybody
Anybody Sent: The Death Of Patronage Hiring In Chicago",
Northwestern University Law Review 86 (Fall 1991)
, pp. 57-
95. A similar article by Susan Lorde Martin examines the
ramifications of the Court's patronage decisions, but her
focus is on the implications for public officials who must
deal with patronage issues. After a brief history of
patronage and an examination of the Elrod and Brant
i
decisions, the heart of Martin's study is an analysis of
U.S. Circuit Court decisions during the 1980' s, proceeding
on a circuit by circuit basis and concluding that there is
division as to how the Court's decisions have been
interpreted. In light of this confusion in the lower
courts, she urges officials to study and document
situations carefully before firing anyone for political
reasons. Martin's analysis views the Court's patronage work
not from a party perspective, but from the viewpoint of
working administrators. Susan Lorde Martin, "A Decade Of
Branti Decisions: A Government Official's Guide To
Patronage Dismissals", American Univers ity Law Review 39
(Fall 1989)
, pp. 11-58
.
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the justices in broader historical and explanatory
frameworks. Jerome Mileur, for example, examines the
freedom of association cases in light of the broader
historical evolution of the legal status of parties and
reaches conclusions about its future that are similar to
Leon Epstein's. Mileur' s analysis focuses on cases
involving party rules, ballot access, and party
registration, and finds that the Court has substantially
enlarged the range of self-determination for parties.
However, he concludes that the decisions are mainly an open
door, not a solution, to the more complex issues of
building strong parties; many political and intellectual
challenges remain to party building. 48
Another historical view of the Court's decisions on
parties and the law, using a different methodology than
Mileur, is provided by Lee Epstein and Charles Hadley.
Epstein and Hadley focus on the Court's treatment of minor
parties, and the Court's role more generally in supporting
the party system. Using Court jurisprudence surrounding
majority and minority rights, and related literature, they
hypothesize that minor parties should participate more
often and be more successful in litigation than major
parties. They test this hypothesis by statistically
analyzing ninety-seven Court cases decided between 1900 and
48 Jerome Mileur, "Legislating Responsibility:
American Political Parties and the Law", in White and
Mileur, eds., Challenges , pp. 167-89.
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1986 in which parties were direct litigants, using cases
drawn from the LEXIS legal research network. They find
minor parties to be more active, as they expected, but less
successful in terms of "winning" cases than they expected;
they attempt to explain this by looking to broad cycles of
American politics and types of case issues, as well as eras
of Court jurisprudence. After controlling for these, they
do find some positive treatment by the Court for minor
parties as against major parties. Beyond this finding,
their broader conclusion emphasizes the complexity of
factors involved in the Court-party relationship over
time . 49
Leon Epstein, in addition to his analysis of Tashi ian
,
also devotes a chapter of his text, Political Parties in
the American Mold , to the evolving legal status of parties,
and places that evolution in a larger historical\cultural
explanatory framework. Epstein's main argument is that
parties, essentially private at their birth, became de
facto "public utilities" during the Progressive era; he
traces this change to the presence of parties on state
produced ballots and the general regulatory spirit of
Progressivism that was afoot in the land at that time.
Epstein then examines the content and impact of the Court
decisions on parties and their "public utility" status, and
concludes that parties are not likely to become fully
49 Lee Epstein and Hadley, "Treatment of Political
Parties" .
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deregulated in the foreseeable future, since "such a
challenge would be deeply at odds with deeply
institutionalized American political patterns"
. Epstein
thus puts forth an historical\cultural framework for
understanding the legal status of parties. 50 Such a
framework does much to place the parameters of the debates
this analysis finds among the justices of the Court.
In contrast to the works discussed above, two scholars
explicitly focus their analyses on the major concern of the
present study: the justices' understandings of parties and
the broader structures of electoral politics. Clifton
McCleskey examines the Court's decisions in ballot access,
patronage, and "freedom of association" from the late
1960 's to the early 1980' s, with the goal of understanding
the Court's views on democracy and the substantive policy
effects of their decisions. McCleskey argues that, "from
the viewpoint of substantive policy, judicial review has
obscured more than it has clarified" . He finds the Court to
be very confused about democratic politics and argues that
political scientists bear some responsibility for this.
McCleskey' s view of the Court and parties is much more
negative and pessimistic than most scholars in the field,
but the issues he raises are important. They help to
organize this dissertation, which, by examining a more
explicit set of issues involving parties and the electoral
50 Leon Epstein, "Parties As Public Utilities".
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process than McCleskey's does, hopes to shed greater light
on whether his conclusions are justified. 51
John Moeller is another scholar who has examined the
Court's understanding of parties and democracy in its
treatment of parties. Moeller analyzes the Court's
decisions on conventions and primaries, ballot access, and
patronage, and argues that they can only be understood "in
the context of a broader discussion about democracy and
politics in which the courts have engaged" . Unlike
McCleskey, Moeller does not find confusion on the Court in
this area. Indeed, he argues that the Court's decisions are
a product of three focused and contending "visions" of
democratic politics: (1) "fair politics", which emphasizes
access and majority rule and is disenchanted with parties;
(2) "1st Amendment politics", which focuses largely on
individual rights and freedom of association in making
decisions in this area; and (3) "Madisonian politics",
which sees American politics as open and involving a
complex balance that necessitates accommodation for the
rights of parties and others as well and leads to case-by-
case decision-making. He finds Court decisions to entail a
contentious mix of all three visions. Moeller' s work tries
to understand the Court's broader views of parties and
democracy in a systematic manner, and the author assesses
51 Clifton McCleskey, "Parties at the Bar: Equal
Protection, Freedom of Association, and the Rights of
Political Organizations", Journal Of Politic s 46 (May
1984)
,
pp. 346-68.
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his conclusions about the Court's views of parties and
democracy in the concluding chapter. 52
Finally, while the literature to date on the Supreme
Court's parties decisions is extensive, most of it
approaches the topic with a primary focus on either the
legal standards and doctrine involved or on the practical
political ramifications of the decisions. A smaller number
of scholars, such as Mileur, Leon Epstein, Moeller,
McCleskey, and Lee Epstein\Hadley
,
attempt to place the
Court's decisions in a larger historical or explanatory
framework. This dissertation builds on the foundations of
all of these approaches in order to establish a clearer
picture of the Court's views on political parties and their
place in the American constitutional system.
In particular, this dissertation addresses one key
feature of the literature. Many of the scholars in this
area have expressed the belief that the Court's standards,
and\or its underlying ideas of parties and democracy, are
uncertain. The questions examined in the dissertation
address the substance of that position, and the
dissertation finds that what is present is not so much
directionless confusion, but rather a fairly clear division
among the justices themselves. This division may be roughly
perceived even in the varying positions in the scholarly
52 John Moeller, " The Federal Court's Involvement in
the Reform of Political Parties", Western Political
Quarterly XL (December 1987), pp. 717-34.
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literature examined here. My analysis argues that this
division holds both good and bad consequences for parties
"at the bar" and in the polity.
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CHAPTER 2
THE COURT AND BALLOT ACCESS: DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITY AND
PARTY COMPETITION
Virtually all students of representative democracy-
acknowledge the central importance of the right to vote,
but less attention is given to a critical corollary of that
right: the candidates one can vote for on the ballot. The
ballot choices open to voters in the United States are
regulated not only by party nomination processes, but also
by state statutes designed to restrict ballot access to
"legitimate" candidates. The scope of party competition and
voter choice, and thus the nature of American democracy, is
not free and unlimited; the flexible but well-defined
parameters of ballot access have been set by the states for
a century.
Controls on candidate access to the ballot first arose
as part of the broad effort to reform the electoral process
that took place during the Progressive era. Many of these
laws were designed to restrict and stifle the growing
political power of third parties during this period, in
particular the Socialist Party of Eugene Debs, by making it
more difficult for them to place candidates before the
voters. As a result, the major parties gained a significant
advantage . 1
1 It is important to note that many "reforms" of this
period were used to restrict, rather than enlarge, the
scope of participation and parties. The
Populist\Progressive era, which saw third parties blocked
from the ballot, also witnessed the effective
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The impact of ballot access statutes can be even more
profound for political parties than for voters. Without
access to the ballot, parties cannot perform their primary
function of contesting elections in order to win control of
the government. Voters may have alternate choices, however
biased and limited, but a party whose candidates cannot
gain access to the ballot has nowhere to turn; it is likely
to face political irrelevance, if not extinction.
Given their consequences for party competition and
voter choice, state standards for ballot access establish
significant parameters for the character of the party
system and the electoral process. Consequently, the content
of these standards raises theoretical and practical
questions about the scope of party competition and
democracy, as well as the proper scope of state authority
in the electoral process. Implicitly, they also shape the
nature and functions of political parties as institutions.
disenfranchisement of African-American males in the South.
This was accomplished through a variety of state voting
requirements which included poll taxes, grandfather
clauses, and literacy tests. The most blatant collusion of
the political parties in this disenfranchisement was the
use of "white primaries", which restricted the right to
vote in what was the critical election in many southern
states . Both the right to vote and the right to run were
not always enlarged during this period when rhetoric
emphasized returning control of politics to "the People".
The use of "white primaries" was definitively outlawed
by Smith v. Allwright . While the concerns of voting rights
and minority participation are clearly related to the
concerns under consideration in this dissertation, most of
the decisions I examine do not extensively focus on these
concerns; most of the Court discussion of these issues has
occurred in voting rights and redistricting cases.
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This chapter examines how the justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court have handled these questions, through an analysis of
their ballot access opinions.
The Supreme Court's ballot access opinions have often
been contentious. At first glance, they divide into two
broad groupings. One group favors challenges to ballot
access statutes. In these cases, the justices have struck
down Ohio's filing deadline and party requirements for
minor party presidential candidates 2 ; Texas and California
filing fees for ballot placement 3 ; differential signature
requirements for local and statewide offices in Illinois 4 ;
another Ohio filing deadline for independent presidential
candidates 5 ; and an Illinois party label regulation and
signature requirements. 6
The second group of opinions is the mirror image of
the first. State laws are upheld, and there is skepticism
about those individuals and groups challenging state
regulations. In these cases, the justices upheld a five
percent signature requirement for minor parties in
2 Williams , 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
3 Bullock v. Carter , 405 U.S. 134 (1972), and Lubin v.
Panish , 415 U.S. 709 (1974)
.
4 Illinois State Board Of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party , 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
5 Anderson , 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
6 Norman v. Reed , 112 S. Ct . 698 (1992).
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Georgia
; a California disaffiliation requirement 8 ; Texas
signature and organizational requirements 9 ; a one percent
primary vote requirement for the Washington general
election ballot 10 ; and a Hawaii ban on write-in votes. 11
It is also of note that, even though the plaintiffs in
the Court's ballot access cases have been "outsiders" from
the major parties, i.e. third parties, independent
candidates, and\or individual voters, the issues addressed
by the opinions have implications for major and minor
parties alike. 12
The divided jurisprudence in this area reflects deeper
disagreements among justices regarding the competitiveness
of two party systems, the importance of primaries, the
purposes of parties, and the relationship of state laws to
the electoral process and party system. These
disagreements, moreover, reflect two fairly coherent
7 Jenness v. Fortson , 403 U.S. 431 (1971)
.
8 Storer v. Brown , 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
9 American Party of Texas v. White , 415 U.S. 767
(1974) .
10 Munro, 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
11 Burdick , 112 S . Ct . 2059 (1992).
12 Unlike other areas of electoral regulation, the
Democratic and Republican parties have had no desire to
challenge the status quo. The reason for their acceptance
of ballot access statutes can be seen in the history of
such statutes, particularly their treatment of the two
major parties. Ironically, the ballot access case of
Williams has served as the foundation for many of the
proparty "freedom of association" decisions that have
benefitted the major parties as much as the minor parties.
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perspectives on the political status quo. One is the
"natural order of politics" perspective: the existing two
party system is only competitive if not "monopolized", and
natural political configurations are distorted by biased
state laws which preserve an electoral monopoly for the two
major parties and thereby stifle truly free
competition. 13 The other is the "constructed order of
politics" perspective: the existing two party system is
competitive unless blatant discrimination can be proven,
and existing political configurations are a product of
democratic processes and nondiscriminatory state laws that
not only permit, but also enable, sufficient
competition
.
14
This "natural order " \ " constructed order" division
within the opinions is evident in differing positions on a
variety of salient issues. The opinions "argue" over the
role of third parties; the character of party membership
and control; the major functions of parties,- the role of
primary elections; the standards of evidence and burden of
proof to be used; and the character and impact of state
statutes
.
13 Majority opinions expressing this view include
Williams and Anderson .
14 Majority opinions which enunciate this view include
Storer and Munro .
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The "Natural Order of Politics" Perspective
The schools of thought in the ballot access opinions
of the justices divide on two crucial matters-, the
competitiveness of the current party system and the
relationship of state laws to the health of party
competition. The "natural order" view generally sees party
competition as monopolized by the two "major" parties and
views state laws as important preservers, if not creators,
of this monopoly. The existing political order is, in other
words, an artificial product of state laws. Justices who
embrace this perspective tend to be skeptical of the
competitive and ideological openness of the major parties,-
of the sufficiency of primaries as the major competitive
arena,- and of state claims regarding political stability,
raiding, voter confusion, and sore losers. They tend to be
more sympathetic to third parties, particularly in their
role as advocates of substantive issues ignored by the
major parties. They feel such parties would be more
successful if their natural growth was not impeded by
government statutes. In essence, this view seeks to protect
democracy , i.e. open party competition, by limiting state
authority over what parties and candidates may access an
election ballot.
This "natural order" perspective is most consistently
supported in the ballot access opinions by Justices William
J. Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and William 0. Douglas. The
perspective has also had limited appeal to other Justices,
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such as John Paul Stevens, who have supported the
perspective in some cases. This perspective, while
sometimes in dissent, underlies pivotal ballot access
decisions like Williams and Anderson , and represents an
important voice in the continuing jurisprudence of ballot
access cases.
A clear articulation of the "natural order"
perspective's central assertions is found in Justice Hugo
Black's 1968 opinion in Williams . George Wallace's American
Independent Party and the Socialist Labor Party had brought
suit against Ohio, claiming that its early filing deadline
for third parties, a fifteen percent signature requirement,
and other requirements of party organization denied equal
protection of the laws. 15 Justice Black agreed, arguing
that the Ohio statutes gave the Democratic and Republican
parties "a complete monopoly" in the electoral system and
were likely to "stifle the growth of all new parties". The
decided advantage thereby provided to established parties
was viewed as "invidious discrimination". 16
15 The Ohio ballot access statute requirements for
qualifying as a "political party" included the creation of
county and state committees and the holding of a nominating
convention. Williams , 393 U.S. at 24-25. It is worthy of
note that Ohio's ballot was the last of the 50 state
ballots accessed by Wallace. Michael Barone, Our Country:
The Shaping Of America From Roosevelt To Reagan (New York:
The Free Press, 1990), p. 734, n. 9.
16 393 U.S. at 30-34. This case demonstrates that a
claim does not necessarily have to be based on race in
order to find "invidious discrimination". In fact, George
Wallace's candidacy was an explicit reflection of the
racial animosity felt by many white voters toward
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This view of an electoral system monopolized by two
major parties, which uses state statutes to disadvantage
third parties, is central to the "natural order"
perspective's concerns about the existing political
environment. The positions taken on a variety of corollary
issues, which will presently be considered in detail, all
derive from this picture of the current system. Scrutiny of
the justices' use of scholarly quotes and citations to
buttress their claim of state-produced electoral monopoly
reveals that their contentions do not go unchallenged by
students of parties and democracy. The major focus of this
analysis is not an empirical critique of the justices'
citations, however; the goal is to explicate the structure
of their ideas about parties and democracy, and to consider
the ramifications of these ideological structures for
political parties as institutions. The content of scholarly
authority cited by the justices, as well as the context of
such citation, sheds light on the justices' ideology and
its ramifications.
Party Competition and Choice
In Justice Black's opinion in Williams , the health of
electoral competition is measured by the choices available
to individual voters. Black cites the Court's opinions in
Wesberry v. Sanders and Carrington v. Rash to support this
minorities, an ironic historical twist.
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proposition. 17 Healthy competition, however, requires
more than voter choice,- it is also measured by the
condition of the party system, which must be
"nonmonopolistic"
. Black writes:
Competition in ideas and governmental policies is
at the core of our electoral process and of the
First Amendment freedoms. New parties struggling
for their place must have the time and
opportunity to organize in order to meet
reasonable requirements for ballot position, just
as the old parties have had in the past. 18
While the need for some reasonable ballot regulation is
admitted, these regulations must afford full opportunity
for new parties to organize and appeal to voters. A
competitive democracy on this model provides a friendly
environment for third parties.
Black's Williams opinion contrasts this "model" of
healthy competition with Ohio's party system and statutes.
Ohio's Democratic and Republican parties are given a
"decided advantage" by the state's election statutes, which
are characterized as "virtually impossible" for minor
parties to meet. 19 State laws have essentially preserved
a monopoly for the two major parties, an unacceptable and
"artificial" restriction of party competition. Concurring
opinions in Williams by Justices Douglas and John Marshall
Harlan IV largely reinforce this position. Harlan, for
17 323 U.S. at 31. See Wesberrv v. Sanders , 376 U.S. 1
(1964), and Carrinaton v. Rash , 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
18 393 U.S. at 32.
19 393 U.S. at 24, 31.
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example, sees Ohio as "denying the appellants any
opportunity to participate in the procedure by which the
President is selected". 20
An additional anti-monopoly argument is proffered by
Justice Stevens in Anderson
. Stevens asserts that monopoly
often leads to corruption, so competition should extend
beyond the two established parties to prevent such
corruption. He characterizes the intent of Ohio's statute
as a "desire to protect existing political parties from
[such] competition". 21 Healthy competition, in this view,
involves free access by all serious parties.
One opinion which seeks to offer some documentation of
this posited burden on competition is Justice Anthony
Kennedy's dissent in Burdick v. Takushi
. a 1992 case in
which Hawaii's ban on write-in voting was unsuccessfully
challenged. Kennedy argues that rather than facilitating
stability and choice as the majority claimed, Hawaii's
restriction actually reduces choice and compounds political
division, since only one choice is available in most
races. 22 He emphasizes the dominance of the Democratic
Party in Hawaiian politics, cites data on the number of
blank ballots voted, and argues that the Court had
previously recognized write-in votes as a way to mitigate
20 393 U.S. at 35-40 (Douglas, J., concurring) and 41-
48 (Harlan, J., concurring); the quote is at p. 41.
21 460 U.S. at 795.
22 112 S. Ct. at 2068 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the restrictions of the Progressive style ballot, citing
Sanner v. Patton . 23
The preoccupation of the "natural order" perspective
with nonmonopolistic competition is complemented by its
solicitude toward third parties, which are seen as having a
unique and essential role in our political system. Douglas'
Williams concurrence emphasizes the importance of third
parties as channels for political dissent, referring to the
Court's opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire . 24 Marshall's
majority opinion in Illinois State Board of Elections v.
Socialist Workers Party , a 1979 case involving a challenge
to Illinois law setting petition signature requirements,
emphasizes the third party function of "disseminating ideas
as well as attaining political office" and stresses their
important role in American political history, supporting
the assertion with citations to works by Alexander Bickel,
Wilfred Binkley, and E.M. Sait. 25 The works he cites,
while supportive of his general point regarding third
parties as historically important carriers of ideas, are in
23 112 S. Ct. at 2068-70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See Sanner v. Patton , 40 NE 290 (1895)
.
24 393 U.S. at 36,39 (Douglas, J., concurring). The
case noted by Douglas, Sweezv v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234 (1957), involved a professor's refusal to answer a
number of questions in a New Hampshire State Legislature
investigation of subversive activities. Sweezy was one of
the first cases to explicitly discuss the doctrine of
freedom of association.
25 440 U.S. at 186.
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some cases much less supportive of the "natural order"
perspective as a whole.
Alexander Bickel's Reform And Continuity devotes a
chapter to minor parties in the electoral system, and his
emphasis on their historic role is congruent with
Marshall's view. After reviewing third parties in American
history, Bickel concludes that they are "an indispensable
part of the system whose beneficent chief aim is to
suppress [them]". 26 That Bickel agrees with those
justices who see bias in the current system is evident from
a statement closing his chapter: "state election statutes
are shot through not only with anti- third-party provisions
that are wrong on principle, but also with some which
positively disserve the two-party system". 27 Bickel
provides strong reinforcement for Marshall and the "natural
order" view of the current party system.
Wilfred Binkley's work also supports Marshall's
assertion about the role of third parties, but without
Bickel's negative commentary on the modern system. In
American Political Parties: Their Natural History
,
Binkley
discusses the breakup of the Whig and Democratic parties in
the 1840 's and 1850' s, and the role of many third parties
in absorbing dissident elements not accommodated by the
26 Alexander Bickel, Reform and Continuity: the
Electoral College , the Convention, and the Party System
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 80. See particularly
chap. 4, "Minor Parties", pp. 79-89.
27 Bickel, Reform , p. 89.
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major parties. His emphasis is largely on third parties as
carriers of ideas that the major parties have failed to
address, but he also sees major parties naturally moving to
capture third party issues that win popular support. 28
Third parties play an important role in raising ideas, but
they have not replaced the major parties that tend to
"capture" their issues.
Marshall's citation of Howard Penniman and E.M. Sait,
when scrutinized in its original context, provides the
least support for the "natural order" perspective on third
party opportunities and state law. In Sait ' s American
Parties And Elections
, Penniman focuses on the historical
role and importance of minor parties, and reviews the same
history discussed by Bickel. 29 This generally supports
Marshall's argument, but the final paragraph of Penniman'
s
chapter, which is not quoted by Marshall, is diametrically
opposed to the contention that the current party system is
a distortion of the "natural order of politics" . According
to Penniman:
The minor parties make loud complaint over the
obstacles that prevent their getting a place on
the ballot. Socialists and Prohibitionists,
contending that the major parties enjoy a virtual
monopoly in many states, have pressed vigorously
28 Wilfred Binkley, American Political Parti es: Their
Natural History , 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959),
esp. chap. 8, "The Breakup of the Major Parties", pp. 181-
205 .
29 Howard R. Penniman, Sait's American Parties and
Elections , 5th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crof ts
,
Inc., 1952), esp. chap. XII, "Minor Parties", pp. 223-39.
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of late for appropriate changes in the election
laws. They have some grounds for dissatisfaction.
It is sufficient in some states to get a mere
twenty- five signatures on a petition, but in
other states petitions must be signed by many
thousands of voters. Perhaps it is not a mere
persecution complex that suggests a conspiracy of
Democrats and Republicans. Yet, in the main, the
sense of grievance has no solid foundation. The
Progressive Party was on the ballot in 45 states
in 1948. The Socialists received votes in 33
states; and the Prohibitionists, in 20. Devotion
to a cause sometimes impairs perspective.
Enthusiasts fail to see that, from the public
standpoint, it may be desirable to keep the
ballot from being encumbered and that very few
voters think otherwise. The "splinter parties"
suffer as much from anemia as from the malignant
designs of the major parties . 30
To find so cogent a statement of the naturalness of the
current two party system is not surprising, but to find the
work in which it appears cited in an opinion arguing
against such a position is ironic. While Penniman may
support the legitimate historical role of third parties,
Penniman, Sait's American Parties
, p. 2 3 9; emphases
added. Penniman clearly feels that state law has not
systemically disadvantaged the minor parties, a position
more congruent with the "constructed order" view of party
competition and state law. With regard to his assessment of
how voters view ballot access issues, a number of trends in
recent decades would appear to contradict Penniman'
s
assumption: (1) the relative success of recent third party
presidential candidates Wallace, Anderson, and Perot; (2)
the general public dissatisfaction with the major parties,
and the willingness to elect independent candidates like
Governors Lowell Weicker of Connecticut, Walter Hickel of
Alaska, Angus King of Maine, and independent Representative
Bernard Sanders of Vermont; and (3) the passage of voter
referenda questions easing ballot access requirements, such
as the approval of Question 4 in Massachusetts in 1990,
which reduced the number of petition signatures required
for independent candidates by 75 percent. Larry Sabato,
while sharing Penniman' s suspicions of an unrestricted
ballot, recognizes the continuing public power of this
"populist" position. Sabato, The Party's Just Begun, p.
229 .
57
his argument is antithetical to the "natural order"
contention that state law, not public apathy, preserves a
two-party monopoly. Nonetheless, in Illinois Board and
other opinions, Marshall argues consistently against a
restricted ballot; it is clear he would not accept the
above portion of Penniman's analysis.
The majority opinion of Justice Stevens in Anderson
continues the emphasis in Williams and Illinois on the role
of third parties and cites political scientist V.O. Key,
Jr., on the importance of third parties as "fertile sources
of new ideas and new programs". 31 In arguing that
campaigns should not be "monopolized by the existing
political parties", Key's chapter on "The Role Of Minor
Parties" in his Politics, Parties And Pressure Groups
reviews the same history as the scholars cited by Marshall,
and generally supports Stevens' assertion; however, Key
points to the direct primary and the general openness of
the major parties to question whether third parties are
still essential for that purpose. 32 Like Penniman, Key's
work is less than fully supportive of the "natural order"
perspective as a whole.
Marshall's dissent in Munro v. Socialist Worker's
Party , a 1986 case in which the Socialist Worker's Party
31 Anderson , 460 U.S. at 794.
32 V.O. Key, Jr., Politics. Parties, and Pressure
Groups , 3rd ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1952)
,
especially chap. 10, "The Role of Minor Parties", pp. 278-
303 .
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unsuccessfully challenged a Washington State law requiring
a one percent vote in the primary to gain access to the
general election ballot, is the most recent opinion to
stress the critical functions of minor parties in our
polity. According to Marshall, third parties "broaden
political debate, expand the range of issues with which the
electorate is concerned, and influence the positions of the
majority". 33 Third parties, in essence, offer
alternatives that make competition in parties, candidates
and ideas a reality.
The "natural order" perspective on party competition,
at heart, sees two-party dominance as evidence of
monopolized competition, and views restrictive state laws
as a major cause of that monopoly. There is a logical
sympathy for third parties: just as two party dominance
indicates unhealthy monopoly, third parties are a sign of
healthy competition. Analysis of the opinions also reveals
that the "natural order" argument on party competition and
state laws finds both supporters and skeptics among
students of politics cited by the justices.
Party Structure and Functions
The ballot access opinions which express the "natural
order" perspective are relatively limited in addressing
issues of party structure and functions, focusing their
33 479 U.S. at 200 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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argument on party competition and state laws. Important
attention is focused, however, on the "ideological"
function of parties. While the "natural order" perspective
does not dismiss the electoral function of parties, equal
stress is placed on ideological and programmatic
activities. In line with its views on competition and third
parties, the "natural order" takes a more skeptical view of
the ideological "fluidity" of the major parties.
Much of the "natural order" view of parties in the
ballot access opinions must be adduced from their
discussion of third parties. With regard to party
membership and control, the complementary emphases on
monopoly and the stifling of dissent indicates a belief
that the major parties are ideologically "closed"
organizations, less interested in ideas than in winning
office. This is essentially an anti-establishment view
combined with a "responsible parties" style critique of the
major parties. Legally open, the major parties are
practically restricted in terms of opportunities for
alternative voices and alternative control. As a result,
third parties become an essential political vehicle for
alternative ideas.
The "natural order" view of party membership and
functions can be further understood by examining the
treatment of primary elections and party integrity issues,
i.e. raiding, sore losers, and disaffiliation, in ballot
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access opinions. 34 These reveal greater concern for
maximum electoral competition both within and between
parties than for party integrity or political stability.
On the question of raiding, Stevens' opinion in
Anderson emphasizes that raiding is not to be confused with
a protection of the existing parties from competition, or
used as a "cover" for exercising monolithic control over a
party's membership or ideas. While sore loser and
disaffiliation concerns are legitimate, laws to enforce
such concerns must be tailored to that end; party
membership and control must be restricted as minimally as
possible. Ohio's statute is characterized by Stevens as
only a deadline, not a sore loser provision. 35
The "natural order" view of primary elections is
congruent with its overall perspective on competition and
the ideological function of parties. The primary is an
important forum for competition, but does not
,
by itself,
constitute sufficient electoral opportunity. Access to the
general election ballot must also be reasonably available.
Marshall's Munro dissent, for example, argues that "access
34
"Raiding" involves voters crossing party lines to
vote in another party's primary in order to disrupt the
results, in states where "open primaries" permit such
behavior. "Sore loser" provisions prohibit a candidate who
has lost a party primary or nomination contest from running
under another party label, or as an independent candidate,
in the general election. "Disaffiliation" statutes prohibit
a candidate from running as an independent if they were a
member of a party within a past specified period of time.
35 460 U.S. at 801-4.
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to a primary election is not... all the access that is due
when minor parties are excluded entirely from the general
election", and characterized the general election as "the
phase of the electoral process in which policy choices are
most seriously considered"
. Blocking minor parties from the
general election is seen as a near total bar which preempts
meaningful political participation on their part. 36
This is certainly a negative view of the "openness" of
existing parties and primaries. The fact that the "natural
order" perspective takes issue with the ballot access
standards in Munro , where a candidate or party can gain
access to the general election ballot with only one percent
of the vote in a blanket primary, indicates that the
justices seek a virtually unrestricted system of ballot
access. Kennedy's discussion of Hawaii's ban on write-in
voting in his Burdick dissent provides an example of the
concerns that support this view, emphasizing that there are
few independents on the ballot and that the primary in
Hawaii is often decisive. 37
With regard to sore loser and disaffiliation statutes,
and the threats of factional infighting they are designed
to address, Justice Brennan's dissent in Storer best
reflects the "natural order" view of such concerns. To
Brennan, factional threats are more likely to occur shortly
36 Munro , 479 U.S. at 202-3, 206 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)
.
37 112 S. Ct. at 2069 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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before the primary rather than far in advance of it, and
thus California's one year disaffiliation requirement
limits political opportunity unnecessarily. 38 Once again,
the emphasis is on keeping competition and opportunity as
open as possible.
The "natural order" view of parties is very much in
keeping with its overall perspective on competition. Party
membership and control should both be as open as possible,
with maximum opportunities for other routes due to the de
facto restricted nature of party organizations. The
functions of parties should be ideological as well as
electoral. In essence, parties should be open to, and
vehicles of, a wide competition in candidates and ideas;
third parties fulfill part of this function for the major
parties
.
The particular ballot access disputes heard by the
justices have given less attention to a critical and
particularly contentious electoral issue involving
democratic competition and the nature of parties: the
ability of racial minorities to participate in the
electoral process and elect minority officeholders. Most of
the disputes in this area have reached the Court as voting
rights or redistricting cases, focusing less directly on
ballot access per se . Nonetheless, ballot access for
minority candidates is a crucial step in achieving a larger
38 415 U.S. at 761 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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role in the electoral process. The "natural order"
perspective's concern with enabling dissent, new ideas, and
alternative viewpoints to be expressed in the parties and
offered on the ballot implicitly encompasses an argument
that traditionally disadvantaged groups and their interests
should not be deprived of political opportunity because of
a monopolized political system. 39
Standards of Evidence and Burden
The "natural order" perspective's strong skepticism
about the status quo of party competition is evident in
their standards of evidence and burden. These opinions
repeatedly offer tests to evaluate the competing claims,
and consistently weigh these tests against the states. The
This stance is reflected in the majority opinion in
Thornburg v. Gingles , 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Thornburg
invalidated a North Carolina districting plan that diluted
African-American voting strength. Brennan's majority test
for determining vote dilution focuses on "the systematic
frustration or exclusion of minority groups from electoral
competition" . Nancy Maveety, Representation Rights And The
Burger Years (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1991), p. 122. Lani Guinier emphasizes Brennan's focus on
the candidate's role as the "chosen representative of a
particular racial group" , as well as on protecting that
group choice and "the right to elect a representative of
their choice" (emphasis added) . Guinier correctly notes
that the current Court majority has gone in an opposite
direction in Presley v. Etowah County Commission , 112 S.
Ct . 820 (1992), in which newly elected African-American
county commissioners were stripped of their powers by white
incumbents. The Presley majority asserts that the right to
vote does not include the right to govern. Lani Guinier,
The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in
Representative Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 1994),
pp. 13, 177-79.
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centerpieces of their approach are "strict scrutiny" and
"compelling state interest"
.
The first test is offered in Black's Williams opinion.
The Court must consider "the facts and circumstances behind
the law, the interests which the State claims to be
protecting, and the interests of those who are
disadvantaged by the classification"
. Black adds that
unequal burdens on minority groups can only be justified by
a compelling state interest. 40 This test did not make
freedom of association absolute or preclude state
regulation on its face, but its result upheld the challenge
to Ohio's statutes. Brennan's dissent in Storer reaffirms
this strict scrutiny\compelling state interest standard,
arguing that it should have been applied in that case, but
was not. 41
The practical import of the Williams standard is that
effective voting and party competition in our democratic
system cannot be infringed without compelling
justification. What is meant by "compelling" is not
definitively defined, but its application in Williams
emphasizes what the state should not infringe, not what it
40 This test for an Equal Protection Clause violation
is enunciated at 393 U.S. 30. This reflects the concern
noted earlier with the disadvantages that racial and other
minorities groups can suffer under a monopolized party and
political system.
41 415 U.S. at 756 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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can protect. 42 This approach is clearly related to the
"natural order" view that the current party system is
biased by state regulations.
In Illinois Board , a similar three part test is put
forward by Marshall. The Court must examine the character
of the classification in the law; the importance of the
individual interests affected; and the state interests
asserted in support of the classification. Under this test,
the majority finds that the geographic classification
involved in the Illinois signature requirement limits
associational and voting rights without being the least
restrictive means to the end of a reasonable ballot. 43
Marshall reiterates his support for this standard in his
Munro dissent. 44
Stevens' opinion in Anderson enunciates yet another
three part test to determine the appropriate parameters of
freedom of association, noting there is no "litmus paper
standard" for such cases. According to Stevens, the Court
must first consider the character and magnitude
of the asserted injury to the rights protected by
42 Justice Harry Blackmun emphasizes the vague and
amorphous nature of this "easy phrase" in his concurrence
in Illinois State Board , 440 U.S. at 188-89 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) . However, like many other legal terms, its
precise meaning develops from its usage in the totality of
previous cases. Thus, its meaning cannot simply be drawn
out of the sky, but it is open to evolution and
modification in some degree. It is in this process of
modification that justices have space for interpretation.
43 440 U.S. at 183-87.
44 479 U.S. at 201 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the
plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It must then
identify and evaluate the precise interests put
forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment,
the Court must not only determine the legitimacy
and strength of each of these interests, it also
must consider the extent to which those interests
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's
rights
.
45
Justice David Souter's majority opinion in Norman v. Reed
,
a 1992 case involving a largely successful challenge to
Illinois party label and signature requirements, witnessed
the most recent application of the Anderson test. 46
On their face, these tests are all silent when it
comes to the particularities of evidence. In fact, the
justices who reflect the "natural order" perspective have
emphasized a variety of evidentiary factors, all of which
share a concern for wide and minimally impeded competition
between parties and ideas.
One focus of evidentiary analysis has been to examine
whether similar parties are given equal treatment by the
law. Souter's Norman opinion finds Illinois restrictions on
the use of party names "broader than necessary to advance
electoral order", and the signature requirements too
onerous on a local party. In combination, they make it
easier for a statewide party to gain access to the ballot
than it is for a local party. Souter cites the Court's
previous decision in Illinois Board to emphasize that local
45 460 U.S. at 789
.
46 112 S.Ct. at 705.
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ballot access standards should roughly parallel statewide
standards. 47 Chief Justice Warren Burger emphasizes this
same type of state\local standard disparity in overturning
a Texas filing fee statute in his Bullock opinion. 48
The opinions also search for evidence of state effort
to minimize the burden on the affected individuals or
groups. The justices will look with great skepticism on a
current statute if the state could have taken a less
intrusive approach. Brennan's Storer dissent, for example,
argues that California demonstrated no effort to put a
lesser burden on candidates. 49 The political impact of
such laws is another item of evidence the opinions have
considered. Brennan's dissent in Storer stresses the
"impossible burden" of having to decide on a ballot
strategy 17 months before a general election, long before
politics makes such a choice "sensible". 50 The state
statute is seen as constricting the political landscape,
and is therefore not neutral, but rather biased and
discriminatory
.
47 112 S. Ct. at 706-8.
48 405 U.S. at 140.
49 415 U.S. at 756, 761 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50 415 U.S. at 758 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As cited
earlier, Storer involved a California statute specifying a
one year disaffiliation requirement for independent
candidates; this forces the "early choice" noted by
Brennan
.
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Evidence of possible impacts on political events is
also stressed in Stevens' Anderson opinion. In evaluating
Ohio's early filing deadline, Stevens cites the late
launching of several third party campaigns. 51 Alexander
Bickel is cited to assert the likelihood that early filing
deadlines may actually reduce party harmony by forcing
early polarizations brought on by the deadline, and thus
decrease party stability. 52 This citation to Bickel is
from Reform and Continuity , the same text cited by Marshall
in Illinois State Board , and is generally supportive of
Stevens's point. 53
Despite its skepticism about state laws, the "natural
order" perspective does not give the parties a "free ride"
in evaluating their cases,- they, too, must meet standards.
Black's Williams opinion emphasizes a party's "show of
support" as a relevant criterion for evaluating an equal
51 460 U.S. at 792.
52 460 U.S. at 805.
53 Bickel 's viewpoint is, however, not as friendly to
third parties as the "natural order" perspective. Following
the ideas quoted by Stevens, Bickel states that
From the point of view of fostering the two
party system this is counterproductive. It is
calculated to induce third party movements, like
the George Wallace party; calculated to drive
people away from the coalition-building process
that is the genius of the two-party system, and
into a premature and more likely permanent
ideological separatism, which is precisely what
the two party system is intended to prevent.
Bickel, Reform , p. 88.
69
protection claim. 54 Burger's majority opinion in Lubin v.
Panish
,
a 1974 case involving a successful challenge to
California filing fees, also emphasizes petitions and a
show of voter support as proper tests of seriousness for a
candidacy. 55 Stevens affirms that states have the
"undoubted right to require candidates to make a
preliminary showing of substantial support" in his Anderson
opinion
.
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The Role of Government
The "natural order" perspective is highly skeptical of
state laws and holds them to a standard of compelling state
interest. This hostility is evident in successive drafts of
Black's Williams opinion. An early draft simply refers to
the Ohio statutes as the state's "position" in the
controversy, but a later draft characterizes them as "very
restrictive election laws". 57 It is no surprise that
state interests are viewed with caution and the states are
forced to prove their claims. The "natural order" view of
federalism, revealed most explicitly in the opinions
54 393 U.S. at 34.
55 415 U.S. at 718.
56 460 U.S. at 788, n. 9.
57 This change occurred between Justice Black's
October 9 and October 15, 1968 drafts of the Williams
opinion, at 393 U.S. 32 of the final opinion. See Williams
v. Rhodes draft opinions in Folder 17, Box 54, Thurgood
Marshall Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library Of Congress.
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involving ballot access for presidential candidates, also
reflects a skepticism of state interests that clash with
the national interests of a presidential election process.
The control of state legislatures by the major parties
is one of the major reasons cited for skepticism of state
intent and interests in structuring party competition and
the electoral process. Stevens' Anderson opinion asserts
that the domination of state legislatures by the major
parties may put third party interests at a higher risk and
thus justify stronger scrutiny of ballot laws. 58
Likewise, Marshall's Munro dissent argues that "major
parties, which by definition are ordinarily in control of
legislative institutions, may seek to perpetuate themselves
at the expense of developing minor parties" . Marshall even
goes so far as to say that "the only purpose this statute
seems narrowly tailored to advance is the impermissible one
of protecting the major political parties from competition
precisely when that competition would be most
meaningful". 59 The obvious concern is that partisan self-
interest prevails in this type of regulation. 60
58 460 U.S. at 793, n. 16.
59 479 U.S. at 201, 205 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60 The fact that these justices are so explicitly
willing to question the motives of legislators in this area
of policy reflects just how far the Court has moved since
the days of the "political question" doctrine, which
advocated a neutral acceptance of legislative choices
involving these types of issues.
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That states have a proper role in regulating elections
is not in dispute. The question is what the parameters of
that role are. Black's opinion in Williams emphasizes that
state powers over elections are not absolute, but are
instead subject to constitutional limits, such as equal
protection. 61 An internal memo from Justice Abe Fortas to
Black makes clear his view that a state may properly impose
some limitations. Justice Fortas expresses the following
reservations on a draft of Black's opinion:
I'm concerned lest the opinion be taken as
indicating that the State may not impose any
limitations relating to a political party's
securing or retaining a place on the ballot. 62
Along these same lines, Stevens's opinion in Anderson cites
the legitimate right of states to prevent electoral
distortions caused by party raiding. 63
The opinions favoring the "natural order" perspective
consider a variety of state interests, and find most of
them to be either invalid or insufficiently supported by or
related to the state laws in question. These avowed
interests include promotion of a two party system, desire
for a majority victor, structuring the primary, and
preventing voter confusion caused by a crowded ballot, all
61 393 U.S. at 29.
62 Justice Abe Fortas memo to Justice Hugo Black,
October 10, 1968, Folder 17, Box 54, Thurgood Marshall
Papers
.
63 460 U.S. at 789, n. 9
.
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asserted by Ohio in Williams 64
; regulation of the primary
ballot and financing of the primary, asserted by Texas in
Bullock65
; voter education, equal treatment, and
political stability, asserted by Ohio in Anderson66
screening out frivolous candidates, asserted by Washington
in Munro67 ; and prevention of sore losers and raiding,
asserted by Hawaii in Burdick68
. Most of these stated
interests focus on order, stability, and restriction, and
given the nature of the "natural order" perspective, it is
not surprising to find opinions skeptical of such claims.
In their view, there is already too much control by the
states
.
Stevens's opinion in Anderson emphasizes another
aspect of the "natural order" perspective: its view of
national interests and the nature of federalism. Stevens
stresses the national interest in the conduct of
presidential elections, and argues that Ohio as a state is
restricting a national process, with possible impacts both
on the voters of Ohio and the national presidential
64 393 U.S. at 31-33. Justice Harlan cites evidence on
the last point in his concurrence, at 393 U.S. 47 (Harlan,
J
. ,
concurring)
.
65 405 U.S. at 145-47.
66 460 U.S. at 796-805.
67 479 U.S. at 200 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68 112 S. Ct. at 2071-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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process. 69 A comparison of two earlier drafts of Anderson
reveals that Stevens' assertions here were previously even
stronger; in two places, the word "may" is inserted as a
modifier in a discussion of effects of the Ohio
statutes. 70 In his view, the Ohio law "places a
significant state- imposed restriction on a nationwide
electoral process ". 71 It is clear that this national
process must be protected.
Thus, while the "natural order" has not prohibited all
state regulation of parties and the electoral process, it
is clearly skeptical of many state statutes and the
interests asserted to support them. State governments are
given the heavier burden of proof. This demanding standard
grows out of the central concern of the "natural order"
perspective: that competition between parties and amongst
ideas has been limited by state laws that create an
artificial two party electoral monopoly, restricting
opportunities for voters, groups, candidates, and parties.
The "Constructed Order Of Politics" Perspective
The central idea of the "constructed order of
politics" perspective is that the existing two party system
59 460 U.S. at 790, 795.
70 At 460 U.S. 790, "may have" was substituted for
"has" at line 3, and "may affect" for "changes" at line 9.
Anderson draft opinions, March 7, 1983, and April 5, 1983,
Folder 6, Box 321, Thurgood Marshall Papers.
71 460 U.S. at 795; emphasis added.
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is a legitimate historical construction of democratic
political institutions (i.e. popularly elected
governments)
.
This school of thought also holds related
views in harmony with this contention: that the current
party system is competitive and open to hard- working third
parties and independents; that parties are open,
electorally-oriented organizations; and that primaries are
a "winnowing device" for the general election. In addition,
it asks for a high standard of evidence for discrimination
claims, and a burden of proof on such claimants rather than
the states; state laws are nondiscriminatory unless proven
otherwise. It is essentially a positive, though not totally
unquestioning, view of the political status quo and state
regulation of the electoral process. Most importantly,
there is much less of the skepticism shown by the "natural
order" towards the motives of elected state legislators
whose regulations structure parties and elections.
These views can be traced through a series of majority
opinions, as well as dissenting opinions in cases where the
"natural order" perspective held sway. The most consistent
adherents to these views are Justices Byron White, Potter
Stewart, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Chief Justice William
Rehnquist. Justice White in particular is the author of
majority opinions in Storer , American Party , Munro, and
Burdick . They represent a strong and fairly consistent bloc
for granting leeway to the states in ballot access
75
regulation, in marked contrast to the "natural order"
perspective
.
Stewart's Williams dissent probably provides the best
summary of the "constructed order" perspective. He asserts
the following:
As my brethren's surveys of ballot requirements
in the various States suggests, the present two
party system in this country is the product of
social and political forces rather than of legal
restrictions on minority parties. This Court has
been shown neither that in States with minimal
ballot restrictions third parties have
flourished, nor that in States with more
difficult requirements they are moribund. Mere
speculation ought not to suffice to strike down a
State's duly enacted laws . 72
Barring proof, this view will not simply assume the failure
of the current system. To these justices, the status quo
seems fully competitive and nondiscriminatory, and state
interest and authority too legitimate to override.
Party Competition and Choice
The contention that the existing party system is
democratically healthy and legitimate is, ironically,
stated most explicitly in a dissenting opinion. In
Williams , Stewart asserts that the current two party system
is the "product of social and political forces", not
laws. 73 For Stewart, the explanation for major party
dominance in Ohio, as well as the failure of George
72 393 U.S. at 60 (Stewart, J., dissenting); emphasis
added
.
73 393 U.S. at 60 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
76
Wallace's American Independent Party and the Socialist
Labor Party to meet the requirements for the 1968 general
election ballot, lies not in Ohio's statutory filing
deadline and organizational requirements, but in the
realities of Ohio politics.
Though Stewart does not cite the writings of students
of parties, his assertion finds some support amongst
political scientists. The work of John Fenton, for example,
argues that Ohio has long been a hotly divided two party
state, with job-oriented rather than issue-oriented
parties. 74 Other scholars also classify Ohio as a "two
party competitive" state. 75 That type of political
environment would not appear to be fertile soil for a
multiparty system, irrespective of state laws.
The implications of viewing the existing party and
electoral system as a legitimate institutional construct
are reflected in how the justices who subscribe to this
view treat a variety of related issues. To begin with,
competition is assumed to be open to all political forces
and viewpoints unless proven otherwise. While this position
is often based on the assertion that alternative parties
74 John H. Fenton, Midwest Politics (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1966), especially chap. 5, "Issueless
Politics In Ohio"
.
75 See, for example, John Bibby, Politics, Parties and
Elections in America (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1987) , p. 52,
and Malcolm E. Jewell and David M. Olson, American State
Political Parties and Elections (Homewood, IL: The Dorsey
Press, 1982)
, p. 28
.
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can meet the requirements, there is also an assumption that
two party politics is de facto evidence of competition.
White's majority opinion in American Party v. White
, a
1974 case involving Texas petition and organization
requirements for third parties and independent candidates,
is reflective of this view of competition. White emphasizes
that all parties have electoral access and opportunity
through primary day under the Texas system, and that the
state laws are not impossible to meet:
Hard work and sacrifice by dedicated volunteers
are the lifeblood of any political organization.
Constitutional adjudication and common sense are
not at war with each other, and we are thus
unimpressed with arguments that burdens like
those imposed by Texas are too onerous,
especially when two of the original party
plaintiffs themselves satisfied the
requirement
.
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As American Party indicates, party competition will be
assumed unless clear evidence of exclusion or
discrimination is offered. White uses Texas primary turnout
statistics to argue there is still a large pool of
potential petition signers available after a primary. 77
These statistics were cited in an evidentiary footnote that
was added between the February 15 and March 4, 1974, drafts
76 415 U.S. at 787.
77 415 U.S. at 789.
78
of the opinion, perhaps reflecting a need for White to
bolster his argument factually. 78
White's majority opinion in Storer also emphasizes
this positive view of current competition by giving an
alternative, retrospective view of the facts in Williams
.
There, he states, "the opportunity for political activity
within either of two major political parties was seemingly
available to all". 79
With a positive view of the existing two party system
and its possibilities for competition, it is not surprising
that the "constructed order" perspective appears to see no
special or unique role for third parties in American
politics. While the opinions of the "natural order"
perspective stress the unique and important role of third
parties, the justices who voice the "constructed order"
perspective are virtually silent on this topic. As the
previous quote from American Party indicates, these
justices view the marginality of third parties as a product
of lack of popular support, not discriminatory laws.
Despite this lack of sympathy for third parties, the
"constructed order" perspective does not blindly dismiss
all third party claims. White's opinion in Storer
enunciates specific standards for evaluating the legitimacy
78 American Party v. White , February 15 and March 4,
1974 opinion drafts, Folder 2, Box 123, Thurgood Marshall
Papers
.
79 415 U.S. at 746.
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of an independent or third party candidate: seriousness,
community support, and true independence. On the basis of
these standards, his opinion remands to the District Court
for further proceedings a challenge to California's five
percent signature requirement brought by the independent
presidential ticket of Gus Hall and Jarvis Tyner. 80 Chief
Justice Earl Warren's Williams dissent offers a similar
test for the legitimacy of third parties: a substantial
showing of voter interest; interest shown before the
election; and a party structure with some degree of
organization. 81 The last point is the most at variance
with White's test. Thus, while third parties and
independents have no essential role in the "constructed
order of politics", those which meet certain standards
should be free to participate.
The "constructed order" perspective's view of healthy
competition is, in essence, a much less demanding one than
that of the "natural order". Unless proven otherwise, the
current two party system in most states is assumed to
provide sufficient competition; two party dominance is not
equated with a lack of competition, and state laws are seen
as neutral toward or protective of competition. Since the
two major parties are not seen to stifle competition, the
80 415 U.S. at 738, 746. Gus Hall and Jarvis Tyner
were the Communist Party's candidates for President and
Vice President, respectively, in 1972.
81 393 U.S. at 70 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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"constructed order" perspective is also much more
indifferent to the fortunes of third parties.
Party Structure and Functions
The "constructed order" perspective's positive view of
competition and indifference to third parties is
complemented by a sanguine view of the openness of major
party membership and control to competitive forces, and an
emphasis on the electoral function of parties. To preserve
this competitive order, however, the "constructed order"
also seeks to protect the integrity of parties and the
primary's role as a forum for final settlement of
intraparty disputes. This effective system of orderly
competition would be disrupted by unrestricted ballot
access
.
White's majority opinion in Storer offers an explicit
definition of a political party, one that reflects a
pragmatic view of parties. According to White, a party is
an ongoing, statewide organization; its goal is to gain
control of government by electing candidates; it holds
primaries and conventions and writes platforms,
responsibilities under state law; and has specified members
who join the party. 82
This understanding of a party is interesting for its
omissions as well as its inclusions. It holds that a
82 415 U.S. at 745.
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party's key function is electoral, which comports with
political science definitions of party like that offered by
Leon Epstein. 83 But omitted is any explicit mention of
parties as responsible, programmatic carriers of ideas, as
is the case with the "natural order" perspective and also
the "responsible parties" model of party offered by a
number of political scientists. 84 This electoral
definition supports the perspective's positive view of the
existing two party system and is largely indifferent to
third parties
.
Stewart's majority opinion in Jenness v. Fort son , a
1971 case involving a Georgia five percent petition
signature requirement, is congruent with the Storer
definition of party and addresses more explicitly the
relationship of ideas to parties. Stewart argues that
Georgia's overall electoral system "recognizes the
potential fluidity of American political life", which seems
to imply that the major parties are open to changing views
and are fluid organizations in terms of ideas, membership,
and control. Stewart cites the 1966 gubernatorial election
and the 1968 presidential election in Georgia as proof that
this openness is more than theoretical; in both, candidates
83 Epstein defines parties as "any group, however
loosely organized, seeking to elect governmental office
holders under a given label". Leon Epstein, Political
Parties In Western Democracies (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1967), p. 9.
84 APSA, Towards A More Responsible Two Party System,-
White and Mileur, eds
.
, Challenges .
82
gained access to the ballot by petition and carried the
state
.
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It is unclear, however, precisely where these opinions
stand on the question of party membership. The Storer
understanding of party membership and control appears
roughly congruent with the "party worker" model of party
membership, in which those persons who have joined or
worked for a party organization are seen as members, and in
which the party organization controls the party. This
contrasts with the Jenness understanding, which seems
closer to the "ticket voter" model of party membership, in
which anyone who votes for party candidates is seen as a
member and in which the public "supporters" of a party
control the party.
The difference between these two understandings of
party membership is that, under the first definition, a
party is a much smaller, more bounded organization. Both
definitions find support in the political science
literature and have long been the subject of active debate,
so it is not surprising that the justices might apply both
understandings
.
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Stewart's Jenness opinion also goes beyond Storer'
s
stark, singular definition of parties to emphasize that a
85 403 U.S. at 439.
86 On this controversy, see Ranney, The Doctrine Of
Responsible Party Government , pp. 17-19. Ranney' s work
reflects the fact that this debate splits even the ranks of
"responsible party" advocates.
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spectrum of parties exists. Stewart argues that there are
different "types" of parties, which the state may
legitimately treat differently:
The fact is that there are obvious differences
in kind between the needs and potentials of a
political party with historically established
broad support, on the one hand, and a new or
small political organization on the other.
Georgia has not been guilty of invidious discri-
mination in recognizing the differences and
providing different routes to the printed
ballot
.
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Jenness thus embodies an understanding of parties as a
heterogeneous "species" whose differences and distinctions
can be legitimately considered by the states in their
regulation of ballot access and other electoral matters.
This understanding, as well as the understanding of the
major parties as organizationally fluid, complements the
description of parties put forward in Storer .
Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent in Norman offers a
small addition to the preceding definitions of a party. He
states that it is "reasonable to require a purported
'party'... to run candidates in all the districts that elect
the multimember board governing the subdivision. Otherwise,
it is less a 'party' than an election committee for one
member of the board". 88 Since no other justice joined his
dissent, it is unclear how much support there is for this
perspective. White's Storer opinion, in contrast,
U.S . at 439
.
S.Ct. at 710 (Scalia, J. ( dissenting).
84
87 403
88 112
emphasizes that states cannot force independent candidates
to form a new party organization in order to obtain access
to the ballot. 89 This is thus a disputed, but nonetheless
important, corollary to the "constructed order" definition
of a party.
The "constructed order" view of parties is therefore a
heterogeneous one, though unified in its electoral and
pragmatic focus. In terms of party structure, membership,
and control, parties are seen as open to competition and
relatively nonideological in character. Their main function
is to win elections and control government. This contrasts
markedly with the issue-oriented "natural order"
perspective on parties.
While parties are seen as open to competition, the
"constructed order" perspective also believes that parties
are vulnerable to disruption, requiring state statutes to
"protect" their integrity and stability and thereby
preserve competition. The major concerns of the
"constructed order" in this regard are raiding, sore
losers, and the integrity of primary elections as a
"winnowing device" for the general election ballot; these
interests are given high value when asserted by state
governments. All of these concerns reflect a desire to
preserve the meaning of party labels and party membership
from being too open and fluid.
89 415 U.S. at 745-46.
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One method used by states to protect party integrity
and prevent sore loser candidacies is the disaffiliation
statute. These statutes bar independent candidacies by
those who have been affiliated with a party within a
specified time period before the election. White's Storer
opinion upholds such a statute, viewing it as "expressive
of a general state policy aimed at maintaining the
integrity of the various routes to the ballot"
.
California's changing primary laws are cited as another
expression of this state policy, which the opinion views as
fully legitimate. 90
White's Storer opinion also emphasizes the legitimate
and complementary goals of preventing raiding and prolonged
intraparty disputes by using the primary as a winnowing
device to promote clear struggles at the general election.
To protect party integrity and clarify electoral choice,
any intraparty democracy must take place at the primary
stage, not thereafter. California's history of primaries is
offered as evidence that the primary is an "integral part
of the electoral process", a two tiered process of
intraparty and then interparty struggles. 91 White's
earlier dissent in Williams , in a similar vein, describes
the primary as an "opportunity for the presentation and
90 415 U.S. at 733-34.
91 415 U.S. at 735.
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winnowing out of candidates which is surely a legitimate
objective of state policy". 92
The pivotal purpose of these types of restrictions,
and of primary elections, is the preservation of a stable
political system not torn by factions. In Storer , for
example, White turns to James Madison to support this
argument, citing the classic Federalist 10 essay on the
"evils" of factions. 93 It is noteworthy that the
supporting language of this defense of "the State's
interest in the stability of its political system" was
strengthened in the final draft of Storer . While his first
draft characterized this state interest as permissible,
White's second draft calls the interest "not only
permissible but compelling " . 94
Stewart's Jenness opinion highlights the winnowing
function of primaries from a slightly different angle. He
cites with approval Georgia's argument that the state has
proper role in "avoiding deception, confusion, and
frustration of the democratic process at the general
election". 95 This reflects a view that electoral
confusion will result if the primary does not winnow out
candidates; by preventing such confusion, the primary
92 393 U.S. at 62 (White, J., dissenting).
93 415 U.S. at 735-36.
94 See Second Storer draft, March 22, 1974, Box 122,
Thurgood Marshall Papers; emphasis added.
95 403 U.S. at 438.
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preserves effective competition. White's Munro opinion also
accepts as legitimate this view of the primary as a device
to simplify the general election ballot. 96
In the "constructed order" perspective, parties are
both open and bounded, fluid and vulnerable. This view
complements the positive view of competition in the
existing two party system. As a result, state interests in
protecting the integrity of parties and the electoral
process are seen as highly credible, and statutes to
protect the primary process and prevent sore losers and
raiding are seen as fully legitimate. This view of parties
is similar to the "responsible parties" view, but it lacks
one crucial element: the latter' s generally strong emphasis
on ideology and platforms.
While these arguments of the "constructed order"
perspective are strong and consistent, their assumptions
are as subject to challenge as the "natural order"
opinions. White's opinions, for example, accept state
arguments regarding primaries and party integrity, but say
nothing about the comparative factional experiences of
preprimary and primary systems. As an examination of the
"constructed order" views of state law will demonstrate,
the arguments of state governments are given a substantial
benefit of the doubt.
96 479 U.S. at 196.
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Standards Of Evidence and Burden
The positive view of current major party competition
detailed above leads, as one might expect, to a skepticism
about challenges to state statutes. With respect to
evidence and burden of proof, this skepticism translates
into a demand for strong evidence from challengers of
statutes and a placement of the burden of proof on their
shoulders. This strong burden of proof on challengers is
reflected consistently in the "constructed order" opinions.
The "constructed order" opinions, while not fully
refuting the "compelling state interest" tests put forward
by the "natural order" opinions, have applied such tests to
state statutes very leniently in practice. They are
consistent in calling for a lower burden on the states and
for a more lenient standard based on "reasonableness"
.
Stewart's dissent in Williams , for example, sees the proper
standard as being whether a classification is "wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's
objective". 97 Other "constructed order" opinions, such as
White's in Burdick , have echoed that emphasis on
"reasonableness" and relevance to legitimate state
objectives
.
98
The flip side of this lenient standard for the states
is an insistence on strong evidence from challengers;
97 393 U.S. at 51 (Stewart, J., dissenting), quoting
McGowan v. Maryland , 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
98 112 S. Ct. at 2062-63.
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discrimination must be proven. In Williams , for example,
Stewart's dissent chides the majority for its lack of
evidence on infringement of associational and voting
rights, and dismisses the analogy with the NAACP
discrimination cases drawn by Black, arguing that
There is certainly no comparable showing that
Ohio's ballot requirements have any substantial
impact on the attempts of political dissidents
to organize effectively."
This perspective is thus unwilling to equate cases or
assume discrimination blindly.
White's opinion in Storer captures this skepticism. He
asserts that one cannot automatically invalidate all
substantial restrictions,- there is no bright line test, "no
substitute for the hard judgments that must be made"
.
White's opinion also suggests that this skepticism is not
dogmatic; Storer ' s remand of the Hall\Tyner petition
signature challenge underscores the fact that requirements
can be unconstitutionally severe. 100 His majority opinion
in Burdick also reaffirms that not all burdensome laws are
subject to strict scrutiny. 101
Many of the "constructed order" opinions stress a lack
of proof by those challenging statutes. Rehnquist's
Anderson dissent emphasizes a lack of proof in the record,
and argues that "a statute 'is not to be upset upon
99 393 U.S. at 60 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
100 415 U.S. at 738.
101 112 S. Ct. at 2063.
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hypothetical and unreal possibilities, if it would be good
upon the facts as they are'". He claims the record leads to
a "contrary conclusion" from that of the majority. 102
The citations above indicate that restrictions will
not be assumed to damage competition. This caution is
reflected in doubts about some of the tests put forward by
the "natural order" opinions. Justice Harry Blackmun's
concurring opinion in Illinois Board , for example, takes
issue with the three part test used by Marshall in the
majority opinion, calling it too filled with "easy
phrases", and thereby easy to misuse. He compares the
application of the "compelling state interest" test to past
Court use of the "substantive due process" doctrine in the
economic realm. 103
This reluctance to assume a burden on competition
appears to derive not only from the aforementioned sympathy
to state interests, but also from skepticism of the
rationale of the "natural order" jurists for their
decisions. These doubts are reflected in Stewart's Williams
dissent; he asserts that the majority's result seems in
part to rest on "possible doubts regarding the
permissibility of the legislative objective itself". 104
The "constructed order" does not share this suspicion of
102 460 U.S. at 809 (Rehnquist, J . , dissenting).
103 440 us _ at 188-89 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
104 393 U.S. at 53 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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legislative purposes and actions, and is thus willing to
hold their actions to a lesser legal standard.
If discrimination must therefore be proven, the
question becomes what evidence will be sought and examined.
One important factor is the comparative burden of ballot
access methods. The "constructed order" opinions have found
primaries, petition signatures, and conventions to be
equally burdensome routes to the ballot. Stewart's opinion
in Jenness asserts that obtaining signatures cannot be
assumed to be more burdensome than winning a primary. 105
This was reemphasized by White in American Party , who cites
primary turnout and Clifton McCleskey ' s Texas Politics on
the relative burdens of petition signatures and primaries.
In the same case, White is also unpersuaded that a
convention is more burdensome than a primary, stating that
"appellant's burden is not satisfied by mere
assertions". 106 Rehnquist's Anderson dissent even claims
that maj or parties bear the heavier organizational and
ballot access burden. 107
Challengers must also show evidence of efforts to
comply with existing requirements. Warren's and White's
Williams dissents argue that the laws were known by the
plaintiffs but no effort was made to comply, a fact they
105 403 U.S. at 434-40.
106 415 us> at 781/ 787-90.
107 460 U.S. at 816 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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find to be critical. 108 This is echoed by White in
American Party when he stresses that two minor parties were
able to meet Texas requirements, while one fell far short
of compliance and another made no effort to comply. 109
The "constructed order" perspective also considers
comparative laws from other states to be relevant evidence.
Stewart's Jenness opinion cites similar ballot access laws
from other states in upholding Georgia's five percent
signature requirement. 110 Historical and current
political experience within the state is also seen as
relevant evidence, as for example White's charge to the
District Court in his Storer remand of the Hall\Tyner
dispute asking that court to consider the facts of
California politics as evidence. 111
Another type of evidence examined by the "constructed
order" opinions is the nature of the current methods. In
his Munro opinion, White cites Washington's blanket primary
as offering virtually guaranteed access to a statewide
ballot. According to him, the requirement of a one percent
vote percentage in this primary is no real burden on the
108 393 U.S. at 62 (White, J., dissenting), 65
(Warren, C.J., dissenting). Cheif Justice Warren is even
skeptical of the 450,000 signatures collected by George
Wallace's supporters, stating correctly that they had never
been verified by the state.
109 415 U.S. at 778-79.
110 403 U.S. at 434.
111 415 U.S. at 742.
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political opportunity to access the general election
ballot. He also stresses that the 1977 legislation
requiring this primary vote percentage did seem to be
responding to increasingly cluttered ballots at that
time
.
112
One of the more pivotal items of evidence for the
"constructed order" perspective is being able to
demonstrate a "show of support". Stewart's opinion in
Jenness finds that Georgia's five percent signature
requirement does not infringe on any associational or
voting rights because it is simply demanding a reasonable
show of public support for the party. 113 A party must
show it can attract support in the marketplace of politics
This echoes White's Storer standards for legitimate third
parties and independent candidates. That opinion also
emphasizes the need to show public support, a task also
faced by major party candidates. 114
Blackmun's partial concurrence in Lubin highlighted a
important evidentiary corollary to the "show of support"
requirement: opportunity to show such support is assumed t
be unimpeded if alternative means of ballot access are
provided by the states . Blackmun argues that the main
problem in Lubin was a lack of alternative routes to the
112 479 U.S. at 196, 198.
113 403 U.S. at 437-40.
114 415 U.S . at 733
.
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ballot, and that the provision of a write-in option would
alleviate the issue. 115 This echoes Stewart's Jenness
opinion, which highlights the allowance of write-in votes
and independent candidates, the lenient filing deadline,
and the lack of a required primary under the Georgia system
as evidence that competition is not stifled. 116
This stress on alternative means of access is echoed
in all the "constructed order" opinions. White's opinion in
American Party notes four methods of ballot access
available to Texas candidates. 117
Rehnquist's Anderson dissent details alternate routes to
the Ohio ballot. 118 The same standard is employed by
White in Burdick : access by petition, primary, and
nonpartisan ballot is available to the challengers, and
therefore their ability to compete is not heavily
burdened
.
119
With these standards of evidence, the burden of proof
is placed on the challengers of state statutes, as the
"constructed order" opinions demonstrate. White's Munro
opinion, for example, argues that a "proof" of state
interests has never been required, citing Storer in
115 415 U.S. at 723 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
116 403 U.S. at 434, 438.
117 415 U.S. at 772-75.
118 460 U.S. at 807 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119 112 S. Ct. at 2066-67.
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particular: "there is no indication that we held California
to the burden of demonstrating empirically the objective
effects on political stability that were produced by the
one-year disaffiliation requirement". Requiring such proof,
according to White, would lead to "endless court battles
over the sufficiency of the 'evidence'". 120 The
"constructed order" perspective seems to have no such
evidentiary qualms when it comes to demanding proof from
challengers. In essence, the benefit of the doubt is given
to the states, whose word will be taken at face value; the
challengers of such laws bear the burden of proof. 121
The "constructed order" perspective shows itself to be
a friend of the states in its treatment of evidence and
burden. While challengers can make arguments, they must
show that no alternate means are available, that public
support has been offered, and that the means of access are
more burdensome than other means available to different
parties. Given these high standards, they have a difficult
task. It should thereby come as no surprise that the
120 479 U.S. at 194-95.
121 The employment of the "burden of proof" technique
for considering these cases is an indication that the
evidence is very much in dispute and/or difficult to
obtain. The demand that a "burden of proof" be satisfied
thus implies that assumptions and ideology will inevitably
color the interpretation of contested evidence. It thus
comes as no surprise that the interpretations of both
perspectives being examined here contain their own
particular assumptions.
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"constructed order" perspective also takes a positive
attitude toward the character and impact of state laws.
The Role of Government
The "constructed order" perspective, in addition to
its positive view of current party competition, sees state
laws as nondiscriminatory in character, with a neutral or
even positive impact on competition. This view of state
laws is reflected in White's Storer opinion, which cites
prevention of raiding and the protection of the integrity
of the electoral process as legitimate state objectives
furthered by such laws. 122 State regulations are not
merely neutral to party competition, but are legitimate
interventions to protect competition and the existing party
system.
The "constructed order" perspective justifies its
positive treatment of state authority over the ballot on
constitutional, legal, and political grounds. The most
important of these are the constitutional and legal
justifications for state management of the electoral
process. Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Anderson argues
that state authority in this area is proper, based on
Article 2, Section 1 of the Constitution (the "time, place
and manner" clause) . He also cites the Court's decision in
Macpherson v. Blacker as affirming legislative power in
122 415 US- at 731<
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this area. 123 Stewart's Williams dissent also frames the
question of state regulation as one of constitutional
power, not public policy. 124 Most recently, White's
opinion in Burdick argues that "common sense, as well as
constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government
must play an active role in structuring elections", and
that strict scrutiny would tie the hands of the states in
this area. 125
The "constructed order" view of federalism provides
another critical justification for their understanding of
the proper state role in this area. This is particularly
evident in the Williams dissents. Stewart refers to his
reluctance to strike down Ohio's laws by saying that to do
so would "require more insensitivity to constitutional
principles of federalism than I possess". 126 Warren's
dissent refers to "the need to promote orderly federal-
state relationships" and "the legitimate demands of
federalism"; he even asserts that "this Court is writing a
new presidential election law for the State of Ohio"
.
Warren also cites past Court deferments to the states in
"these sensitive areas", specifically on apportionment
123 460 U.S. at 806-9 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See
Mcpherson v. Blacker , 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
124 393 U.S. at 48 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
125 112 S. Ct. at 2062-63.
126 393 U.S. at 60 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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procedures. 127 It is quite clear that the "constructed
order" opinions have a sure idea of the proper roles of
federal and state governments in this area.
Positive treatment of state authority is also
justified in "political" terms, i.e., the state interests
in stability and integrity discussed earlier. White's
Storer opinion accepts California's proffered interests of
fairness, honesty, and order at face value. 128 His Munro
opinion reinforces these justifications, contending that
associational rights are not absolute and "are necessarily
subject to qualification if elections are to be run fairly
and effectively". 129 These interests are strongly
reminiscent of Progressive justifications for electoral
reform
.
Other state interests accepted by the "constructed
order" perspective also have a Progressive echo. White's
Burdick opinion emphasizes state interests in avoiding
divisive factionalism. Thus, Hawaii may try to prevent sore
loser candidates and party raiding by eliminating write-ins
as a method of circumventing anti-raiding laws. The
legitimate intent behind these interests, according to
127 393 U.S. at 65-69 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). The
quotes are from pages 66, 69, and 68, respectively.
128 415 us _ at 730.
129 479 U-S _ at 193 _
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White, is the maintenance of the "integrity of the
democratic system". 130
A state government may manage the electoral process,
so long as its interventions are proper. The classification
of parties is one such "proper" state intervention.
Stewart's Williams dissent views the majority as disputing
this legitimate legislative objective, and finds it
"inconceivable
. .
.
that the Constitution imposes on the
States a political philosophy under which they must be
satisfied to award election on the basis of a plurality
rather than a majority vote". 131
Stewart's Jenness opinion affirms the legitimacy of such
classification, asking rhetorically if nonmajor party
candidates would want to have to conduct a primary, as the
major parties in Georgia are required to do. 132
Regarding another type of state management, White's
opinion in American Party approves of the state's right to
permit only one "voting act". While states can allow
multiple acts, the Court cannot impose an affirmative duty
to do this. White cites one Supreme Court and three lower
court decisions in support of this assertion. 133 His
Storer opinion also cites the legitimacy of this
130 112 S. Ct. at 2066-67.
131 393 U.S. at 48, 53-54 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
132 403 U.S. at 442.
133 415 us at 785 _
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limitation. 134 These justifications and "approved" state
actions, in sum, indicate an unwillingness on the part of
these justices to intrude into state decisions, reminiscent
of Warren's Williams dissent. For reasons of
constitutionality, federalism, and political viewpoint, the
"constructed order" opinions give the states wide leeway in
managing the conduct of the party system and the electoral
process
.
Conclusions
As this chapter has shown, the Court's ballot access
opinions, from Williams in 1968 to Burdick in 1992, can be
seen not only as a shifting treatment of ballot access
regulation, but as a continuing debate over the status of
party competition, the current party system, and the impact
of state laws on that system. One perspective sees a
legitimate "constructed order of politics", while the other
sees an "natural order of politics" distorted by state
regulation. The Court's ballot access opinions reflect a
theoretical agreement on the need for party competition and
the prohibition of discrimination. They are also united in
their emphasis that parties must demonstrate a "show of
support" from the public. The justices appear to agree in
theory on the basic nature of a party. They also agree that
the state has a legitimate role to play in structuring the
134 415 U.S. at 741.
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electoral process. Beyond these basic values, however, the
justices part company on how parties and the party system
operate in practice, particularly with regard to questions
of democracy (party competition) and authority (the
legitimacy of state laws regulating access to the ballot)
.
There is major disagreement between the two
perspectives on a variety of issues. First, they do not
agree on what constitutes healthy party competition. The
"constructed order" jurists believe that the two major
parties allow for sufficient competition, while the
"natural order" justices believe that a system monopolized
by two parties stifles full competition. As a result, those
who embrace the "natural order" perspective put a special
emphasis on the unique and pivotal role of third parties in
promoting competition, particularly in the realm of ideas.
With regard to the functions of parties, the electoral
function is not disputed. The "natural order", however,
places greater and more explicit emphasis on the issue-
raising function of parties than does the "constructed
order" . The perspective seems also to have a skeptical view
of the openness of membership and control in the two major
parties
.
The two perspectives also take very different
approaches to issues of federalism. The "constructed order"
is reluctant to interfere with state judgments regarding
regulation of the electoral process. Even when ruling
against a state ballot access law, these justices ground
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their decision on the narrowest rationale, preserving as
much state freedom as possible. The "natural order", on the
other hand, is much more willing to question state
regulations and to hold states to a high standard of
compelling interest. From these different views of
federalism and the dynamics of the party system come the
continuing divisions on the Court over ballot access
regulation
.
A number of observations are relevant to the analysis
of these ballot access opinions. The opinions which contain
these perspectives tend to focus on the perspective's
central concerns, and give little attention to "opposing"
points of view. In the "constructed order" opinions, scant
attention is given to third parties, and discrimination is
not focused upon. The "natural order" opinions, in
contrast, are limited in their discussion of the nature of
parties or the interests of the state. Each addresses a
different facet of the questions considered here, and their
views on other facets are more implied than explicit.
Both perspectives are also "silent", in evidentiary
terms, on some of their central assertions. Their cases, in
essence, are both based in part on assumptions, and neither
gives a full and convincing factual defense of its
positions. The nature of the judicial forum and its modes
of discourse helps to explain these facts. Since much of
the Court's approach is based on precedent, past arguments
and positions are often repeated in a string of cases; we
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have seen this in the foregoing analysis. In addition, the
legal opinion is not a debate pamphlet or a treatise,
though elements of both do slip into some opinions; an
opinion need not cite data nor meet all possible issues,
but must simply convey the legal findings of the court
involved. This lack of focus on factual evidence is a
result of the Supreme Court's identity as an appellate
court, rather than a trial court. It may only examine the
facts found at trial for their sufficiency or their
connection to the proper legal doctrine to be applied in
the case. As a result, assertions in opinions can seem very
stark
.
While these artifacts of the legal forum shape the
verbal content of the opinions, they do not determine the
essential positions taken. The views explored here are
substantive stances, not verbal figureheads trotted out to
make a foundationless decision. The opinions, despite their
skeletal nature, contain very real perspectives and
positions
.
In terms of the justices' allegiances and voting
records, there are some fairly clear divisions. One finds
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas giving consistent
support to the "natural order" perspective, while Justices
White, Sandra Day O'Connor, Stewart, Scalia, and Rehnquist
have consistently supported the "constructed order"
perspective. Other Justices, such as Blackmun, Lewis
Powell, Stevens, and Burger, have shifted their stances
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over time, and have thereby held the balance between these
two "blocs". The "constructed order" perspective is in the
majority most frequently, but the "natural order"
perspective continues to press its views in dissents, and
has in fact won some major victories in Williams and
Anderson
.
There is also a more subtle division in these cases
which crosscuts the division I have sketched. This is
between those cases that have had a unanimous or an eight
member majority opinion, versus those cases where at least
two justices have dissented from the majority. Examining
the cases from this perspective shows us where the
"persuadable justices" have been able to bring the opposing
perspectives together, and where they have landed when the
two viewpoints could not be reconciled. They also reveal
what the "unbending principles" of each perspective are.
In the "unanimous" column (9-0 or 8-1) , we find six
opinions: Jenness , Bullock , Lubin , American Party , Illinois
Board , and Norman . The connecting threads in these cases
appear to be the presence or absence of alternative avenues
to obtain ballot access, as well as an emphasis on equal
treatment for equally situated parties. In Jenness and
American Party , alternative means of access were judged to
be easily available, and so the Georgia and Texas signature
requirements were upheld. In Bullock and Lubin , the Texas
and California filing fees at issue were seen to bar all
alternative means of access to the ballot, and were
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therefore overturned. Illinois Board and Norman both
involved Illinois statutes that imposed differential
signature requirements for local and statewide ballot
access that fell more heavily on local candidates. Since
this was clearly unequal treatment of similar parties, the
requirements were overturned.
On the substantive side, these unanimous cases reflect
an agreement that similar parties must be treated alike and
that multiple means of access to the ballot must be
available. With regard to the justices and the two
perspectives, they demonstrate that the two "blocs" are not
rigidly opposed to each other; there are some areas where
both perspectives can agree.
Despite this unanimity, the differences were still
present even in these cases. Internal Court memos, for
example, reflect that both Powell and Stewart may have had
some hesitation and doubt in the Illinois Board case. Both
wrote to Marshall indicating they would wait for
concurrences (in Powell's case, Rehnquist's) before joining
Marshall's opinion. 135 This fits both their stance as
"middle figures" on these issues, as well as their general
leanings toward the "constructed order" perspective.
By comparison, there were five cases in which at least
two justices dissented from the majority: Williams (6-3)
,
135 Justice Lewis Powell memo to Thurgood Marshall,
January 4, 1979, and Potter Stewart memo to Thurgood
Marshall, December 9, 1978, Folder 10, Box 228, Thurgood
Marshall Papers.
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Storer (6-3), Anderson (5-4), Munro (7-2), and Burdick (6-
3) . Of these, Williams and Anderson followed the "natural
order" perspective, while Storer
, Munro, and Burdick (all
authored by White) followed the "constructed order"
perspective. The causes of division in these cases appear
to be rooted in the different views of healthy party
competition elaborated in this chapter, but also in the
respective facts, which point less clearly to an obvious
decision than the facts of the unanimous cases. In all of
these cases, the alternative means of access were more
complex and restricted. The skepticism about their
effectiveness was increased by the biases of the state
political cultures involved, particularly the political
cultures of Ohio ( Williams , Anderson ) and Hawaii ( Burdick )
.
The presence of six opinions in Williams (a majority
opinion fully joined by one concurrence, another concurring
opinion, and three dissents) is a clear example of how
deeply these issues can divide the justices. 136
What differences do these contentious cases reveal?
Anderson and Williams both dealt with Ohio presidential
filing deadlines, which the "constructed order" saw as
efficacious and the "natural order" saw as stifling. Storer
dealt with a disaffiliation requirement, with the same
divisions as Williams . Munro dealt with a one percent
136 It is noteworthy that commentators have given
little or no attention to the divisions in Williams, since
it is a foundational case for party freedom of association
jurisprudence
.
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primary vote requirement, and Burdick with a ban on write-
in votes. The justices divided on how severely these
restricted competition and how many alternate means were
effectively available.
With the departure from the Court of the leading
proponents of the "natural order" perspective, Justices
Brennan, Douglas and Marshall, it would appear that the
"constructed order" view will have greater prominence in
ballot access jurisprudence, with the "natural order"
opinions preserving that perspective by virtue of their
precedential weight. The areas where the justices agree are
likely to remain stable. The results of Norman and Burdick
seem to bear out these predictions . Burdick shows the
"constructed order" view in ascendance, while Norman
represents the type of common ground on which the justices
have met in other earlier decisions.
The justices who bear watching as to the future of
this debate are the Burdick dissenters: Kennedy, Blackmun,
and Stevens. The latter two have been swing votes in past
cases, and the trend of the Court may be pushing them
towards the Marshall\Brennan position. Kennedy is a
relative newcomer to these cases. Future cases will show us
how these alignments fare.
Beyond the Court, these two perspectives may be found
in the literature of political science on party
competition, the functions of parties, and the nature of
state electoral laws. With regard to the competitiveness of
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the current party system, most political scientists seem to
share Penniman's assessment that third party weakness is
due to politics and not laws. Most, however, do underscore
the important historical role that third parties have
played in the United States. With regard to the nature,
membership, and functions of the major parties, most
political scientists would agree that their main purpose is
electoral, though this point has been debated by the
proponents of "responsible parties" for many decades. The
vulnerability of party membership and control to outside
influences, and whether party membership should be defined
as party worker or ticket voter, are as actively debated in
political science as they are amongst the justices. With
regard to the state role in the electoral process, most
political scientists acknowledge that state management of
the electoral process at some level is likely to be a
permanent part of American politics. Even those who argue
for the legal deregulation of parties understand and accept
such a state role. In this, they appear to agree with the
mainstream of thought on the Court
.
The practical implications for parties and the polity
in this continuing debate are important, albeit restrained
by the passive nature of the Court's ability to address
these issues, i.e., ballot access disputes must be brought
to court and must climb the appeals ladder to the Court.
The debate reveals a continuing split in the opinions, and
among the justices, regarding the competitive health of the
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current party system, the functions of parties, and the
impact of state regulation of the ballot. Since the ballot
is a tool for all parties, such continuing disagreement is
not positive for either the major parties, which face
uncertainty as to third party and other challenger's access
to voters, or independent and third party challengers, who
face uncertainty as to their ability to access the ballot.
If these opinions are indicative of the Court's general
viewpoints on party and electoral issues, it may not be a
wise forum for those who seek stable standards for ballot
access or a consistent view of the current party system.
The implications of the justices' divisions for
parties and the electoral process are thus twofold. The
agreements on the nature of parties and the general shape
of the democratic system indicate that parties will
continue to be recognized and have a basic set of rights.
The more troubling implications, however, lie in the
differences over the party system and state regulations.
Neither side of the "argument" has formulated a sharply
defined standard beyond some general phrases, and neither
side has fully convinced the other or consistently
dominated the Court's rulings. This means that a ballot
access litigant can never be sure of the standard or result
to expect from the Court, making it a risky forum for
trying to open up access to the ballot, as well as for
advancing the rights of third parties and independent
candidates more generally. The following chapters will
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indicate whether the justices have been equally divided in
their views of other parts of the electoral process and the
party system.
Ill
CHAPTER 3
NOMINATION METHODS, PARTY ORGANIZATION AND THE
COURT
Like many other electoral activities, the
organizational structures of political parties, as well as
their methods for nominating candidates for office, were
originally private matters managed by the parties. Early
parties determined their own structure and membership
without government intervention, and made nominations by
caucuses or conventions of their own devising. These
methods evolved through the first half of the nineteenth
century. 1 State governments made their first forays
into the governance of party activities following the Civil
War, when a number of states enacted party primary laws.
The initial impact of these interventions was minimal, as
these laws were either optional or narrowly constructed and
thus either integrated into party practices or avoided.
Most parties continued to have full control over
organization, membership, and nomination of candidates
until the late 19th century. 2
The widespread adoption of Australian (secret) ballot
laws by state governments between 1888 and 1900 provided
the legal and political impetus for wider regulation of
1 V.O. Key, Politics, Parties, And Pressure Groups ,
5th ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), pp. 371-72.
2 Charles E. Merriam and Louise Overacker, Primary
Elections (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1928). See also
Penniman, Sait's American Parties , p. 277.
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parties during the Progressive Era. The scattered and
optional primary laws became more widespread and mandatory,
as a number of states enacted statutes governing party
organization and party registration for voters. The main
justification for these direct primary and party
organization statutes, voiced most consistently by
Wisconsin Governor (later U.S. Senator) Robert La Follette,
Sr., was to take power out of the hands of corrupt
political machines and their "bosses" and return it to "the
People"
.
3
Despite some resistance by parties and a period of
limited use in the presidential nominating process, primary
and party organizational statutes have persisted and given
the states an important role in shaping the electoral
process. These statutes have also captured the imagination
of a majority of the American public, to such a degree that
arguments for returning control of party organizations and
the nomination process to the parties are greeted with
considerable skepticism. This is particularly true in the
states where the Progressive tradition has its strongest
roots
.
4
3 Robert M. La Follette, La Follette' s Autobiography
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960) . La
Follette' s confidence in "the people" is an ubiquitous
theme in the book, but is particularly well stated on p.
96 .
4 For recent and striking polling data on the
acceptance of primaries, see Sabato, The Party' s Just
Begun , p. 207.
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The justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, in seven major
decisions since 1972, have played an important role in
modifying the legal order in this area. The majority
viewpoint among the justices has given parties
substantially increased authority over their nominating
procedures and internal party structures, while still
leaving a role for some state regulation if compelling
state interests in such regulation can be demonstrated. As
a result, the parties have now regained a measure of their
previous authority over their internal structures and
decisionmaking
.
The arguments and divisions among the justices in the
seven cases to be examined in this chapter are similar to
those in the ballot access opinions. The majority of the
justices in these cases have voted to overturn state laws,
arguing that they take away the freedom of association that
properly belongs to the party. The justices who depart from
the majority view argue that much greater deference should
be accorded to state interests and to democratically
enacted state laws, since the states have authority under
the Constitution to manage elections as they see fit. On
one side are justices who argue for party freedom, facing
justices who are more sympathetic to state interests.
While there is less talk of "monopoly" in these
opinions than in the ballot access decisions, the
undertones of such a viewpoint are evident if one examines
the question of who the justices trust to make decisions
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about organization and nomination. The majority of justices
put faith in the parties themselves, and doubt the
intentions of the status quo state governments. The
dissenting justices defer to the authority of popularly
elected officeholders as a proper expression of democracy.
As in the ballot access decisions, some justices trust the
"constructed order", while the majority are more skeptical
of its relation to the "natural order" of politics and
democracy
.
The "Natural Order" Viewpoint
The majority of justices in the party governance
opinions take a dim view of state restrictions on party
organization, party registration, and nomination
procedures. The major contention of these justices is that
the character of parties, and thereby the electoral
process, is distorted by state-mandated structures and
procedures which reduce democratic control and
opportunities for choice. This structuring, a kind of
"construction" of a mutant political order, is viewed as
unjustified by the state interests asserted. The views of
these justices on competition, parties, legal standards,
and state law reflect this concern.
Party Competition and Choice
At the heart of the "natural order" perspective is a
belief in the constitutional freedom of parties to choose
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their own methods of governance and nomination, and a
belief that such freedom is the best guarantor of full
democratic competition. This is evident in Cousins v.
Wigoda, the first full decision by the justices in this
area. 5 Cousins involved delegates from Illinois to the
1972 Democratic National Convention. Upholding the freedom
of the convention to choose which of two sets of delegates
it will seat to represent Illinois, the Cousins majority
grounds their decision in the party membership's right of
association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Illinois statutes are viewed as constituting a
"significant interference" with that freedom. According to
the author of the majority opinion, Justice Brennan,
competition is best structured by the parties, not state
governments
.
s
The particular effects of state laws like that of
Illinois on competition are also cited by Brennan. He
connects the law in question to the ballot access
decisions, arguing that the nomination process can restrict
5 Cousins , 419 U.S. 477 (1975) . Cousins was preceded
by O'Brien v. Brown , 409 U.S. 1 (1972), a brief per curiam
decision which involved a dispute between the National
Democratic Party and individuals from California and
Illinois who had been chosen as delegates to the 1972
Democratic National Convention, over their delegate status.
The case is important in "freedom of association" terms
because it explicitly states that there is an "absence of
authority ...in intervening in the internal determinations
of a national political party, on the eve of its
convention, regarding the seating of delegates". 409 U.S.
at 4 .
6 419 U.S. at 487-88.
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voter choice as much as a restricted ballot. He cites a
dissent by Justice Pitney in Newberry v. U.S. to buttress
his argument for the importance of nominations for
competitive choice: "the likelihood of a candidate
succeeding in an election without a party nomination is
practically negligible ... as a practical matter, the
ultimate choice of the mass of voters is predetermined when
the nominations have been made". 7 State laws restricting
the national process of the convention ultimately damage
national voter choice and thereby reduce competition.
Although the justices in Cousins do not discuss it
explicitly, their decision in this Illinois dispute is also
highly relevant to local voter choice and the
representational concerns of minority groups. The alternate
delegation seated by the 1972 Democratic Convention was led
by Jesse Jackson, long a spokesman for minority concerns,
and was chosen to challenge the "official" Illinois
delegation. The "official" delegation effectively
represented the interests of Chicago Mayor Richard Daley's
political "machine", at a time when Daley's organization
appeared to be increasingly unresponsive to African-
7 Cousins , 419 U.S. at 490, quoting Newberry v. U.S . ,
256 U.S. 232, 286 (1921). Newberry involved the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act of 1910 and its regulations on
congressional campaign spending; U.S. Senator Truman
Newberry's conviction for violating these regulations was
overturned by a four justice plurality that argued Congress
has no power over primaries. That line of reasoning was
later firmly rejected in Smith v. Allwright.
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Americans and their concerns. 8 Thus, Cousins offered
"after the fact" support to the ongoing effort to open up
participation in Democratic Party politics. 9
This emphasis on protecting and expanding competition
is also evident in Marshall's majority opinion in Tashi ian
v. Republican Party of Connecticut , which involved the
Connecticut Republican Party's effort to open some of its
primary elections to unaffiliated voters, a practice
prohibited by the state's closed primary law. Upholding the
right of the Connecticut Republicans to allow participation
of these voters, Marshall states that "the Party's attempt
to broaden the base of public participation in and support
for its activities is conduct undeniably central to the
exercise of the right of association". 10 This is clearly
supportive of allowing parties to broaden their base of
8 Though he had initially had strong political support
from the African-American wards of Chicago, a series of
events- -including Martin Luther King, Jr.'s open housing
march in 1966 --had soured the relationship between
minorities and the Daley "machine". Michael B. Preston,
"Political Change In The City: Black Politics In Chicago,
1871-1987", in Peter F. Nardulli, ed., Diversity, Conflict,
and State Politics: Regionalism in Illinois (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1989), pp. 178-94.
9 The 1972 seating of the alternate Illinois
delegation can be seen as a part of the culmination of a
process that began in 1964 with the unsuccessful attempts
of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party delegation to
be seated at the Democratic National Convention. This
effort helped build the momentum for the expansion of
minority group participation in Democratic Party
decisionmaking processes.
10 479 U.S. at 214.
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participation if they so choose, even if this overturns
contrary state law.
This emphasis is strengthened by Marshall's discussion
of Connecticut's claim that the Republican's plan would
impose a substantial administrative burden on the state. In
finding against the claim, Marshall asserts that "the State
could not forever protect the two existing major parties
from competition solely on the ground that two major
parties are all the public can afford"
. In drawing an
analogy between keeping a third party off the ballot due to
administrative cost and prohibiting unaffiliated voters in
a primary, Marshall reveals a continuing concern with
monopoly, as well as suspicion of state justifications for
restricting the political playing field. 11
Participation, however, is not equated with
organizational anarchy in the "natural order" perspective.
Marshall's Tashi ian opinion emphasizes the borders of the
association, referring to the Democratic Party v. La
Follette decision and its emphasis on "the freedom to
identify the people who constitute the association" ; a
footnote also stresses that the decision applies only to
unaffiliated voters, not to voters of other parties. 12
Thus, competition is not unequivocally opened across all
party boundaries. Nonetheless, the principal authority for
11 479 U.S. at 218.
12 479 U.S. at 224-25, n. 13.
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determining a party's boundaries should be the party, since
"a major state political party necessarily includes
individuals playing a broad spectrum of roles in the
organization's activities", roles which the party can best
recognize
.
13
Another aspect of competition relates to a party's
ability to endorse candidates for nomination; this issue is
addressed in the nearly unanimous opinion in Eu v. San
Francisco County Democratic Central Committee . Marshall's
majority opinion cites the campaign finance case of Buckley
v. Valeo for the proposition that "debate on the
qualifications of candidates" is a central part of our
democratic system. Debate is a form of competition, which
these justices seek to protect and encourage. Nor do they
limit its range: "free discussion about candidates for
public office is no less critical before a primary than
before a general election". 14
Any effort to limit public discussion or access is
regarded as highly suspect by the "natural order"
perspective. In Eu, Marshall notes that "a 'highly
paternalistic approach' limiting what people may hear is
generally suspect". 15 The strong connection between
speech, association, and competition drawn by these
13 479 U.S. at 214-15.
14 489 U.S. at 223, citing Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S.
1 ( per curiam ) (1976)
.
15 489 U.S. at 223 .
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justices is evident in Eu: let the parties and the voters
make their own decisions in an open political "field", with
only minimal state restriction of their choices.
Cases involving party registration requirements for
voters also raise issues of competition and its
restriction. In his dissent in Rosario v. Rockefeller , a
case in which the majority justices upheld a New York State
statute that mandated a deadline for party registration in
order to vote in a future party primary, Justice Powell,
joined by Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, characterizes New
York's requirement as "facially burdensome", as well as
"substantial and unnecessary ". 16 Since "a citizen without
a vote is to a large extent one without a voice in
decisions which may profoundly affect him and his family",
choice is restricted by New York. Such a restriction can
prevent a citizen "from voting in a primary in response to
a sympathetic candidate, a new or meaningful issue, or
changing party philosophies in his State", and in so doing
it "runs contrary to the fundamental rights of personal
choice and expression which voting in this country was
designed to serve". 17 Political competition is distorted
by such restrictions, since political outcomes are
affected
.
16 Rosario v. Rockefeller , 410 U.S. 752, 763-764
(Powell, J., dissenting); emphasis mine.
17 410 U.S. at 764, 769-70 (Powell, J., dissenting!
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Powell also disagrees with the majority in Rosario
that these restrictions are due to the inaction of the
voters themselves. According to Powell, he could agree with
this if the registration deadline were "less severe", but
It is difficult to perceive any persuasive basis
for a registration or party enrollment deadline
eight to 11 months prior to election. Failure to
comply with such an extreme deadline can hardly
be used to justify denial of a fundamental
constitutional right. Numerous prior decisions
impose on us the obligation to protect the
continuing availability of the franchise for all
citizens, not to sanction its prolonged deferment
or deprivation. 18
Nor does Powell find the fact that the ban is not absolute
to be persuasive. A substantial infringement is still an
infringement, and this one "totally disenfranchises" a
particular class of citizens who register or change party
affiliation late "for quite legitimate reasons". 19
The implicit standard used by these justices to
evaluate such restrictions is a comparison of state laws on
a national basis. Powell emphasizes that New York's
requirements are "lengthy", and that New York is the only
state with such severe restrictions; the law's uniqueness
appears to be reason for suspicion to these justices, as
more lenient laws from a variety of states are cited in a
footnote. Powell notes that "other States, with varied and
complex party systems, have maintained them successfully
without the advanced enrollment deadline imposed by New
18 410 U.S. at 765 (Powell, J., dissenting).
19 410 U.S. at 765-67 (Powell, J., dissenting)
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York". 20 Competition, in essence, should only be burdened
if absolutely necessary for its own preservation, and a
national standard is best for evaluating this issue.
The concern of the "natural order" perspective for
open competition is clearly reflected in these cases. Party
registration deadlines, restriction of primary
participation, and state control over who participates in
the nomination process at a national party convention are
all called into question as restrictions on freedom of
association. The deeper concern, however, is to protect the
right of parties and voters to make free choices in order
to protect democratic competition.
Party Structure and Functions
The justices who favor the "natural order"
perspective, as seen in the discussion of competition,
believe in the right of parties to determine much of their
own structure and procedures. In general, state governments
should be only minimally involved in determining a party's
procedures, particularly those of a national party. As a
result, the decisions favor a variety of party choices,
some that restrict participation in a party procedure 21
20 Rosario, 410 U.S. at 763-64, 771 (Powell, J.,
dissenting)
.
21 La Follette , 450 U.S. 107 (1981), where the
Justices upheld the right of the National Democratic Party
to bar Wisconsin from binding the votes of its delegates to
the Democratic National Convention on the basis of the
results in Wisconsin's open primary, thus allowing it to
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and some that open up participation in a party primary. 22
These justices do not take a "black and white" stand on
what a party should look like, but leave that choice to the
parties themselves.
Brennan's majority opinion in Cousins takes a clear
position in favor of party choice, arguing against the
proposition that "the interest of the state in protecting
the effective right to participate in primaries is
superior" to the party's interests. He even questions if
the state's objective could be achieved, since the
Convention could refuse to seat the state's delegates. 23
This sounds odd when placed against the concerns for
competition and voter choice noted in the last section and
in the ballot access cases, but it is a nuanced
distinction. While these justices are concerned with the
state restricting voter choice, there is an equal concern
with the restriction of party choice. With regard to
internal affairs, such as nomination procedures, the
parties are seen as properly in control of their own
identity, including the essential question of
restrict its participatory boundaries to publicly
affiliated Democrats.
22 Tashiian , 479 U.S. 208 (1986), where the
Connecticut Republicans sought to open parts of their
primary to unaffiliated voters.
23 419 U.S. at 488.
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boundaries. 24 Parties are seen as both better
decisionmakers than state legislatures and better
representatives of the democratic and competitive interests
at stake. 25
Brennan also speaks to the role of the national
convention. In concluding his opinion, he states that "this
is a case where 'the convention itself [was] the proper
forum for determining intra-party disputes as to which
delegates [should] be seated'". 26 The party machinery is
thus properly employed to decide party issues; barring the
prevention of discrimination, government has no role in
such situations. As we have seen in the examination of the
ballot access cases, state intrusions are seen as
artificially biasing the political system; the same applies
to internal party affairs.
The justices' concern for the integrity of the free
choices of party organizations and processes is evident in
Stewart's majority opinion in La Follette , in which the
justices ruled that Wisconsin could not bind the votes of
its delegates to the Democratic National Convention to the
24 The major constitutional exception to this control
is a prohibition on invidiously discriminatory practices
that would exclude certain groups such as African-
Americans. This was established by the Court's rulings in
the aforementioned "White Primary" cases, which culminated
in Smith v. Allwright .
25 For an argument favoring this interpretation, see
Gottlieb, "The Courts And Party Reform".
26 419 U.S. at 491, quoting 0' Brien , 409 U.S. 1, 4.
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results of Wisconsin's open primary, since that would
violate national Democratic Party rules restricting
nomination procedures to Democrats only. 27 Stewart states
that past Court opinions have noted "that the inclusion of
persons unaffiliated with a political party may seriously
distort its collective decisions, thus impairing the
party's essential functions". On that basis, "political
parties may accordingly protect themselves 'from intrusion
by those with adverse political principles'". 28 The
Wisconsin law is seen as opening the door to such
intrusions
.
With regard to the issue of intrusion in Wisconsin,
Stewart cites David Adamany's study of crossover voting in
Wisconsin primary elections, to explain the derivation of
Rule 2A restricting participation to declared Democrats.
Adamany's numbers on past crossover voting are recited in
detail in a footnote. 29 Adamany's data and argument
generally support the justices' overall arguments, as he
finds that crossover voters may well "dilute" the role of
27 La Follette . 450 U.S. 107. The specific rule at
issue is Democratic Party Rule 2A, passed to ensure that
party delegation votes are not manipulated by forces
outside the Party.
28 450 U.S. at 122, quoting Ray v. Blair , 343 U.S.
214, 221-22 (1953) .
29 4 5 0 U.S. at 118-19.
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Democratic voters. 30 Stewart makes it clear in a footnote
that raiding, i.e., crossing over with intent to disrupt,
is not at issue here; the Democrat's concern is "with
crossover voters in general, regardless of their
motivation"
.
31
Two examples from past political contests reveal how
the purpose of the direct primary could be frustrated by
"outside forces". In 1938, the Republican state chairman of
Georgia sent a letter urging Republicans to vote in the
Democratic primary, in order to nominate conservative
Walter George for reelection to the U.S. Senate. 32 Thirty-
four years later, George Wallace won the 1972 Michigan
Democratic presidential primary with large numbers of
crossover voters. 33 It was this type of "abuse" to which
the majority justices appear to be objecting in the La
Follette case.
This emphasis on free party choice is reinforced by
Marshall's Tashi ian opinion, as we have seen in our
30 David Adamany, "Cross-Over Voting and the
Democratic Party's Reform Rules", American Political
Science Review 70 (June 1976), pp. 536-41. Adamany states
that the evidence he presents "tends to confirm the factual
assumptions underlying the Democratic party's rules
preferring advance party registration of voters
participating in delegate selection primaries".
31 450 U.S. at 123, n. 23 .
32 Kenneth S. Davis, FDR: Into The Storm. 1937-1940
(New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 291-92.
33 John F. Bibby, Politics. Parties. And Elections In
America
, p . 173
.
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discussion of competition. Marshall notes that there is a
"spectrum of roles" to be filled in a party, and elaborates
on his view thus:
Some of the Party's members devote substantial
portions of their lives to furthering its
political and organizational goals, others
provide substantial financial support, while
still others limit their participation to casting
their votes for some or all of the Party's
candidates. Considered from the standpoint of the
Party itself, the act of formal enrollment or
public affiliation with the Party is merely one
element in the continuum of participation in
Party affairs, and need not be in any sense the
most important . 34
A party is seen as a multifaceted organization best able to
determine the avenues of participation in its activities.
Marshall makes yet another distinction about the
structure of parties in his Eu opinion. In dismissing the
state claim that the parties "consented" to the preprimary
endorsement ban, he separates the party members from the
official structure of the party; they have independent
views and rights. According to Marshall, "it is wholly
undemonstrated that the members authorized the parties to
consent to infringements of members' rights". 35 Thus,
parties are viewed as complex and multifaceted entities by
the "natural order" perspective.
In Tashi ian , Marshall also notes the damage state laws
can do to parties and their activities. He analogizes the
restriction of primary voting to party members to
34 479 U.S. at 215; emphasis added.
35 489 U.S. at 225, footnote 18.
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restrictions on financial support for party nominees to
party members, and emphasizes that such prohibitions would
clearly infringe on associational rights. He makes it clear
that the key decision maker is the party; if the party does
not want the nonmembers to participate, they have some
right to restrict such participation. 36
Marshall cites Julia Guttmann's Yale Law Journal
article on the La Follette decision to emphasize the
centrality of the party's right to choose. 37 Guttmann
argues that the pivotal issue is the right of the party to
set its own boundaries, and agrees with the distinction of
Nader v. Schaeffer38 :
Central to our conception of the political party
is its ability to determine what its ideological
slant and its base of support will be-whether the
party will be broad-based and non- ideological or
closely-knit and ideological. Thus, deference to
the political party's ability to define its own
boundaries forms an appropriate cornerstone for
the law of state regulation of participation in
primary elections, as that ability goes to the
very heart of freedom of association. 39
Guttmann's piece, however, also argues that the justices'
application of the means-ends test in La Follette has
36 479 U.S. at 215, including note 6.
37 Tashiian , 479 U.S. at 216, citing Guttmann,
"Primary Elections"
.
38 Nader v. Schaeffer , 417 F. Supp . 837 (D. Conn.
1976), aff'd. mem. 429 U.S. 989 (1976), in which the
justices upheld a lower court decision denying an
unaffiliated voter's challenge to his exclusion from the
Connecticut Republican primary.
39 Guttmann, "Primary Elections", p. 13 7.
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turned it "into a virtual guarantee of the supremacy of the
right of political association" by "insulating" freedom of
association from claims of state interests. 40 Thus, the
majority view is not unequivocally supported by this
citation, as Guttmann argues that state interests cannot be
illogically ignored by an absolute freedom of association.
The "natural order" justices do recognize particular
functions as central to parties as organizations. The
nomination of candidates is one of these functions. In
Tashi ian
, Marshall emphasizes the centrality of nominating
power to party activities. He describes the nomination of
candidates as a "basic function" of parties, citing the
party registration case of Kusper v. Pontikes . He describes
this function as a pivotal political moment, "the crucial
juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be
translated into concerted action, and hence to political
power in the community". 41
Marshall emphasizes that Connecticut's approach to
nominating activity leaves the party no way to broaden
participation in this process beyond publicly affiliated
members if they so choose; the state insists on a public
act of affiliation. 42 The party's power over nominations
is thereby reduced, because the pool of decisionmakers is
40 Guttmann, "Primary Elections", p. 13 6.
41 479 U.S. at 216-17, including note 7, citing Kusper
v. Pontikes , 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
42 Tashi ian , 479 U.S. at 216-17.
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not of the party's design. Marshall thus makes a direct
connection between a central function of parties and the
freedom of parties to choose how they structure themselves
to perform that function. His opinion in Eu quotes Tashi ian
and reaffirms this position. 43
Marshall's opinion in Eu reflects the "natural order"
view that the right of parties to manage their own
structure and leadership, as well as nomination procedures,
is protected by the Constitution. Citing the precedents of
Cousins
, LaFollette , and Tashi ian , Marshall asserts that
California's laws regarding party structure prevent "the
political parties from governing themselves with the
structure they think best" and restrict "the parties'
choice of leaders" . He then proceeds to describe a variety
of leadership and organizational changes that the parties
could not make under the California statutes. He contends
that "the associational rights at stake are much stronger
than those we credited in Tashi ian " ; party members are
seeking only internal power to choose their leaders, not
power over the more public nomination process. 44 The fact
that Eu was a nearly unanimous decision, while Tashi ian was
closely divided, reflects that even the "constructed order"
justices appreciate the strength of that associational
claim.
43 489 U.S. at 224.
44 489 U.S. at 230.
131
At the heart of the dispute over party membership and
who should manage the structure and functions of parties is
the issue of distortion. Two types of distortion issues
concern the "natural order" justices: the distortion of
party choices by "raiding" or "crossover" voting, and the
distortion of these choices by state-mandated procedures of
voting or delegate selection. Notably, their concern with
distortion is centered on the parties, but not on the
choices of popularly elected state governments.
Powell's Rosario dissent addresses the issue of
distortion by "party raiding" and "crossover" voting,
asserted as a state interest by New York. He admits that
such a state interest is legitimate, since raiding would
damage "the efficacy of the party system in the democratic
process" and "its usefulness in providing a unity of
divergent factions in an alliance for power", quoting from
the lower court's opinion. However, he takes issue with the
"presumption" that "most persons who change or declare
party affiliation nearer than eight to 11 months to a party
primary do so with intent to raid that primary" . According
to Powell, "any such presumption assumes a willingness to
manipulate the system which is not likely to be
widespread" . 45
The affiliation decisions of citizens are usually
unrelated to any desire to disrupt a party, according to
45 410 U.S. at 768-69 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Powell; they decide their vote on the basis of candidates
and issues. 46 This latter point seems implicitly to
reflect an awareness of how the role of parties has
diminished in favor of individual candidates.
Powell also sees raiding as less germane to a situation
such as New York's, where previously unaffiliated voters
are involved. 47 Thus, the concern about distortion should
not center solely on raiding, but also on the voting
restrictions that the statute brings about.
Powell's Rosario dissent takes a skeptical view of
raiding, and a pessimistic view of the fortunes of parties.
According to Powell, parties are not the political force
they used to be:
Partisan political activities do not constantly
engage the attention of large numbers of
Americans, especially as party labels and
loyalties tend to be less persuasive than issues
and the qualities of individual candidates. 48
The threat of raiding is also usually more immediate than
the eight to eleven month period imposed by the statute. A
deadline closer to the primary would therefore place less
burden on the right to participate and vote, while still
protecting the party from whatever dangers of raiding do
exist. 49 The state should thus adopt less drastic measures
46 Rosario , 410 U.S. at 769 (Powell, J., dissenting).
47 410 U.S. at 770 (Powell, J., dissenting).
48 410 U.S. at 771 (Powell, J., dissenting).
49 410 U.S. at 771 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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to guard against this possible disruption; measures like
New York's may be worse than the disease they seek to cure.
Stewart's majority opinion in Kusper v. Pontikes also finds
the state interest in preventing raiding insufficient to
support the burden placed on voter Harriet Pontikes. 50
Marshall's Tashi ian opinion also addresses the issue
of party raiding. Marshall finds the state's concern with
raiding to be inapplicable to the facts at issue, and thus
asserts that the judgment gives "no opinion" on the
question of raiding. In so doing, however, Marshall
appears to reveal a belief that raiding may well not exist.
He cites a Democratic Party study which argued that "the
existence of 'raiding' has never been conclusively proven
by survey research", and the issue on which no opinion is
expressed is "whether the continuing difficulty of proving
that raiding is possible attenuates the asserted state
interest in preventing the practice". 51 This is a
backhanded way of dismissing the issue of raiding without
formally taking that position, and reveals the "natural
order"' s greater concern with state-induced distortion than
with party or voter- induced distortion.
The justices have also addressed the issue of party
endorsements in the primary process. Marshall's Eu opinion
50 414 U.S. at 61. In Kusper , the majority of justices
struck down an Illinois law which mandated a 23 month
waiting period for voters who had voted in one party's
primary to vote in another party's primary.
51 479 U.S. at 219, including note 9.
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highlights the differential associational standard imposed
on parties by California law, noting that, "although the
official governing bodies of political parties are barred
from issuing endorsements, other groups are not ". In this
way the parties are "silenced" in this part of the
political process. Such a state- imposed scheme of "imposing
limitations on individuals wishing to band together to
advance their views on a ballot measure, while placing none
on individuals acting alone, is clearly a restraint on the
right of association". 52
Marshall's discussion of preprimary endorsements also
reflects the "natural order" understanding of parties as
organizations that possess both freedom and boundaries. He
asserts that prohibition of preprimary endorsements has
made it "possible for a candidate with views antithetical
to those of her party nevertheless to win its primary". 53
This may reflect a differential understanding of party
access to the political process and party operations within
that process, i.e., between interparty and intraparty
democracy. The justices seem more concerned with the former
than with the latter. Marshall's Eu opinion, for example,
cites La Follette for the position that parties have a
right to identify the parameters of their membership. This
ability enables parties "to select a standard bearer who
52 4 8 9 U.S. at 217, 224.
53 Eu, 489 U.S. at 218.
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best represents the party's ideologies and preferences".
According to Marshall, "depriving a political party of the
right to endorse suffocates this right". 54 This is
reminiscent of E.E. Schattschneider
' s observation that
democracy happens between the parties, not within them. 55
Stewart's opinion in La Follette supports this
viewpoint. He notes that participation is open "for
everyone who claims a stake in the Democratic Party" ; the
concept of investment is thus introduced, differentiating
between initial access to the political process and access
to the internal affairs of parties. The justices who favor
the "natural order" perspective focus on dilution of
participation in the latter, a striking nuance on their
broader participatory arguments. Stewart later argues for
this position by asserting that unaffiliated voters, i.e.
those without a stake, can distort collective decisions and
thereby impair the "essential functions" of parties. This
gives parties the justifiable right to protect themselves
from those with "adverse principles". 56 But, as Tashj ian
indicated, such a choice is for the party, not the state or
a court, to make .
This trust of parties as decisionmakers is also
reflected in Marshall's Eu opinion. He treats the claim
54 4 8 9 U.S. at 224.
55 E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York:
Rinehart and Co., 1942), p. 60.
56 La Follette , 450 U.S. at 116-17, 122.
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that preprimary endorsements can lead to intraparty
factionalism with great skepticism, quoting generously from
the Court of Appeals opinion to support this view. That
court saw the prohibition of preprimary endorsements as an
"'outright ban' on political speech", and Marshall notes
its assertion that the state has not shown how its law
would prevent factionalism. He also quotes the view that
"California's ban on preprimary endorsements is a form of
paternalism that is inconsistent with the First Amendment",
shielding parties from "disruptions of their own
making"
.
57
The Court of Appeals in Eu also draws a distinction
between parties and elections which the justices appear to
accept. Marshall quotes their opinion that "a State has a
legitimate interest in orderly elections, not orderly
parties". 58 This understanding is supported by Marshall's
view of the purpose of primaries. In dismissing
California's reliance on the Storer precedent, he asserts
that it "does not stand for the proposition that a State
may enact election laws to mitigate intraparty factionalism
during a primary campaign" . Instead, Marshall sees the
primary as the "ideal forum" for settling such disputes
before the general election, noting that "Tashi ian
recognizes precisely this distinction". Parties, he adds,
57 4 8 9 U.S. at 221.
58 4 8 9 U.S. at 222.
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can be protected from without, not from within, and
therefore "preserving party unity during a primary campaign
is not a compelling state interest". 59
In the balance between electioneering and the
promotion of ideas as functions of political parties, the
justices who favor the "natural order" perspective show a
bias toward the latter. Marshall's opinion in Eu quotes his
own opinion in the ballot access case of Illinois State
Board to emphasize that the "election campaign is a means
of disseminating ideas as well as attaining political
office"
.
Parties and elections will not be viewed simply as
the pursuit of jobs and authority, but as a means of
articulating and enacting ideas as well . Marshall claims
that California's preprimary endorsement ban defeats that
purpose because it "directly hampers the ability of a party
to spread its message and hamstrings voters seeking to
inform themselves about the candidates and the campaign
issues" . These state-created limits are also seen as
"particularly egregious where the State censors the
political speech a political party shares with its
members" . 60
The "natural order" justices also assert that the
message and ideas of a party are shaped by the party's
structure. In a footnote in Eu, Marshall notes that
59 4 8 9 U.S. at 227.
60 489 U.S. at 223-24.
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regulation of party leadership "may also color the parties'
message and interfere with the parties' decisions as to the
best means to promote that message". 61 There is a direct
relation between organization and leadership and the issues
and positions of a party.
Marshall's Eu opinion also makes an important
distinction between legislators and the party to which they
belong. He states that "simply because a legislator belongs
to a political party does not make her at all times a
representative of party interests" . This is in line with
the findings of political scientists that elections are now
dominated more by candidates than parties. Marshall expands
on the implications of this state of affairs:
In supporting the endorsement ban, an individual
legislator may be acting on her understanding of
the public good or her interest in reelection.
The independence of legislators from their
parties is illustrated by the California
Legislature's frequent refusal to amend the
election laws in accordance with the wishes of
political parties. Moreover, the State's argument
ignores those parties with negligible, if any,
representation in the legislature. 62
In this, we see a suspicion both of the motives and
allegiances of the legislative branch and of the parties
currently in power. Party interests are thus not seen to be
61 489 U.S. at 230.
62 489 U.S. at 225, footnote 18. For a political
science perspective on this issue, see Paul Herrnson, Party
Campaigning In The 1980'
s
(Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1988), and Sabato, The Party 's Just Begun. They
note, but are not happy with, this "candidate-centered"
politics
.
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automatically protected by a party "controlled" legislature
or government
.
The justices who favor the "natural order" perspective
do not have a fully consistent view of what parties should
look like, but they are consistent in favoring the freedom
of parties to make choices about internal structure,
membership, and the nomination process. On the one hand,
parties are supported in making their own determinations of
who can and cannot participate in that process. On the
other hand, in supporting that free choice, the justices
find themselves supporting both expanded and contracted
participation in the process. They are thus not married to
one particular ideological construct of party membership
and control
.
Standards of Evidence and Burden
As in the ballot access cases, the justices who favor
the "natural order" perspective hold the states to
standards of strict scrutiny and compelling state interest.
Brennan makes this clear in Cousins :
Even though legitimate, the 'subordinating
interest of the State must be compelling...' to
justify the injunction's abridgement of the
exercise by petitioners and the National
Democratic Party of their constitutionally
protected rights of association. NAACP v.
Alabama , 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958). 63
63 4 1 9 U.S. at 489
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A simple standard of reasonableness or rationality is
insufficient; the state must give strong reasons for its
infringement of association, which is given the benefit of
the doubt. The states must prove that their involvement in
these processes are justified actions, and not unwarranted
distortions that burden freedom of association.
Powell's dissent in Rosario , for example, questions
the majority opinion in that case for its failure to
identify the proper standard of scrutiny, a failure which
he contends is likely to confuse other courts and state
legislatures when they try to understand how such burdens
should and will be evaluated. The majority's description of
the New York law is characterized as "nebulous
promulgations", which are essentially analogous to the
"rational basis test" that is sometimes employed by the
justices. Powell's central contention on standards is that
past Court precedents do not support the use of the
rational basis test in these cases, but call instead for a
stricter standard of review. 64
Powell contends that the proper yardstick is "whether
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state
interest". He asserts that past decisions value the right
of association highly, arguing that this right "must be
carefully protected from state encroachment". The standard
that past cases call for is one of "strict judicial
64 410 U.S. at 767 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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scrutiny". Interests must be evaluated "in the context of
the means advanced by the State to protect it and the
constitutionally sensitive activity it operates to impede"
.
He also quotes with approval considerations from Dunn v.
Blumstein
.
States pursuing legitimate interests must draw
statutes with "precision", and they "must be tailored to
serve their legitimate objectives"; they must also choose
"less drastic means" of pursuing their objectives. The onus
is thus on the states to infringe as little as possible
upon the freedoms exercised in the electoral process.
Powell sees New York as failing in that objective. 65
The "natural order" perspective uses a comparative
standard to evaluate state laws, in that the experiences
and statutes of other states are noted as evidence. In
Stevens's unanimous opinion in Marchioro v. Chaney , for
example, he places particular emphasis on the widespread
nature of statutory requirements for state committee
structure, citing numerous state laws. 66 This indicates
that these justices will not blindly rule in favor of
freedom of association claims. Similarly, in Tashi ian ,
65 410 U.S. at 768-70 (Powell, J., dissenting).
6S Marchioro v. Chanev , 442 U.S. 191 (1979), at 195.
Marchioro involved a challenge by members of the Washington
State Democratic Party to state statutes which required
political parties to have state committees composed of two
members from each county in the state. In a unanimous
opinion, the justices found that the regulations did not
infringe on party freedom of association, since the
Democratic Party had made a free choice to vest power in
its state committee.
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Marshall refers to the Anderson ballot access opinion to
emphasize that there is no "litmus paper test" to resolve
these controversies; decisions must be made on a case by
case basis, using the Anderson three part test. 67 The
states are nonetheless given the heavier burden of proof,
as the Anderson test calls for a compelling state interest,
not simply a reasonable or rational basis.
Marshall's Eu opinion reinforces that demanding
standard for state interests. He enunciates a test similar
to those employed in the ballot access cases. The justices
must "first examine whether it [the state statute] burdens
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments".
If such a burden is found on parties and their members, "it
can survive constitutional scrutiny only if the State shows
that it advances a compelling state interest, and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest". 68
The key to understanding the approaches of both the
"natural order" and "constructed order" perspectives to the
issue of standards is the elasticity of the terms that
constitute the standards. What constitutes a "compelling
state interest", an interest that is "legitimate", or a
"rational basis" is ultimately defined in part by the
justices themselves, employing past precedent as guidance
but without any objective definition fixed for all time.
67 4 7 9 U.S. at 213.
68 489 U.S . at 222 .
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The use of precedent, while setting some parameters, still
leaves significant case-by-case interpretive authority with
the justices. The justices who favor the "natural order"
perspective have employed that flexibility to hold the
states to a very stringent standard that favors the
challengers of state laws involving party organization and
nomination procedures.
The Role of Government
The "natural order" justices' suspicion of extensive
state management of the electoral process, evident in their
views of competition, parties, and judicial standards, may
also be seen in their attitudes toward state laws in the
area of party organization, registration, and nomination
methods. These justices are skeptical of the interests
advanced by the states in these cases, showing a preference
for the concerns of parties and for claims of national
interest. The latter theme is particularly evident in the
presidential nomination cases of Cousins and La Follette .
The solicitude of the "natural order" justices for
national interests as opposed to state concerns is
reflected in Brennan's Cousins opinion. He asserts that the
key issue in that dispute is "whether the Appellate Court
was correct in according primacy to state law over the
National Political Party's rules in the determination of
the qualifications and eligibility of delegates to the
Party's National Convention"; he then indicates that they
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were not correct in doing so. 69 National interests are
thus to be preferred, particularly as regards presidential
nominations; it matters not that the party is a private,
not a public, concern, since the process is one of public
significance
.
Brennan is unconvinced by the counterargument that
Illinois had "a compelling interest in protecting the
integrity of its electoral processes and the rights of its
citizens under the State and Federal Constitutions to
effective suffrage"
. He responds by noting that a national
party convention is involved, whose delegates have a
"special function", i.e., they "perform a task of supreme
importance to every citizen of the Nation regardless of
their state of residence", namely, the nomination of
presidential and vice-presidential candidates. 70 Such
national concerns, in Brennan' s view, weigh decisively
against any claim of state interest.
Brennan pushes the state vs. nation question still
farther, bluntly stating that "the States themselves have
no constitutionally mandated role in the great task of the
selection of presidential and vice-presidential
candidates". He also asserts that, if the states were
allowed to set their own rules, you could have 50 different
standards for the "vital process" of choosing nominees, "an
69 419 U.S. at 483.
70 419 U.S. at 489.
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obviously intolerable result". 71 Cousins thus stands for
the proposition of a nationalized presidential election
system, a modification of federalism congruent with 20th
century American political history. Brennan describes the
Convention as serving "the pervasive national interest in
the selection of candidates for national office, and this
national interest is greater than any interest of an
individual State". 72 Brennan and the majority justices
thus accept the nationalizing of the presidential selection
process brought about by the Democratic reforms that lie at
the heart of the facts of Cousins . 73
The nation/state political balance was also at issue
in La Follette
. The pivotal question in the case, according
to Stewart, is whether Wisconsin and its state Democratic
party "may compel the National [Democratic] Party to seat
a delegation chosen in a way that violates the rules of the
Party". 74 The question is not the constitutionality of the
Wisconsin open primary per se , but whether it is binding on
a national party whose rules specify a different process.
71 419 U.S. at 490, quoting Wigoda V. Cousins , 342 F.
Supp. 82, 86 (ND 111. 1972).
72 419 U.S. at 490; emphasis added.
73 It must be noted that the current of political
events has not fully favored this emphasis. In practice,
the Democratic Party has modified its movement toward
uniform national rules, while the Republican Party has
continued to allow state parties to shape many delegate
selection procedures.
74 4 5 0 U.S. at 121.
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In this area, the answer given by the La Follette
justices favors the national party's interests, but it may
also be seen as favoring a more general policy of minimal
state intervention in the electoral process. Stewart
asserts that, "even if the State were correct, the State
may not choose for the party" in this situation. 75 Barring
any unconstitutional standards, the stringency of
membership is an issue that belongs only to the parties,
not to government
.
The justices in La Follette do not dismiss the states
out of hand; they admit that the states have important
regulatory interests. They conclude, however, that the
interests asserted- -the integrity of the electoral process,
secrecy of the ballot, voter participation, and the
prevention of harassment of voters- -all involve the
primary , which is not at issue in the case. 76 For the
"natural order" justices, the issue of binding delegates is
distinguishable and totally separate from the primary
itself. Even if the ultimate purpose of the primary is lost
by such a distinction, these justices see the national
interest as the central factor in this case.
The Tashi ian case reveals the approach of the "natural
order" justices to conflicts between state government
interests in their own "internal" electoral processes and
75 450 U.S. at 123 .
76 450 U.S. at 125.
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state party autonomy. Marshall's opinion views
Connecticut's interests as insufficient to burden the
associational rights of the state's Republican Party. While
he accepts the authority of Article 1, Section 4, Clause 1
of the Constitution (the times, places, and manner clause)
,
which gives states a role in controlling their own
electoral processes, its "authority does not extinguish the
State's responsibility to observe the limits established by
the First Amendment rights of the State's citizens". He
notes that the clause by itself is not enough to abridge
such rights,- more compelling interests must be asserted. 77
This position is reaffirmed by Marshall's opinion in Eu
.
78
Marshall also finds the other interests asserted by
Connecticut to be insufficient. He dismisses the alleged
administrative burden with familiar language about using
cost arguments to shield the established parties from
competition. The state's concern with raiding is also found
to be inapplicable to the Connecticut facts, since
independents are not moving from another party's primary
and since independents could join a party at a late date
under existing state law. The state interest in avoiding
voter confusion is also unfounded and insufficient, since
the past decisions of the justices "reflect a greater faith
in the ability of individual voters to inform themselves
77 479 U.S. at 217.
78 489 U.S. at 222.
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about campaign issues"; Marshall cites Anderson's emphasis
on the contradiction of restricting information in order to
promote more informed decisions by voters. 79
The "natural order" justices' lack of deference to
state laws is also reflected in the fairly equal respect
they give to official political party documents and state
statutes. Stewart in La Follette . for example, begins his
opinion by noting that the Charter of the Democratic Party
established the "Democrats only" policy for the nomination
process. He also carefully reviews the history of official
party pronouncements on this issue, with particular
reference to Wisconsin's situation. 80
This same respect is evident in Stevens' Marchioro
opinion, which found for the State of Washington on the
grounds that the Democratic Party charter, not state
statutes specifying party structures, was responsible for
the refusal of the Party to add members to the State
Committee. The State Committee decision and activity was
authorized by the Party's own charter, and both state law
and party rules agreed that the state convention was the
ultimate ruling body of the Party. The decisions in
question were made because of a delegation of authority by
the convention ; since the source of the complaint is
79 Tashiian , 479 U.S. at 217-20.
80 4 5 0 U.S. at 109.
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ultimately the party itself, there is no burden, and the
challengers have no case. 81
As Marchioro reveals, this respect for party documents
can be a double-edged sword; even the "natural order"
justices will not blindly dismiss state claims or blindly
favor party assertions. These justices do realize that
there is a role for states. As Stewart makes clear in
Kusper
, "the administration of the electoral process is a
matter that the Constitution entrusts largely to the
states". 82 Nonetheless, Kusper also confirms that a
state's actions cannot infringe on constitutional
protection in the process of using proper state authority.
Illinois had done so by locking voters into their current
affiliations for a significant time.
The justices who favor the "natural order" perspective
also demand that a state convincingly connect its statutory
actions to the achievement of its asserted interests. In
his Eu opinion, Marshall considers two state interests:
"stable government and protecting voters from confusion and
undue influence" . He immediately admits that the former is
compelling; however, he contends that California has not
made a case that connects its interest in a stable polity
to the endorsement ban. No evidence is presented on the
effect of the ban, and Marshall is struck by the fact that
81 442 U.S. at 193, 198-99.
82 4 1 4 U.S. at 57.
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California is "virtually the only State" with such a ban.
He is also skeptical of the asserted interest because of a
claim made by California in the lower court that "this
action is not justiciable because the State has never
enforced the challenged election laws "
.
83
In making these arguments, Marshall cites Arthur M.
Weisburd's 1984 Southern California Law Review article on
constitutional protection of party nominating methods,
which makes an even stronger argument for party freedom
than Marshall's opinion. Weisburd argues that primary
election statutes in general "appear to be
unconstitutional", that the state interest in party
democracy ultimately denies associational rights, and that
"party organizations and party leaders enjoy the same free
speech protection as other associations and individuals"
.
Weisburd's article is strongly supportive of Marshall's
argument, and more, arguing from past Court decisions that
strict scrutiny should be extended to the whole concept of
state-mandated primaries. 84
With regard to the state claim of confusion and undue
influence in Eu, Marshall accepts the legitimacy of the
interest but sees it as unsupported by sufficient
83 489 U.S. at 226; emphasis added.
84 Weisburd, "Candidate-Making and the Constitution",
p. 277, 280-81. This is a step which the justices have not
yet taken and are not likely to take in the foreseeable
future, given the more conservative composition of the
current Court and the public's attitudes toward primaries.
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evidence. He cites the Anderson /Tashi ian concern about the
restriction of political communication to voters, as well
as the Jenness
/
Buckley acceptance of preventing fraud and
corruption, to argue that California's ban does the former
but shows no evidence for the latter. Marshall also cites
Malcolm Jewell and the results of the 1982 New York State
Democratic primary for governor to argue that voters in
fact pay little attention to party endorsements in making
their voting decisions. 85 The results of the 1990
gubernatorial primaries in Massachusetts, where both
candidates endorsed by preprimary conventions were
defeated, is further confirmation that a party endorsement
does not a secure victory in the subsequent primary.
Discussing California's restrictions on party
organization and leadership, Marshall accepts that states
may restrict parties in these areas "when necessary to
ensure that elections are fair and honest"; this includes
eligibility requirements for voters and various
specifications of primary procedures. He notes, however,
that "none of these restrictions ... involved direct
regulation of a party's leaders", and distinguishes the
Marchioro case in a footnote; any restrictions on party
members were an "indirect consequence". California
justified its laws on the basis of the "democratic
management of the political party's internal affairs";
85 489 U.S. at 228-29, including note 19.
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Marshall rejects this type of claim on the now familiar
ground that the state cannot judge for the party. 86 Unless
fairness and honesty are demonstrably implicated and
connected to the state laws, the state has no proper role
in managing the internal affairs, and occasional
disharmonies, of a party. 87
The "natural order" justices have also used historical
evidence to evaluate state claims of authority derived from
the Constitution. In Tashiian . for example, Connecticut
claimed that the Republican Party's inclusion of
independent voters in the U.S. Congress, but not state
legislative, primaries would violate the Constitution's
Qualifications clause. In responding to this argument,
Marshall's opinion cites Federalist 52 and the Records of
the Constitutional Convention to argue that the
Qualifications clause is concerned with federal election
disenfranchisement , not absolute symmetry between states
and federal electorates. 88
This citation of Madison by Marshall is well chosen,
as Madison's discussion of this issue emphasizes how
critical it was to enshrine the federal voting right in the
Constitution, as not to have done so "would have rendered
86 489 U.S. at 232 .
87 As noted earlier, discrimination, particularly on
the basis of race, is a valid ground for state
intervention
.
88 479 U.S. at 228.
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too dependent on the state governments that branch of the
federal government which ought to be dependent on the
people alone". Madison also feels this right will be safe
under the Qualifications Clause because the right to vote
in state legislative elections is protected by state
constitutions
.
89
The Records of the Constitutional Convention cited by
Marshall also appear to bear out his argument. In opposing
a property qualification for federal voting, James Wilson
notes that
It was difficult to form any uniform rule of
qualifications for all the States. Unnecessary
innovations he thought too should be avoided.
It would be very hard and disagreeable for the
same persons, at the same time, to vote for
representatives in the State Legislature and to
be excluded from a vote for those in the National
Legislature
.
90
The key concern is federal disenf ranchisement , and its
possible impact on political acceptance of the new national
order; this point is noted by Oliver Ellsworth and John
Rutledge. 91 Thus, as Marshall notes, the intent is not the
limitation of the federal vote, but the insurance that the
89 Madison, Essay 10, in The Federalist Papers , p.
165 .
90 James Wilson, quoted in James Madison notes for
August 7, 1787, in Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787 , Volume 2 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1966), p. 201.
91 Farrand, Records , Volume 2, pp. 201-205.
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vote is not limited by Congress or state governments; he
sees no such limitation in the Connecticut case. 92
The "natural order" justices reveal in these cases a
lack of deference and some skepticism toward state statutes
and the interests asserted to support them. While not
blindly dismissing the arguments of the states, these
justices put a high value on the interests of party and
voter choice, as well as any processes (such as
presidential selection) with national repercussions. For
state infringement on such freedoms and interests to be
justified, the "natural order" justices set a standard of
compelling state interest and require strong evidence that
such interests are in fact advanced by the state laws at
issue in each dispute. The parties and their freedom of
association, not state laws, receive the benefit of the
doubt
.
The "Constructed Order" Viewpoint
The justices who favor the "constructed order"
perspective are at odds with the "natural order" justices,
maintaining that states have the constitutional right to
play a wide-ranging role in managing party registration and
the nomination process, and even internal party
organization, in the interests of fair and honest
elections. They are less concerned with competition, at
92 Tashiian , 479 U.S. at 228-29
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least as the majority understands it, and they are much
more inclined to favor the rights of individual states over
those of state or national parties. They also do not share
the same concern with party self-determination held to the
"natural order" justices, and they hold the states to a
much more lenient standard of evidence and judicial
scrutiny
.
This viewpoint has been consistently in the minority
in these opinions, in contrast to the ballot access
decisions. This indicates that the balance of opinion among
the justices has gravitated to the "natural order" view of
parties as internally autonomous but not identical to the
"party in government", i.e. elected officeholders who hold
the party label, as opposed to the "constructed order" view
of parties as state-managed but valuable electoral
organizations. An examination of the "constructed order"
viewpoint in these cases bears this out.
Party Competition and Choice
The "constructed order" justices see the free actions
of individuals and organizations, not state laws, as a key
explanatory factor in understanding the limitations of
political choice and competition. In his majority opinion
in Rosario , for example, Stewart emphasizes that the
plaintiffs were unable to register before New York's cutoff
date because they failed to do so, not because of the law;
he also stresses their admission that they had failed to do
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so. 93 Thus, competition and the ability to participate is
limited by free human inaction as much as by law, a point
that is telling for Stewart.
This logic is evident in Stewart's further remarks in
Rosario
.
In dismissing the argument that a series of past
Court cases on disenfranchisement apply to the New York
law, he asserts that in those cases "the State totally
denied the electoral franchise to a particular class of
residents, and there was no way in which the members of
that class could have made themselves eligible to vote"
.
Section 186 of the New York statutes, on the other hand,
"did not absolutely disenfranchise the class to which the
petitioners belong", but "merely imposed a time deadline on
their enrollment". As Stewart puts it, "if their plight can
be characterized as disenf ranchisement at all, it was not
caused by Section 186, but by their own failure to take
timely steps to effect their enrollment" . He dismisses the
claims of impaired association with political parties using
the same logic. 94
The element of free choice is also crucial for
Blackmun in his dissenting opinion in Kusper v . Pontikes.
He notes that disenfranchisement of Harriet Pontikes was
brought about "by her personal and voluntary decision", a
situation which only "lightly brushes" voting and
93 410 U.S. at 755.
94 4 1 0 U.S. at 757-58.
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associational rights. He places great emphasis on the fact
that the past precedents cited by the majority all involved
infringements on the rights of a "discrete class" of
persons, infringements that were "the result of an
involuntary condition not directly tied to the franchise"
.
The pivotal characteristic was that these cases involved
"direct impairment" of participation in the electoral
process "without voluntary action" on the part of the
plaintiffs. 95 Volition is the critical consideration for
Blackmun, as it is for the majority in Rosario .
Blackmun also emphasizes volition in his discussion of
the statutes and their focuses. In New York, an arbitrary
time limit controlled who could vote in a primary. In
contrast, the Illinois statute called for an actual vote, a
volitional act, as the standard for controlling primary
voting. The latter is characterized as "more rational" by
Blackmun, another indication of the centrality of free
choice to his disposition of these matters. 96
In addition to the issue of volition and choice,
Blackmun notes that the prevention of voting in "one
primary of one party" is a "meager restraint" upon freedom
of association; Illinois voters are otherwise "fully free
to associate with the party of her varying choice". A voter
does not have the right to participate in all elections on
9B 414 U.S. at 62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
96 Kusper , 414 U.S. at 64 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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an open basis; the states and parties can limit voting to
this extent. Blackmun notes further that this situation
mainly involves personal desire to undo an affiliation, and
treats this with some skepticism. Ultimately, the Illinois
statute places only a "minor burden" on "a few uniquely
situated citizens" in order "to preserve an otherwise
vulnerable structure", the primary. 97
Scalia's dissent in Tashi ian , joined by Rehnquist and
O'Connor, is even more concerned with free choice and
participation. He begins his argument as follows:
Both the right of free political association and
the State's authority to establish arrangements
that assure fair and effective party
participation in the election process are
essential to democratic government. 98
In essence, the free process itself is not sufficient to
insure fair and effective party action; the states have an
important structuring role. This is a clear example of the
view that party competition and democracy are best
preserved by a "constructed order" of politics.
In addition to defending the state role, Scalia takes
issue with the majority's view of freedom of association
and asserts that the majority "exaggerates the importance
of the associational interest at issue, if indeed it does
not see one where none exists". The Connecticut Republican
Party's ability to associate is not restricted, nor is the
97 Kusper , 414 U.S. at 61-64 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)
.
98 479 U.S. at 234 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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association of their members. The key is that the party
wants to allow nonmembers to participate in candidate
selection, a desire which Scalia sees as a "fanciful"
definition of freedom of association and as "casual
contacts". 99 Scalia thus takes a narrower view of
membership and legitimate participation than the "natural
order" justices do.
Powell's dissent in La Follette does not seem to share
this narrower view. His sense of the Wisconsin law is that
it "does not impose a substantial burden on the
associational freedom of the National Party, and actually
promotes the free political activity of the citizens of
Wisconsin"
. Powell cites the founding history and purposes
of the primary, its grounding in expanding participation
and giving meaningful control to citizens rather than party
bosses
.
100
Contrary to Scalia, Powell asserts that by keeping its
primary open, not closed, Wisconsin promotes politics. As
he puts it, the Democratic Party's effort to use Rule 2A to
open up participation "has the ironic effect of calling
into question a state law that was intended itself to open
up participation in the nominating process and minimize the
influence of party bosses". He describes the Wisconsin law
as attempting "to ensure that the prospect of public party
99 Tashiian , 479 U.S. at 235 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100 450 U.S. at 127 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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affiliation will not inhibit voters from participating in a
Democratic primary". 101 While these two positions are
seemingly in conflict, both justices agree on the
legitimacy of the choices made by state governments. Like
the "natural order" viewpoint, the political results of
this "constructed order" viewpoint can be contradictory.
The "constructed order" justices are much less
concerned with giving maximum protection to the free
competition and choices of parties. While those concerns
are not dismissed, these justices feel that the states have
an essential role to play in preserving and structuring the
electoral process, a role enshrined in the Constitution.
They feel the majority has given insufficient weight to the
rights of states, all in the name of minimal and tenuous
associations between parties and individuals. As a result,
they contend that fair and honest political competition and
democratic choices are hindered rather than helped by the
decisions of the Court.
Party Structure and Functions
On the issue of party structure and membership, the
"constructed order" justices seem to follow their ballot
access opinions, which stress the proper state role in
insuring party integrity. Their opinions, however, would
also result in contradictory political outcomes, as some
101 La Follette , 450 U.S. at 128, 136 (Powell, J.,
dissenting)
.
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favor expanded choices and party boundaries, while others
favor restricted boundaries. Like the "natural order"
justices, the "constructed order" justices do not appear to
favor a particular type of party organization or electoral
structure, but rather believe that the states have the
right to some authority over those matters, and their
choices are owed some deference by the Court.
In Rosario, Stewart initially shows little concern for
the boundaries of a party, detailing how New York voters
could easily move from one party registration to another
with minimal difficulty and were not unavoidably "locked
in" to a particular party affiliation. 102 Rehnquist's
dissent in Kusper is also not wedded to any particular form
of party enrollment, as his acceptance of the differing
statutory schemes of New York and Illinois indicates. 103
The unifying factor in these views is that the states can
make these choices, as long as the disenf ranchisement that
occurs is due to individual action and is not the result of
a full statutory bar.
With regard to the boundaries of parties, the
"constructed order" justices most often defer to state
political cultures and expressed state interests, rather
than to any abstract standard or model. These justices, for
example, reach contrasting positions on the issue of
102 410 U.S. at 759.
103 414 U.S. at 67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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raiding and crossover voting. In Rosario
. Stewart
emphasizes the prevention of raiding as an important state
goal and argues that the general election timing of the
registration deadline acted as a "deterrent" to such
raiding. 104 Blackmun's dissent in Kusper also believes
that preventing raiding is of "unquestioned" legitimacy,
and implicitly favors a well -bounded party by noting that
those most affected by the Illinois statute are likely to
be "party switchers", who "clearly are the group most
amenable to organized raiding". 105 Rehnquist's dissent in
Kusper also recognizes the prevention of raiding as a
legitimate state interest. 106
Powell's dissent in La Follette . however, takes a
strongly contrasting view of party membership and party
boundaries. In allowing secret and limited voter
affiliation at its primary, Wisconsin, Powell argues, is
exercising a legitimate and compelling state choice. He
does note that "the Democrats remain free to require public
affiliation from anyone wishing any greater degree of
participation in party affairs", and that the caucuses and
delegates must be publicly affiliated. 107 He would,
however, vote to uphold Wisconsin's right to use the open
104 410 U.S. at 760-62.
105 414 U.S. at 63-65 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106 414 u s> at 69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
107 450 U.S. at 129-30 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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primary and have it accepted. While this view seems at odds
with the opinions noted above, they are united in their
deference to and defense of the choice made by the
particular state; the needs and political realities of each
situation are seen as worthy of serious weight in judging
these conflicts.
Scalia's dissent in Tashi ian is also concerned with
the issue of party membership. Scalia sees a lack of
meaningful contact between the party and independent voters
in this case, arguing that the "casual contacts" implied
here do not really constitute freedom of association.
Implicitly, he is arguing that parties must have reasonable
boundaries if their freedom of association is to have any
clear parameters. This is made clearer in his assertion
that the State can legitimately limit the selection process
to party members in order to protect against the dilution
of the votes of those members by "outsiders". 108
Nor does Scalia's Tashi ian dissent agree that
Connecticut's action is protecting the Republican Party
from itself. He puts great emphasis on the fact that the
decision to allow independents
was not made by democratic ballot, but by the
Party's state convention-which, for all we know,
may have been dominated by officeholders and
office seekers whose evaluation of the merits of
assuring election of the Party's candidates,
vis-a-vis the merits of proposing candidates
faithful to the Party's political philosophy,
diverged significantly from the views of the
ice 479 u s _ at 235-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
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Party's rank and file. 109
In essence, Scalia argues that democracy may have been
distorted by the state convention. His description is an
implicit reference to the fact that Lowell Weicker, more
liberal than most of the Connecticut Republican Party, was
a major backer of this change in order to advance his own
chances of nomination. This is seen by Scalia as a
distortion of the party, an unusual focus on the
ideological character of a party. He asserts, "I had always
thought it was a major purpose of state- imposed party
primary requirements to protect the general party
membership against this kind of minority control", citing
Nader v. Schaef fer . 110
Powell's dissent in La Follette admits that Wisconsin
"has, to an extent, regulated the terms on which a citizen
may become a 'member' of the group of people permitted to
influence that decision", i.e., the selection of a
presidential nominee. He argues, however, that this is only
an issue if the party has "a particular ideological
orientation or political mission" . The Democratic Party, as
well as our other major parties in history, he concludes,
. have been much more malleable in their ideas and
membership
.
111
109 479 U.S. at 236 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110 479 U.S. at 236 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111 450 U.S. at 131 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Powell puts great weight on the nonideological
character of the major parties. With regard to the
Democratic Party, "it can hardly be denied that this Party
generally has been composed of various elements reflecting
most of the American political spectrum"
. He admits the
party has taken positions, but focuses on their shifts over
time. On this basis, he argues that "it is hard to see what
the Democratic Party has to fear from an open primary
plan"
.
In fact, an open primary will allow voters to go to
the party that speaks to their ideological concerns, which
should add to party support. 112
Powell's citation of Robert Horn in his opinion is
interesting, in that Horn discusses the permeability of
parties in the context of lamenting this lack of discipline
and cohesion. He states that the major parties in America
"are prepared to welcome almost anyone with open arms and
strive to make almost anyone feel at home in their midst";
his discussion is in the context of the rights of groups
under the Constitution, a product of the American ideal of
majority rule. But in discussing the then contemporary 1950
APSA Report and related calls for responsible parties, Horn
seems to have grave doubts about the potential for changing
parties. He states that "surely those who think our parties
are now inadequate for their tasks ought to pause before
112 450 U.S. at 131-33 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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laying this additional burden on them". 113 He seems to
favor Powell's position, but not the positions of those
states seeking to preserve the boundaries of their parties.
In a footnote, Powell also offers a lengthy quotation
from Austin Ranney' s Curing The Mischiefs of Faction ,
citing the virtue of the American party trend to
accommodation. 114 The overall point of Ranney' s work is to
highlight the often unintended consequences of party reform
throughout American history and to suggest that "party
reform is one of the easier forms of social engineering"
and therefore often adopted despite the unlikely chances of
success. 115 Powell also cites Frank Sorauf on the
differences between open and closed primaries, as well as
on the Progressive focus on curing ills of democracy with
more democracy. 116
113 Robert A. Horn, Groups And The Constitution
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956), pp. 97-99,
103-4
.
114 450 U.S. at 132 (Powell, J., dissenting).
115 Austin Ranney, Curing The Mischiefs of Faction:
Party Reform In America (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1975), p. 210. A number of
other prominent political scientists have echoed this
assessment. See for example Julius Turner, "Responsible
Parties: A Dissent From The Floor", American Political
Science Review 45 (March 1951), pp. 143-52; Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick, Dismantling The Parties (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute, 1978); and Edward C.
Banfield, "In Defense Of The American Party System", m
Robert A. Goldwin, ed., Political Parties, U.S.A. (Chicago:
Rand McNally and Co., 1961), pp. 21-39.
116 450 U.S. at 133-34 (Powell, J., dissenting), citing
Frank Sorauf, Party Poli tics In America, 4th ed. (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1980), pp. 203-5.
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Powell's dissent places little importance on the
participation of unaffiliated voters, stating that the
resulting delegates will likely not differ much from those
of other states and regions. He also takes issue with the
distortion argument, contending that the national party's
alternative methods, such as a caucus, "would be as least
as likely as an open primary to reflect inaccurately the
views of a State's Democrats". The ease of affiliation in
Wisconsin also weakens the national party's argument. 117
The views of the "constructed order" justices on the
proper boundaries of party membership are thus as
contradictory as those of the "natural order" justices, in
that both expanded and restricted participation are favored
in different cases. What unites these justices and
separates them from the "natural order" viewpoint is that
they defer to whatever choice a particular state has made
in structuring its party registration or nomination
methods. The differences are thus less over the character
of parties and electoral methods per se and more over who
should have the authority to make those choices: the
parties or the state governments.
Standards of Evidence and Burden
It is clear that the "constructed order" justices hold
the states to a much more lenient standard of review than
117 La Follette , 450 U.S. at 132-33 (Powell, J.,
dissenting)
.
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do the "natural order" justices. In Rosario
. Stewart notes
that the New York limitation is "not an arbitrary time
limit unconnected to any important state goal". It is
motivated by desires to prevent interparty raiding and to
preserve the integrity of the electoral process, which it
accomplishes by forcing voters and politicians into
"deliberate inconsistencies" that occur by encouraging
registration in one party and general election voting for
an opposing party. The timing of primary and general
elections appears to be crucial in the majority's decision
to uphold the statute. 116
Thus the standard seems one of reasonableness. In
dismissing the substitution of a law whereby party
registrants could be challenged, Stewart emphasizes that
the state is not bound to use "ineffectual means" simply to
protect fundamental rights. 119 Blackmun in Kusper
reaffirms these lenient standards. In discussing the
Illinois statute, he finds the asserted state interest in
protecting the ballot box and the party system "clearly
legitimate" and the statute "reasonably related to the
fulfillment of that interest". 120
In these opinions, there is no talk of strict
scrutiny, but instead an emphasis on reasonableness and
118 410 U.S. at 760-61.
119 Rosario , 410 U.S. at 762.
120 414 U.S. at 63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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legitimacy, a much lesser hurdle than "compelling state
interest". In fact, Blackmun concludes his opinion in
Kusper by emphatically stating that the "incongruity"
between Kusper and Rosario "underscores what I believe to
be the potential mischief that results from an easy and
all-too-ready resort to a strict- scrutiny standard in
election cases of this kind". 121 Rehnquist's dissent in
Kusper shares this emphasis on legitimacy as the proper
standard
.
122
Powell's La Follette dissent accepts the standard test
in this area: "if the law can be said to impose a burden on
the freedom of association, then the question becomes
whether this burden is justified by a compelling state
interest". He does not agree that the Wisconsin law creates
a burden, however, nor does he accept the majority's
distinction between the primary and the voting of delegates
at the convention. He sees little burden on association,
and a strong argument for compelling state interest. 123 He
writes
:
I am unwilling-at least in the context of a
claim by one of the two major political
parties-to conclude that every conflict
between state law and party rules concerning
participation in the nominating process creates
a burden on associational rights. Instead, I
would look closely at the nature of the
intrusion, in light of the association involved,
121 414 u.S. at 65 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122 414 u at 69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123 450 U.S. at 128 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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to see whether we are presented with a real
limitation on First Amendment freedoms. 124
In other words, claims against freedom will not be
themselves accepted without scrutiny.
As for the state, Powell's reference to Rosario
appears to indicate that "a particularized legitimate
purpose" is sufficient. In La Follette . he sees the
majority ruling "without any serious inquiry into the
extent of the burden on associational freedoms and without
due consideration of the countervailing state
interest". 125 Stevens' concurrence in Eu, which consists
almost solely of a quote of Blackmun's opinion in Illinois
Board
,
is grounded in the same belief that the majority has
taken its standard too far with "too easy phrases". 126
That the "constructed order" justices choose
rationality over compelling interest is confirmed by
Scalia's dissent in Tashj ian . He argues from past Court
experience that accommodation of freedom with fair and
effective state action "does not lend itself to bright line
rules" . Instead, it "requires careful inquiry into the
extent to which the one or the other interest is
inordinately impaired under the facts of the particular
case" . Scalia cites Anderson and Storer to support this
124 450 U.S. at 130-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
125 450 U.S. at 136, 138 (Powell, J., dissenting).
126 489 U.S. at 233-34 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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position. 127 He also proposes a major modification of the
majority's compelling state interest standard, in that he
gives equal weight to freedom of association and state
interest by his phrasing ("the one or the other interest")
.
He is clearly unwilling to hold the states to a more
demanding standard.
Scalia's Tashi ian dissent joins this lenient standard
to an argument for the predictability of decisions. He
asserts that predictability in this area of the law is
"important", adding that "today's decision already exceeds
the permissible limit of First Amendment restrictions upon
the State's ordering of elections". 128 The argument of the
majority is turned around; the issue is not the limits of
the State's power, but the limits of First Amendment
restrictions on that power. This is clearly a pro-state
standard at work.
The "constructed order" justices, though clearly in a
minority in these cases, assert a clear case for a standard
more responsive to state interests. While the compelling
state interest standard is not disputed per se , these
justices seek to apply it more leniently to the states, and
look at challenges to state laws more critically. In
general, this reflects a more deferential attitude both to
state governments and the diverse political cultures of the
127 479 u s> at 234 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128 479 U.S. at 234-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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states. The interpretation of "compelling" by the
"constructed order" justices is much different than that of
the "natural order" justices.
The Role of Government
That the "constructed order" justices accept the broad
premise of freedom of association is indicated by
Rehnquist's concurrence in Cousins , one of the pivotal
decisions made by the justices in this area. He begins by
emphasizing that he supports the freedom of association of
the plaintiff delegates and agrees with the majority that
the interests of Illinois are not sufficiently compelling
to prevent the seating of the plaintiffs. 129
The differences between the justices are not over
outcomes, but rather over ideas and principles. Rehnquist
insists that, in reaching their conclusion, the Cousins
majority has engaged questions beyond the scope of the case
at hand and put forward "gratuitous observations" . He sees
the majority as incorrectly dismissing the interests of
states in the presidential selection process, and of
supporting its claim of "national interest" solely with a
dissenting opinion in Newberry v. United States that does
not give credence to constitutional provisions such as
Article II, Section 1, which Rehnquist believes gives the
states a role with presidential electors. As he sees it,
129 419 u s> at 491 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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Under our constitutional system, the States also
have residual authority in all areas not taken
from them by the Constitution or by validly
enacted congressional legislation. The question
for us, therefore, is not whether the States have
a "constitutionally mandated role" in the task of
selecting Presidential and Vice-Presidential
candidates, but whether the authority of the
State of Illinois is sufficient in this case to
authorize an injunction flatly prohibiting
petitioners from asserting before the Democratic
National Convention their claim to be seated as
delegates
.
130
Thus, while Rehnquist supports the outcome of the majority,
he does it on much narrower ground regarding the state
role, which should not be restricted in a cavalier manner.
Stewart's opinion in Rosario indicates that the
states have a full right to be involved in the management
of the electoral process in order to protect the integrity
of the existing political system; the latter emphasis is
more implied than stated. The critical emphasis seems to be
on the word "integrity"; the "constructed order" justices
would seem to equate this term with stability. Yet this
emphasis is not fully clear. Stewart himself notes that
much party shifting is still possible under the New York
system. 131 The more basic concern is thus with the
sanctity of the state's right to choose how it pursues its
objectives, rather than the chosen methods or objectives
per se . That this was the case seems clear in the opinions
of these justices following Rosario.
130 Cousins , 419 U.S. at 496 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) .
131 410 U.S. at 759.
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Blackmun's dissent in Kusper puts great stock in the
difficulty of managing the electoral process and the
challenge this task presents to the states; we hear this in
his description of the statutory structure as "complex".
His discussion of raiding also indicates that the states
should have room to make choices. While he admits the
existence of raiding is debatable, he characterizes the
legitimacy of trying to prevent it as "unquestioned"
. Most
importantly, he refers to Illinois' history of significant
party regimentation to argue that the justices should be
cautious in second guessing the choice of methods to deal
with such political realities. 132 This echoes Rosario in
its emphasis on allowing the states to choose, rather than
mandating a particular method of dealing with electoral
issues. Blackmun makes this association clear:
By resorting to a standard of rigid and strict
review, and by indulging in what I fear is a
departure from the appropriately deferential
approach in Rosario , the Court places itself in
the position of failing to give the States the
elbow room they deserve and must possess if they
are to formulate solutions for the many and
particular problems confronting them that are
associated with the preservation of the integrity
of the franchise. 133
Thus, we see clearly stated the deference that "constructed
order" justices pay to the authority of the states, and
their acceptance of the states as a major manager and
problem solver of the electoral process.
132 414 U.S. at 63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133 414 U.S. at 63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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This emphasis is mirrored in Rehnquist's Kusper
dissent. Rehnquist emphasizes that Illinois, unlike New
York, does not require party enrollment prior to election
day, with the result that Illinois has chosen a different
approach to protecting its process from interparty raiding,
a legitimate interest. While neither state's approach is
"perfect", both are legitimate and constitutionally
permissible. 134 Rehnquist shows great deference to the
right of individual states to choose their own methods for
managing the electoral process, as well as a standard of
review based on legitimate rather than compelling state
interests
.
Powell's partial dissent in Cousins goes even further
to defend the role of states . He maintains that while the
plaintiff delegates bring valid claims, the state of
Illinois "has a legitimate interest in protecting its
citizens from being represented by delegates who have been
rejected by these citizens in a democratic election". 135
The states, rather than a national political party, should
have power over delegate representation procedures.
Powell also asserts a positive view of state purposes
in his La Follette dissent. He notes that the Wisconsin
open primary was designed to maximize participation, an
implicit argument that state action can be a positive force
134 414 U.S. at 65-69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135 419 U.S. at 497 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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for promoting democratic ideals. He also defends the state
by asserting that the case "involves a state statutory-
scheme that regulates delegate selection only indirectly",
which "differs substantially from the direct state
interference in delegate selection at issue in Cousins "
.
Powell cites Marchioro to support this contention. 136
Powell's dissent also notes that the state party in
Wisconsin has taken a position favoring the state law. To
him, this carries an equal if not greater weight than the
claims of the national party. He sees the history of party
regulation as "a continuing accommodation of the interests
of the parties with those of the States and their
citizens" . He also sees the nonbinding primary as
inadequate for the state goals, since the primary's purpose
is to "give control over the nomination process to
individual voters"; the state's purpose is deserving of
adequate means. 137
The solicitude with which the state role is viewed is
evident in Scalia's dissent in Tashi ian . In arguing against
the freedom of association claims of the Connecticut
Republican Party, Scalia asserts that freedom is not
impaired and that "the State is under no obligation ... to
let its party primary be used, instead of a party- funded
opinion poll, as the means by which the party identifies
136 450 U.S. at 128-29 (Powell, J., dissenting).
137 La Follette . 450 U.S. at 133-34, 137 (Powell, J.,
dissenting)
.
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the relative popularity of its potential candidates among
independents". He also states that there is not
any reason apparent to me why the State cannot
insist that this decision to support what might
be called the independent's choice be taken by
the party membership in a democratic fashion ,
rather than through a process that permits the
members' votes to be diluted- and perhaps even
absolutely outnumbered-by the votes of
outsiders
.
138
This is an explicit assertion that the states may properly
"construct" the electoral process in order to preserve
competition
.
Scalia goes even further to assert that, even if the
party faithful wanted to allow independents, "there is no
reason why the State is bound to honor that desire",
comparing this desire to a desire to use conventions or an
executive committee to choose nominees and finding them
unacceptable even if democratically approved. This is so
because
the validity of the state- imposed primary
requirement itself, which we have hitherto
considered "too plain for argument", American
Party of Texas v. White , 415 U.S. 767, 781
(1974)
,
presupposes that the State has the right
to "protect the Party against the Party itself".
Connecticut may lawfully require that significant
elements of the democratic election process be
democratic-whether the Party wants that
or not. It is beyond my understanding why the
Republican Party's delegation of its democratic
138 479 U.S. at 236 (Scalia, J., dissenting); emphasis
added
.
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choice to a Republican Convention can be
proscribed, but its delegation of that choice to
nonmembers of the Party cannot
.
139
Thus, Scalia seeks to roll back freedom of association to
the extent that it treads on state authority to "protect"
the democratic process. He characterizes Connecticut's
power to specify democratic votes by members in this area
to be "plainly and entirely constitutional". 140 Thus, he
argues for a democratic structure constructed in part by
statute
.
Stevens' dissent in Tashi ian , joined by Scalia,
focuses on another aspect of participation: the
qualifications of voters, and the role granted to the
states in this area by the Qualifications Clause of the
Constitution. Stevens views this clause as the fulcrum of
the case, and finds the Connecticut Republican Party's plan
unconstitutional for that reason. Its "facial disparity"
and "the more stringent qualifications for electors to the
state legislature" would clearly violate the Constitution.
He does not accept the majority's "freewheeling
interpretation" or their characterizations of the Founders'
intent or Oregon v. Mitchell . 141 In this way, Stevens
seems to be protecting a particular view of participation
and of states rights.
139 479 U.S. at 236-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
empha s e s added
.
140 4 7 9 U.S. at 237 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141 479 U.S. at 230-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Like the majority justices, Stevens's opinion in
Tashjian cites the debates of the Constitutional Convention
to buttress his argument on the Qualifications Clause,
emphasizing that the original draft of the clause by the
Committee on Detail, which was argued about in the notes
cited by the majority, specified that the qualifications of
electors "shall be the same". 142 His citation of the
Committee's draft is accurate. 143 But he neglects the
critical fact that the final and enacted Constitution does
not state that the qualifications shall be the same; it
says simply that "the Electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous
Branch of the State Legislature". 144 The implication is
not necessarily absolute symmetry, but simply federal
qualifications that are not less than the states'
.
The "constructed order" justices ultimately take a
strongly solicitous view of state purposes and interests,
granting them significant deference. It is clear that the
deference is not total; the basic legitimacy of freedom of
association is not challenged. These justices are
nevertheless in agreement in asserting that such freedom
has been given too much credence, and legitimate state
purposes have been short-changed with easy phrases.
142 479 U.S. at 232 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143 parrand ( Records , Volume 2, p. 178.
144 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 2.
180
Conclusions: Parties. States, and the Power of Choice
The "natural order" justices' opinions involving party
organization, party registration, and nominating methods
reveal a definite preference for an electoral process
governed more by the parties and the free choices of voters
than by state-mandated statutory schemes. These justices do
not favor a particular type of party organization or
nominating method, but rather favor choices, however
different, made by parties themselves. In this sense, these
opinions have no particular theory of party organization or
membership. What they do reflect is a preference for free
competition and free choices by voters and parties as the
best method of promoting competition and democracy. The
parties themselves are viewed as the proper decisionmaker.
The "natural order" perspective is skeptical of state
claims of ensuring democracy by statute. A high standard of
both scrutiny and evidence is applied to state claims, and
most of these claims are found wanting (Marchioro is the
significant exception) . The overall outcome and perspective
is a "precedential environment" friendly to party claims
and doubtful of state interests, one that has carried the
majority of justices in the decisions of the Court in this
area
.
The "natural order" justices make a more limited use
of political science in these decisions than in the ballot
access opinions, perhaps because they find themselves in a
majority and thus have less need of extrajudicial evidence
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for arguments. Eu is noteworthy in that this most recent of
nomination/party organization opinions makes virtually no
use of political science references, except for a citation
to a statement in the record by political scientist Malcolm
Jewell; this is particularly ironic because political
scientists were a critical force in challenging
California's statutes. Nonetheless, the earlier and now
precedential opinions in this area do make telling and
effective use of authorities like David Adamany, Arthur
Weisburd, and the Records of the Constitutional Convention.
The "constructed order" justices, whose opinions have
often been in dissent in these cases, offer a striking,
though by no means absolute, contrast to the "natural
order" justices' treatment of parties and the state. Their
trust seems to lie much more with the actions of popularly
elected state legislatures, and much greater deference is
given to legislative actions and the interests asserted in
support of them. The "constructed order" justices also pay
attention to very different concerns than those which are
noticed by the "natural order" justices. These include the
asserted interests of state governments; the political
context of the cases; and the practical political
implications, small or large, of the Court's decisions.
The "natural order" justices appear to favor broad and
universally applied principles, with less attention to
particular political context. The essence of the
"constructed order" viewpoint is that state governments
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have a perfectly valid right to protect the boundaries of
political parties and to be a player in shaping the party
system. The states do play a role in preserving a
particular political order, a role which these justices are
either not prepared to usurp or believe is fully
legitimate
.
It is interesting to note that citation of outside
authority such as political science and historical accounts
seems to occur more frequently in these dissenting
opinions. Particular justices appear to use these sources
as a way to make their policy stances clear and argue their
view of the political/constitutional order.
The jurisprudence of the Court in this area is thus
divided between a "natural order" viewpoint that values
freedom of association highly and suspects the effects of
state regulation, and a "constructed order" viewpoint that
is much more sensitive to state interests and the actions
of politically elected legislatures. The former viewpoint
has held the majority in cases involving party organization
and nomination processes, but the latter viewpoint has
maintained a continuous and active counterargument among
the justices. The critical difference between the two is
not so much the political outcomes they favor, but who
should have the authority to shape the electoral process
and make the particular choices among political
alternatives
.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SUPREME COURT AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE: HOW MUCH
CAN THE GOVERNMENT REGULATE?
Once a party organizes itself, nominates candidates,
and gains access to the ballot, its candidates must
campaign for the vote
. A key ingredient of modern
campaigning is money. A lack of money limits communication
with the voters, thereby damaging a candidate's chances of
election. At the same time, money has long been seen as a
source of political corruption, and state and federal
governments in the U.S. have attempted to regulate campaign
finance since the late nineteenth century.
Early examples of government efforts to stem the
"corruption" of campaign finance met with mixed results.
The 1883 Pendleton Act restrictions on soliciting political
funds from federal employees, the first in a series of acts
reducing the "political" nature of public employment, had a
noticeable impact on the financial relationship of
government employees and political campaigns. In contrast,
despite the 1907 Tillman Act prohibition of direct
corporate contributions, much corporate money still flowed
into the coffers of political parties. Both types of
governmental initiative grew out of the Progressive
hostility toward the perceived political power of "big
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money", as well as the Progressive distrust of political
party "machines". 1
In general, most of the pre- 1971 campaign finance laws
were poorly monitored and enforced. Not until the 1974
Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA) was an enforcement agency created in this area. That
agency, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) , and the
various provisions of the FECA, have been the focus of most
of the Supreme Court litigation on campaign finance in
recent years. 2
1 The Progressive foundation of continuing efforts to
regulate and reform campaign finance is well noted by Frank
Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), especially chap. 1,
"The First Ninety Years" . The 1940 Hatch Act placed further
restrictions on financial contributions by government
employees, while the 1943 Smith/Connally Act and the 1947
Taft/Hartley Act broadened the restriction on direct
corporate contributions to include labor union
organizations as well. Margaret Latus Nugent and John R.
Johannes, eds
. ,
Money, Elections, and Democracy: Reforming
Congressional Campaign Finance (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1990)
, pp. 3-4
.
2 For a brief history of campaign finance regulation,
see Herbert Alexander, Financing Elections: Money,
Elections, And Political Reform , 4th ed. (Washington, DC:
CQ Press, 1992), particularly chap. 2. The literature on
campaign finance is extensive, with the focus of many works
being reformist and centered upon the patterns of
contributions and expenditures and their implications for
democracy. A representative sample includes Alexander
Heard, The Costs of Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1960) /Elizabeth Drew, Politics and
Money: The New Road To Corruption (New York: Macmillan,
1983); Michael J. Malbin, ed., Parties, Interest Groups,
and Campaign Finance Laws (Washington, DC: American
Enterprise Institute, 1984) ; Robert Mutch, Campaigns,
Congress and Courts (New York: Praeger, 1988) ; Brooks
Jackson, Honest Graft (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988);
and Nugent and Johannes, eds., Mnnpy. Elections and
Democracy . A recent study which critiques a number of the
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The identification of money with both speech and
corruption produces the dilemma facing the justices and
campaign finance regulators. While officials strive to
reduce corruption by regulating campaign finance, they must
do so without abridging the free speech of individuals or
groups. This conflict is reflected in Supreme Court
jurisprudence in this area, where the majority's position
is that money constitutes a form of speech protected by
the Constitution. 3
In general, the differences over how to handle this
dilemma divide the "natural order" and "constructed order"
viewpoints along the same fault lines revealed by the
ballot access and nominations decisions, with the
"constructed order" being more supportive of the
government's right to regulate. At the same time, the
breadth of the division is blurred by a shift in the
stances of Brennan and Marshall, two of the most consistent
advocates of the "natural order" perspective. Unlike the
other areas examined in this dissertation, campaign finance
regulation is often approved by these justices on the
grounds that preventing corruption is a compelling state
interest. In this area of jurisprudence, the perception
reformist arguments about campaign finance is Sorauf's
Inside Campaign Finance . Contrary to claims of ever-
increasing campaign spending and PAC proliferation, Sorauf
finds that the growth of PACs, contributions, and spending
have all stabilized since the mid-1980' s.
3 Only Justice Byron White consistently dissented from
the majority's identification of money as speech.
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that unregulated campaign money has a potent and
detrimental effect on political competition significantly
moderates the stance of the "natural order" perspective
that state laws damage healthy competition.
While most justices since the decision in Buckley v.
Valeo have supported the position that money is speech,
they have also upheld a variety of federal and state
efforts to regulate campaign money. With the exception of
Burger and Scalia, the dividing line between the justices
in this area has not been if government can regulate, but
how extensively it may in order to prevent corruption of
the electoral process. It is not that the justices who
normally support the "natural order" have changed their
standards; they simply find campaign finance to be an
exception, a case where state action can enhance democracy.
Nonetheless, Rehnquist and White, the Justices who most
consistently advocate the "constructed order" perspective
in these cases, are still willing to allow a wider range of
government regulation than their "natural order"
counterparts. Thus, although the judicial fault lines have
shifted, questions of authority (government control of
campaign finance practices) and democracy (how to preserve
political competition) continue to divide the two
perspectives
.
The justices' treatment of specific campaign finance
statutes reflects this balance. They have upheld FECA
contribution limits, disclosure requirements, and public
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financing of presidential campaigns 4 ; FECA limits on
contributions by unincorporated associations to
multicandidate committees 5 ; an FEC prohibition of
corporate solicitation of nonmembers for political funds 6 ,-
and a Michigan statute prohibiting the independent use of
unsegregated corporate treasury funds to support or oppose
candidates for state office. 7 In contrast, they have
struck down FECA expenditure limitations, independent
expenditure limitations, and limits on expenditures of
personal or family funds 8 ; a Massachusetts law barring
corporate and union expenditures in referendum campaigns 9 ;
a New York State prohibition on enclosing policy statements
in electricity bills 10 ; FEC limits on independent
expenditures by political committees on behalf of publicly
funded presidential candidates 11 ; and limits on
4 Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
.
5 California Medical Association v. FEC , 453 U.S. 182
(1981) .
6 FEC v. National Right To Work Committee (NRWC) , 459
U.S. 197 (1982) .
7 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce , 494 U.S. 652
(1990) .
8 Buckley , 424 U.S. 1.
9 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti , 435 U.S.
765 (1978) .
10 Consolidated Edison of N.Y. v. Public Service
Commission of N.Y. , 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
11 FEC v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee (NCPAC) , 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
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independent expenditures by political, non-business
corporations. 12 In broad terms, the majority of justices
have favored contribution limits, particularly with regard
to corporations and candidates; they are more skeptical of
expenditure limits and limits on independent or general
policy issue spending.
The two central concerns of justices in campaign
finance cases -- the danger of corruption, particularly by
corporate wealth, and the relationship between money and
speech -- are rooted in differing ideas of how to promote
political competition. The "natural order" perspective
seeks to support competition by striking down expenditure
limits, equating money with speech, and supporting public
financing of presidential elections, while preventing
corruption of that competition by supporting contribution
limits and disclosure requirements. The most extreme
variant does not even support these governmental intrusions
into the competitive process. The "constructed order"
perspective shares the concern for competition, but is more
deferential to government regulatory efforts in this area
as the best method of preserving competition. This position
on campaign finance is congruent with their government-
friendly stance in ballot access and nomination cases. The
most extreme variant here denies that money is a form of
protected free speech.
12 FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc
.
(MCFL) , 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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It is notable that both the "constructed order" and
the "natural order" perspectives have justices who argue
for and against protection of the interests of minor
political parties in campaign finance regulation. On a
broader level, neither perspective defends any unique or
assured role for political parties in the campaign finance
arena. While the justices' decisions have led indirectly to
more campaign money being channelled through party
committees, their opinions do not enshrine any
associational protections for parties in this area of the
electoral process. 13
While campaign finance disputes involve a wide array
of groups and individuals, most of these cases have not
involved political parties directly. Nevertheless, such
regulation has a profound effect on the electoral system in
which parties function, so it is reasonable to ask how the
opinions of justices in this area relate to their views on
13 The justices' upholding of FECA contribution limits
in 1976 meant that those individuals and groups wishing to
funnel large amounts of money into the political process
could no longer do so directly through candidates, and
contributions to political action committees were limited
as well. An alternate "route" for campaign money- -through
party committees- -was established by a 1979 amendment to
the FECA which allows unlimited contributions to state and
local party organizations for voter registration and "get
out the vote" activities for presidential candidates, as
well as the production of election paraphernalia for
federal candidates. These contributions, now known as "soft
money", often flow legally through national party
committees, strengthening those organizations as well.
Thus, the justices' defense of contribution limits has
played a part in increasing the role of parties in campaign
financing
.
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parties and the electoral process. Analysis of these
opinions reinforces the thematic findings of the previous
chapters, with an important twist: while the essential
differences between the "natural order" and "constructed
order" persist, the former's concern for party
associational rights is overridden by fears of corruption,
resulting in more "common ground" between the two
perspectives
.
The "Natural Order" Perspective
The "natural order" perspective favors a limited
regulatory role for government with regard to campaign
finance, similar to its skepticism about government
management of ballot access and party
organizational\nomination procedures. Unlike the latter
cases, however, the "natural order" is more accommodating
to regulation, seeing government as having an important
role to play in controlling the corrupting influence that
concentrated wealth and unlimited contributions may have on
candidates, the party system, and the electoral process.
Restriction and disclosure of contributions, as well as
public funding of major party presidential campaigns, are
seen as permissible to prevent such corruption. The
"natural order" therefore finds more common ground with the
"constructed order" in this area of disputes.
Ironically, the only justices who consistently follow
the antigovernment skepticism of the "natural order"
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perspective in the campaign finance cases are Burger, who
shifts between the two perspectives in other areas, and
Scalia, who supports the "constructed order" deference to
government statutes and interests when ballot access and
nomination\organization procedures are involved. In this
area, however, supporting the "natural order" perspective
is consistent with their own positions over time. Burger's
opinions in other cases, particularly the filing fee cases
of Bullock and Lubin discussed in Chapter Two, reflect a
strong sensitivity to issues of financial requirements or
regulation in the electoral process. Scalia' s "departure"
in these cases is consistent with his longstanding
sensitivity to First Amendment free speech concerns. 14
Party Competition and Choice
In seeking to further healthy political competition,
the "natural order" justices are equally concerned with
enabling free speech and preventing corruption. The seminal
case is Buckley v. Valeo . Buckley , which involved a
challenge to the constitutionality of the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 (FECA) , led the justices to
an examination of all the major provisions of that Act. The
original Act, passed in 1971, led inadvertently to the
14 On Scalia' s broad reading of First Amendment
freedoms, and his particular displeasure at their narrowing
by the majority in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
(to be discussed in this chapter), see David G. Savage,
Turning Right: The Making Of The Rehnqu ist Supreme Court
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1992), pp. 328-29.
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fundraising abuses of the 1972 Nixon campaign that occurred
just prior to the law's taking effect. These abuses,
revealed by the Watergate investigation, produced the
reforms contained in the 1974 Amendments: expenditure and
contribution limits for all campaigns for federal office;
reporting and disclosure requirements of all contributions
of $250 or more,- a system of public financing for the
presidential election process; and the establishment of a
Federal Election Commission (FEC) to monitor and enforce
these regulations. Buckley represented a quick, but largely
unsuccessful, effort by opponents of the law to challenge
the constitutionality of the FECA.
The per curiam majority opinion focuses on the two
concerns emphasized by the "natural order" justices in this
area of jurisprudence: (1) whether money is speech
protected by the First Amendment from state limitation, and
(2) whether large and undisclosed contributions were a
threat to corrupt fair political competition. The answers
to these questions of authority and democracy have
important implications for the role that political parties
can and will play in the electoral process. The ability of
parties to raise and spend money shapes the volume of their
"speech", while corruption can pervert the balance of
intraparty and interparty competition.
Buckley begins with a strong defense of free speech,
quoting New York Times v. Sullivan to argue that "debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
193
open", as such debate affects "the ability of the citizenry
to maKe informed choices among candidates for office". 15
In considering the constitutionality of the FECA
expenditure and contribution limitations, the justices
address the question of whether money is a form of free
speech. For the "natural order" majority, the answer is
mixed; money is speech, but it is worthy of full
constitutional protection only if it is direct speech.
The "natural order" finds that expenditures constitute
direct speech, asserting that "this Court has never
suggested that the dependence of a communication on the
expenditure of money operates to introduce a nonspeech
element" into the action. For the "natural order" justices,
the use of money in the political process is fully
protected by the First Amendment. Expenditure limitations
are compared to "being free to drive an automobile as far
and as often as one desires on a single tank of gas". 16
15 424 U.S. at 14.
16 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 15-16, 19, 39, including n. 18
on p. 19. With regard to other expenditure limits,
corruption is seen as an "inadequate" justification for the
ceiling on independent expenditures, since the restriction
"prevents only some large expenditures". Nor is the
corruption danger as great; since the candidate has no
connection to the expenditures, there is an "absence of
prearrangement and coordination" . The limits on personal
expenditures are also found to be unjustified by the
interest in preventing corruption. Marshall dissents on
personal expenditures, noting that the ceilings are
substantially higher than those for other contributions,
and that they are justified by the governmental interest ±r.
"promoting the reality and appearance of equal access to
the political arena". He cites the Court's ballot access
opinions as supportive of that interest. Those opinions
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In contrast to their ballot access opinions, the
"natural order" justices do not appear as concerned about
financial equality among candidates as they are about equal
ballot access. The goal of "equalizing the relative ability
of all voters to affect electoral outcomes" by limiting
expenditures is not viewed as constitutionally
legitimate. 17 In a confrontation between free competition
and enforced equality of expenditure, the former value will
be upheld under the First Amendment, despite the "natural
order" concerns with corruption.
The justices in Buckley who joined the full opinion
(Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stewart), while protecting
the use of money in politics, do not endow the collection
of money, i.e. contributions, with the same constitutional
protection. Contributions are not seen as direct speech,
but as promoting someone else's speech and, thus, are not
entitled to the same stringent protection. They are
outweighed by a compelling governmental interest in the
prevention of corruption, real or apparent. The justices
used that interest to strike down governmental action,
while here it is cited to support governmental regulation.
The promotion of access is the ultimate value for Marshall.
424 U.S. at 45-47, 53.
The government may properly limit expenditures by
publicly funded candidates, as well as some corporate and
union expenditures. The FECA puts expenditure limits on
presidential candidates who accept public funding; these
were upheld in Buckley . Direct contributions of
unsegreaated corporate and union funds to federal candidate
campaigns are prohibited by a variety of statutes,
including the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act.
17 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 17.
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argue that large contributions do not accurately reflect
the speech of the community, thereby warping the
competitive process. 18
In responding to free speech concerns, the justices
argue that contribution limits "do not undermine to any
material degree the potential for robust and effective
discussion of candidates and campaign issues". Moreover,
they also see no evidence of adverse impact on campaign
funding, simply a need to raise funds from more
contributors and shift contributor expenditures to direct
expression. The limits restrict only one important means of
associating, leaving many other avenues of competition and
18 424 U.S. at 26-27. The Justices do not take
positions on the issues of equalizing citizen ability or
opening up access for poor candidates, which contrasts with
their solicitude toward such candidates and citizens in
filing fee and signature requirement cases. In fact, in
Austin vs. Michigan Chamber of Commerce , Marshall
implicitly argues against the propriety of equalization,
noting that the Michigan act in question "does not attempt
'to equalize the relative influence of speakers on
elections'", as Justice Kennedy contends, but instead
assures "that expenditures reflect actual political
support". 494 U.S. at 660.
Limits on contributions by political committees, the
organizational requirements for such committees, and a
yearly limitation on total contributions by an individual
are upheld on the basis of avoiding evasion of the
individual contribution limits; they are not seen as
favoring "established interest groups". The Justices'
approval of the exemption of volunteer time services from
limits, while still upholding limits on material
assistance, indicates that participation per se is not seen
as a source of corruption. The key danger is large
contributions of other people's money to a candidate's
campaign. Buckley , 424 U.S. at 35-38.
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expression open. 19 The limits thereby protect democratic
competition from corruption without fundamentally limiting
the realm of speech and association.
The concern of the "natural order" justices with
corruption also led them to uphold the reporting and
disclosure requirements of the FECA
.
20 Like Louis
Brandeis, they held that "sunlight" is "the best of
disinfectants". 21 FECA "impose [s] no ceiling on campaign-
related activities" and thereby survives the "exacting
scrutiny" to which such items are subject under the NAACP
freedom of association precedents. 22 At the same time, the
Buckley majority upholds the public funding of qualified
presidential candidates as a proper effort to enhance
competition. They argue that public funding "furthers, not
19 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 20-22, 28-29. This language is
very similar to the "alternate means of access" emphasized
in the ballot access opinions.
20 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 61-62, citing Burroughs v.
U.S. , 290 U.S. 534 (1934). The justices cite federal
campaign finance disclosure laws enacted in 1910 and 1925,
and the upholding of the latter statute in Burroughs , as
legal precedent for the requirements.
21 424 U.S. at 67, citing Louis Brandeis, Other
People' s Money (New York: National Home Library Foundation
ed. ( 1933), p. 62. The title of Brandeis' book reflects the
"natural order" view of the pivotal source of corruption in
campaign finance. The connection between disclosure and
uncorrupted party/candidate competition is evident in the
justices' distinction between candidate related independent
spending and spending unrelated to a political candidate.
They approve the FECA's reporting requirements on the
former on the grounds that it helps voters to be aware of
what groups are supporting a candidate. 424 U.S. at 81.
22 424 U.S. at 64-72.
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abridges, pertinent First Amendment values" because it will
"facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation
in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing
people"
.
23
The restrictions on speech within the public financing
scheme are justified by an argument drawn from a unanimous
ballot access opinion, Jenness v. Fortson . In this view,
"Congress may legitimately require 'some preliminary
showing of a significant modicum of support'
. . .as an
eligibility requirement for public funds". 24 They also
distinguish their application of this principle in the
ballot access cases from public financing in the following
manner
:
Our decisions finding a need for an alternative
means turn on the nature and the extent of the
burden imposed in the absence of available
alternatives. We have earlier stated our view
that Chapter 95 [the law governing public funding
of the presidential general election campaign] is
far less burdensome upon and restrictive of
constitutional rights than the regulations
involved in the ballot access cases. 25
The justices argue that "any risk of harm to minority
interests is speculative" and that "campaigns can be
successfully carried out by means other than public
23 424 U.S. at 92-93.
24 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 96.
2B Buckley , 424 U.S. at 101
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financing, arguing that they have been up to this date, and
this avenue is still open to all candidates". 26
In judging the fairness of public funding, the
critical element for the "natural order" justices is not
equal results, but equal opportunity to be part of the
competition. Any failure of minor parties to gain public
funding does not directly restrict their ability to run
candidates or obtain votes; it simply forces them to rely
more on private contributions, which candidates with public
funding are wholly denied. 27 In other words, claims of
restricted competition must be genuine and significant.
Unlike the moderation of the majority, Burger's
dissent in Buckley represents the "natural order"
perspective taken to its furthest extent of antigovernment
skepticism. Burger finds virtually all the provisions of
the FECA to be unconstitutional, arguing that many of them
do more to damage competition than to assist it. Burger's
major argument is that contributions and expenditures are
worthy of equal First Amendment protection, and that
restrictions on either are therefore unconstitutional. 28
Burger asserts that
We do little but engage in word games unless we
26 424 U.S. at 101.
27 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 94. It is important to note
that private contributions can be indirectly channeled to
the support of publicly funded presidential candidates
through independent expenditures and "soft money".
28 424 U.S. at 235 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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recognize that people-candidates and
contributors
-spend money on political activity
because they wish to communicate ideas, and their
constitutional interest in doing so is precisely
the same whether they or someone else utters the
words
.
29
He argues that both types of limitations will "drastically"
change or "foreclose" some candidacies. 30 Since
competition will be reduced by the limits, they are
logically insupportable. On this point, Blackmun's dissent
in Buckley joins Burger in failing to see "a principled
constitutional distinction" between the contribution and
expenditure limits, and he too would invalidate both. 31
Burger also takes Congress to task on the content of
their disclosure requirements, arguing that they gave
"little or no thought" to the matter and simply "lifted
figures out of a 65-year-old statute". He sees the claim of
corruption by small contributions as "too extravagant to be
maintained", asserting that "Congress has used a shotgun to
kill wrens as well as hawks" . He also argues that "the
public right to know ought not to be absolute when its
exercise reveals private political convictions" . Citing the
secrecy of the ballot, he argues that "secrecy and privacy
as to political preferences and convictions are fundamental
in a free society". In rebutting the majority, he argues
29 424 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
30 424 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
31 424 U.S. at 290 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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they "failed to give the traditional standing to some of
the First Amendment values at stake here". 32
Burger also objects to the public funding of
presidential elections, viewing it as "an impermissible
intrusion by the Government into the traditionally private
political process". 33 The danger he sees in public
financing is that government financing of conventions and
the electoral process could subvert the private nature of
these processes and provide "a springboard for later
attempts to impose a whole range of requirements on
delegate selection and convention activities". 34
Justice Burger in Buckley finds the rationing of
political expression in the FECA unacceptable. As he puts
it, "freedom is hazardous, but some restraints are
worse". 35 In his view, Congress' restrictions,
requirements, and resources run afoul of the First
Amendment and also invidiously discriminate against
challengers outside the major parties. This is a much more
antigovernment argument than is evident in some of Burger's
other opinions, but it is likely due to Burger's particular
32 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 237-39 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)
.
33 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 237-39 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)
34 424 U.S. at 250 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
35 424 U.S. at 256-57 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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concern with the role of money in politics, evident is his
Bullock and Lubin opinions. 36
The majority opinion in Buckley sets the tone for the
justices' later opinions. The modified "natural order"
perspective has continued (with some dissent) to defend the
free expenditure of money in campaigns or political causes,
but has also continued to uphold limitations on
contributions on the grounds that large, unreported
contributions pose a particular danger of corrupting the
competitive process. The influence of corporate
contributions and spending has received particular
attention in both of these areas, while the conflict
between free speech and controlling corruption has
continued to be the center of division and debate.
Justice Powell's majority opinion in First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti , which invalidated a
Massachusetts law barring corporate and union expenditures
in referendum campaigns, does show some divisions in the
"natural order" Justices' deference to the prevention of
36 It must also be noted that Burger argues against
the majority's opinion on the ground that it "does violence
to the intent of Congress in this comprehensive scheme of
campaign finance". Burger asserts that "the whole of this
Act is greater than the sum of its parts", and thus a
piecemeal treatment violates congressional intent:
What remains after today's holding leaves
no more than a shadow of what Congress
contemplated. I question whether the residue
leaves a workable program.
In his own way, Burger still respects legislative choices.
424 U.S. at 235-36 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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corruption as a governmental interest. 37 Powell, joined by
Stewart, Blackmun, Stevens, and Burger, asserts that the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court erred in limiting
First Amendment corporate rights to business issues. He
argues that, "if the speakers here were not corporations,
no one would suggest that the State could silence their
proposed speech"
.
Speech cannot be limited simply because
of concerns with the nature of corporate power; the people
"may consider, in making their judgment, the source and
credibility of the advocate". 38
In arguing that speech is "indispensable to decision
making in a democracy", Powell cites Thomas Emerson's
Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment and
Alexander Meiklejohn's Free Speech and its Relation to Self
Government . 39 This general view is not disputed by these
constitutional scholars. Emerson does note that "certain
restraints on expenditure of money in political campaigns"
could be exceptions from the general rule that restrictions
designed to "purify" the democratic process are usually
invalid under law. He does not, however, elaborate on
37 Bellotti , 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
38 435 U.S. at 777-80, 792.
39 435 U.S. at 777.
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possible exceptions; his conclusions accept the need for
positive government protection of free expression. 40
Alexander Meikle j ohn' s work describes the core of the
First Amendment's meaning as facilitating the "thinking
process" in "self-government"; free speech is a necessity
of such governance. He adopts an absolutist view of the
First Amendment, noting that "its great declaration is that
intellectual freedom is the necessary bulwark of the public
safety". 41 In the case of corporate spending on a
referendum, it would likely be seen as part of this
thinking process; however, a sharp rebuke by Meikle j ohn to
the "speech" of modern commercial media and its money-
making focus suggests that this conclusion requires some
qualification
.
42
Arguments could be made that corporations should be
judged by the same standard as individuals, since Congress
40 Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory Of The
First Amendment (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 103-5,
115-16
.
41 Alexander Meikle j ohn, Free Speech And Its Relation
To Self -Government (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press,
1972)
, pp. 26-27, 68
.
42 Meiklejohn, Free Speech , p. 104-5. In words first
penned in 1948, before the full rise of television,
Meiklejohn took this view of the First Amendment and modern
commercial media: "We have used it for the protection of
private, possessive interests with which it has no concern.
It is misinterpretations such as this which, in our use of
the radio, the moving picture, the newspaper and other
forms of publication, are giving the name 'freedoms' to the
most flagrant enslavements of our minds and wills". Whether
this would also apply to corporate- sponsored communication
is unclear.
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and states have legislated (and the Court has upheld)
restrictions on direct corporate spending in election
campaigns; referendum speech might hold the same threat of
corruption that motivated the restrictions on corporate
funding of candidates. The Bellotti majority does not reach
that conclusion. Powell rejects for lack of evidence the
argument that corporate wealth has altered referenda
results
.
43
In contrast to Powell's opinion, "natural order"
Justices Brennan and Marshall join a dissent with Justice
White in Bellotti
.
44 In contrast to the majority, Brennan
and Marshall are more concerned with the corrupting impact
of corporate business money on the political process and
less ready to make the distinction between referendum
spending and candidate campaigns. Thus, even within the
"natural order" viewpoint, there are differences of opinion
as to how far the government may proceed in restricting
speech. A crucial reason for those differences is a
division of opinion on the degree of corruptive danger
posed by corporate money in politics. 45
43 435 U.S. at 789.
44 435 U.S. at 803 (White, J., dissenting).
45 Justice Powell's opinion in Consolidated Edison of
N.Y. v. Public Service Commission of N.Y. , joined by
Brennan, Marshall, Burger, Stewart, and (notably) White,
which overturned a New York State Public Service Commission
prohibition on the inclusion of policy statements in
monthly utility bills, argues that subject matter
discussion cannot be restricted in such a forum. If
customers do not like it, they can ignore it, and the cost
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Marshall's opinion in California Medical Association
v
-
FEC
>
which upheld FECA limits on contributions by
unincorporated associations to multicandidate political
committees, reemphasizes the "natural order" justices'
general approval of contribution limits as a proper means
of guarding against corruption. 46 Marshall notes that
of the insert can be segregated from general corporate
funds
.
Consolidated Edison of N.Y. v. Public Service
Commission of N. Y.
. 447 U.S. 530 (1980). Bellotti and
Consolidated Edison demonstrate that corporate spending on
politics per se is not seen as corruption by most of the
"natural order" justices; the connection to candidates is
important
.
Justice White's participation is notable because it is
the only instance where he voted to strike down a
government prohibition or regulation in these cases; he is
the most consistent advocate of the "constructed order"
perspective
.
A small but important note of skepticism about the
case is raised by Justice Marshall in a separate
concurrence. Marshall agrees with the overall decision, but
is skeptical of the separability of the cost of the
inserts. Consolidated Edison , 447 U.S. at 544 (Marshall,
J., concurring) . As his dissent in Bellotti demonstrates,
and further cases reinforce, Marshall is more skeptical of
corporate funds in politics than many of the other Justices
who adopt the "natural order" perspective, even when he
votes to protect corporate speech.
46 California Medical Association v. FEC , 453 U.S. 182
(1981) . Marshall's opinion is joined in full by Brennan,
White, and Stevens. White's joining of the opinion is
consistent with his greater deference to government
regulation in this area. Justice Stewart filed a dissent
joined by Powell, Burger, and Rehnquist, but it objected to
the decision on jurisdictional rather than substantive
grounds
.
A concurrence by Blackmun, while supporting the
general direction of Marshall's majority opinion, asserts
that contributions are entitled to full First Amendment
protection, and sees the key distinction as between
contributions to candidates and independent political
expenditures; the former is involved here, and on that
basis the restriction should be upheld. 453 U.S. at 202-3
(Blackmun, J., concurring). The assertion that
contributions have full First Amendment status is
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corporations and unions are more restricted in their
campaign finance activities than the unincorporated
associations at issue here. 47 As in earlier decisions,
corruption is identified more closely with direct financial
ties to candidates, and less with political spending per
se .
The "natural order" justices' willingness to protect
expenditures made independently of candidates, particularly
by organizations other than business corporations, is
evident in Brennan's opinion in FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens For Life, Inc. (MCFL) . which finds the FECA
restriction on independent expenditures unconstitutional in
so far as the danger of wealthy corporations is not
involved. 48 Brennan, joined by Marshall, Powell, Scalia,
and a concurrence by O'Connor, finds that the MCFL's
"Special Edition" election newspaper violates Section 316
of the FECA, which prohibits corporate spending of
unsegregated treasury funds on federal elections. But
applying that statute to the MCFL is judged to be
unconstitutional, since MCFL "does not accept contributions
from business corporations or unions", deriving resources
consistent with Blackmun's dissent in Buckley ; however,
this case demonstrates that he will uphold restrictions on
contributions in certain situations.
47 453 U.S. at 195, 199-200.
48 FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc
.
(MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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solely from "member" voluntary contributions. 49 The logic
of Brennan's opinion reveals that the "natural order"
Justices continue to see large aggregations of unsegregated
corporate wealth used to support political candidates, not
the corporate form per se , as a critical nexus of
corruption in campaign finance; the government can only
infringe on speech and association in the former
instance
.
50
The fulcrum of Brennan's argument against the FEC
position is that "voluntary political associations do not
suddenly present the specter of corruption merely by
assuming the corporate form" . Any fear of massive secret
spending through such entities is obviated by the
disclosure provisions which still apply to them. As a
result, "the concerns underlying the regulation of
corporate political activity are simply absent with regard
to MCFL" . 51
49 479 U.S. at 241-42. The violation occurred because
the newspaper was an expenditure of corporate treasury
funds to promote particular candidates, which is prohibited
by Section 441 (b)
.
50 The skepticism of Brennan, and particularly
Marshall, appears to extend beyond candidates to causes
;
note again their positions in Bellotti and Consolidated
Edison .
51 479 U.S. at 259-63. A concurrence by O'Connor joins
the majority, but views the central burden on MCFL
differently. She argues that the additional organizational
requirements entailed by section 316 are the largest burden
on MCFL. 479 U.S. at 265-66 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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If MCFL is not governed or seen as a normal
corporation under these rules, the question becomes what
makes it and others unique. Brennan offers three criteria:
(1) the organization must be expressly formed to promote
political ideas, not to do business; (2) it must have no
shareholders who claim its assets; and (3) it cannot be
established by, or receive contributions from, business
corporations or unions. Such corporations avoid the
corrupting dangers the campaign finance laws were designed
to address. 52
Justice Marshall's opinion in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce , which upheld section 54(1) of the
Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibiting corporations from
using corporate treasury funds independently to support or
oppose candidates for state office, reinforces and expands
past precedent and the distinctions enunciated in
Massachusetts Citizens For Life . 53 Marshall notes that
"state law grants corporations special advantages", quoting
Massachusetts Citizens For Life to argue that these
advantages "permit them to use 'resources amassed in the
52 4 7 9 U.S. at 263-65.
53 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce , 494 U.S.
652 (1990) . Marshall, joined by Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens,
White, and Rehnquist, upheld the statute on the grounds
that "the provision is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest", using a strong standard of
review but finding that standard met. 494 U.S. at 655. The
positions of White and Rehnquist are consistent with their
"constructed order" deference to governmental statutes, and
reveal another case in which the two perspectives have come
together in this area of cases.
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economic marketplace' to obtain 'an unfair advantage in the
political marketplace'". In exchange for the legal
privileges it provides, the state can properly restrict
corporate political expenditures in order to prevent undue
political influence. 54
Brennan's concurrence in Austin rests on an analysis
that distinguishes the Chamber from a corporation like
MCFL, one that is implicitly relevant to party
organizations. While sharing the majority's view that it is
"first and foremost a business association", he argues that
the state law also "protects the small businessperson"
because without it "a member faces significant
disincentives to withdraw, even if he disagrees with the
Chamber's expenditures in support of a particular
candidate"
. It also protects dissenting shareholders of
member corporations from having their funds used for
political campaigns. 55 Democracy and dissent are thus
protected by the state action, a result which the "natural
order" perspective favors for business as well as political
parties
.
54 494 U.S. at 658-61. Marshall argues that the
Chamber of Commerce does not fit the criteria for
distinction laid out in Massachusetts Citizens . Brennan's
concurrence in Austin also argues that the Michigan law is
not a complete ban on either corporate political
participation or political expenditures, citing segregated
funds and PACs . 494 U.S. at 669 (Brennan, J., concurring).
This is reminiscent of the "alternative means of access"
analysis in the ballot access opinions.
55 494 U.S. at 672-73 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Justice Stevens concurs in Austin on two grounds.
First, he sees "the danger of either the fact, or the
appearance, of quid pro quo relationships" as sufficient
grounds in this context for the state regulation "of both
expenditures and contributions"
. In addition, he finds the
difference between speech on general policy and support for
a particular candidate, first noted in Bellotti
. as
applicable to this case. 56 In general, he shares the
majority's respect for the state interest in preventing
corruption
.
The more traditional "natural order" skepticism toward
government regulation, argued at length in Burger's Buckley
dissent, is also evident in the dissents of Scalia and
Kennedy in Austin
. Scalia objects to the majority opinion's
view of corporations and corruption. 57 He begins with a
sarcastic parody of the majority opinion:
56 494 U.S. at 678 (Stevens, J., concurring).
57 Scalia does not agree with the logic of seeing
corporate privileges as unique, noting that "other
associations and private individuals" are granted
advantages by state governments, without losing their First
Amendment rights. Citing a 1984 decision involving a public
TV station's freedom of speech, he argues that commercial
corporations "are no less entitled to this Court's
concern" . While then noting the danger of wealth, he argues
that independent expenditures avoid the threat of
corruption such wealth poses, citing Buckley . He also
argues that few candidates would want direct corporate
support
:
I expect I could count on the fingers of one
hand the candidates who would generally
welcome, much less negotiate for, a formal
endorsement by AT+T or General Motors
.
494 U.S. at 680-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Attention all citizens. To assure the fairness of
elections by preventing disproportionate expres-
sion of the views of any single powerful group,
your Government has decided that the following
associations of persons shall be prohibited from
speaking or writing in support of any candidate:
He characterizes the majority as saying that "too much
speech is an evil that the democratic majority can
proscribe". 59 Scalia instead adopts a laissez faire
attitude toward campaign finance, grounded in a strong view
of the First Amendment
.
Scalia argues that the majority has in fact made its
decision on the basis of "a hitherto unrecognized genus of
political corruption". He quotes Marshall's opinion to
define this "New Corruption", which is seen as
the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with
the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public's support
for the corporation's political ideas. 60
Scalia views this as an "illiberal free speech principle"
of "one man, one minute", and argues that it was rejected
in Buckley . 61 The impact of such a standard on political
competition is significant, in Scalia' s view:
58 494 U.S. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59 494 U.S. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60 Austin , 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61 Nor does he accept Brennan's argument of protecting
shareholders, claiming that the Michigan law is designed
not for this "but to protect political candidates". A
shareholder is subject to majority rule, and may easily
sell his stock without disaster. 494 U.S. at 686-87
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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To eliminate voluntary associations - not only
including powerful ones, but especially inclu-
ding powerful ones - from the public debate is
either to augment the always dominant power of
government or to impoverish the public debate. 62
Scalia is skeptical that "a healthy democratic system can
survive the legislative power to prescribe how much
political speech is too much, who may speak, and who may
not"
.
63
Kennedy's dissent shares Scalia' s concern for the role
of private groups in the political process, citing Robert
Horn's Groups And The Constitution . Federalist Number 10,
and Toqueville for the proposition that "it is a
distinctive part of the American character for individuals
to join associations to enrich the public dialogue", group
identity being "a part of the history of American
democracy". 64 He concludes his opinion with the following:
By constructing a rationale for the jurispru-
62 494 U.S. at 694 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63 494 U.S. at 694-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Kennedy's dissent in Austin , joined by O'Connor and Scalia,
takes a similar stance, arguing that the majority
"validates not one censorship of speech but two" :
Michigan's law restricting independent corporate speech,
and a Justice-created "value-laden, content-based speech
suppression that permits some nonprofit corporate groups,
but not others, to engage in political speech". 494 U.S. at
695-96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In his view, the
majority's judgment of corporations as speakers goes
against precedents in Consolidated Edison regarding content
freedom and Bellotti regarding freedom for all speakers.
494 U.S. at 698-99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Both of these
precedents, however, distinguish speech in favor of
particular candidates, a distinction which Kennedy glosses
over
.
64 Austin , 494 U.S. at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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dence of this Court that prevents distinguished
organizations in public affairs from announcing
that a candidate is qualified or not qualified
for public office, the Court imposes its own
model of speech, one far removed from economic
and political reality. It is an unhappy paradox
that this Court, which has the role of protecting
speech and of barring censorship from all aspects
of political life, now becomes itself the censor.
In the course of doing so, the Court reveals a
lack of concern for speech rights that have the
full protection of the First Amendment. 65
This is a much higher level of trust in the actions of
private economic groups in the campaign finance arena than
is shown by the majority of "natural order" justices.
The "natural order" viewpoint's overall understanding
of competition in the realm of campaign finance is grounded
in a balance between protecting free speech and preventing
corruption of the electoral process. In contrast to their
ballot access and nominations opinions, the majority of
"natural order" justices are much less skeptical of
government regulation of campaign money, and much closer to
the "constructed order" perspective in this area of
opinions. In their view, the principal corrupting influence
that government can properly limit is unlimited
contributions, particularly those from business
corporations and those given to candidates for office. The
most consistent exceptions to this modified stance are
Burger and Scalia, whose arguments are much more skeptical
of government regulations and the prevention of
"corruption" as a compelling state interest. One can almost
65 494 U.S. at 713 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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argue that a number of justices have "traded places"
between the two perspectives in this area of electoral
jurisprudence
.
Party Structure and Functions
The most striking feature of the "natural order"
viewpoint on parties, enunciated in the campaign finance
cases, is not the apparent lack of concern for third
parties by all but Burger, which contrasts with the
solicitude for such parties in the ballot access opinions,
but the relative indifference to parties as an actor in the
campaign finance process. Only Burger's discussion of FECA
gives significant attention to the law's impact on parties.
Minor parties cannot be pleased by the "natural order"
opinions in this area, but major parties have little to
celebrate. The public financing of presidential campaigns,
upheld by most of the "natural order" justices, is a
striking example of how the current system weakens an
already shaky party role in the electoral process. 66
The comments of "natural order" justices in Buckley
reveal some of their views on major and minor parties. The
former are seen, in terms of ideology, as including
"candidates of greater diversity" than minor parties. The
major parties are not narrowly pigeonholed:
66 As noted earlier, the justices' upholding of
contribution limits has indirectly increased party
involvement in campaign finance, by encouraging "soft
money" donations to party organizations.
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In many situations the label "Republican" or
"Democrat" tells a voter little. The candidate
who bears it may be supported by funds from
the far right, the far left, or any place in
between on the political spectrum. 67
Minor parties, on the other hand, "usually represent
definite and publicized viewpoints" and are more
ideologically focused. 68 The justices take no direct
position on whether one type of party is superior to the
other, but this positive view of major parties is in marked
contrast to the ballot access and nomination cases, where
doubts are raised about the ideological diversity of the
major parties. Still, there is continuity in the portrayal
of the major parties as entities with no fixed ideology
save the winning of elections.
The majority opinion in Buckley raises the question of
whether the FECA "invidiously discriminates against
nonincumbent candidates and minor parties in contravention
of the Fifth Amendment". 69 This echoes the ballot access
"natural order" concern that the political playing field be
kept level for all parties, yet the outcome is very
different. In dealing with campaign finance, the justices
find that FECA has not fostered a political imbalance; its
67 4 2 4 U.S. at 70.
68 424 U.S. at 70.
69 4 2 4 U.S. at 14.
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restrictions are seen as "evenhanded" in their treatment of
major and minor parties. 70
The public funding scheme for the presidential
selection process is also found not to constitute
"invidious discrimination against minor and new parties in
violation of the Fifth Amendment". All parties are not
required to be treated the same, a position for which the
unanimous ballot access case opinion in Jenness v. Fortson
is cited; the FECA provisions are simply a response to the
historical fact of major party dominance in America.
According to the justices, "no third party has posed a
credible threat to the two major parties in presidential
elections" since i860; they have been unable to match the
major parties in victories and fund raising. 71
70 The "natuj-ai order" justices assert that
challengers to incumbents can raise large sums and defeat
their opponents, citing statistical and other evidence in
the record. While acknowledging that minor party claims are
"more troubling", they find no evidence of discrimination
against them in the record, although they do acknowledge
that major parties receive more of the large contributions.
Buckley , 424 U.S. at 32-33. The justices also dismiss the
comparison of minor parties' privacy concerns under the
FECA disclosure requirements to the facts of NAACP v.
Alabama and related precedents. They see the claims of
possible harassment as "highly speculative", and outweighed
by "the substantial public interest in disclosure
identified by the legislative history of this Act". The
justices' concern with possible corruption outweighs any
sensitivity to minor party disadvantages. 424 U.S. at 69-
72 .
71 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 97-98. This assertion clearly
neglects the presidential election of 1912, where third
party candidate Theodore Roosevelt (running under the
banner of the Progressive Party) received more popular
votes than the Republican incumbent, William Howard Taf t
.
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Thus, the "natural order" perspective defends only a
mixed role for parties in the area of campaign finance. In
Buckley, the only campaign finance opinion which addresses
parties at any length, the justices identify no special
role, or great disadvantage, that qualifies minor parties
for better treatment under federal law, nor do they see a
protected role in campaign finance for parties as a class.
Parties must compete with all other organizations in the
political marketplace. While claims of disadvantage will
not be ignored, the majority of "natural order" justices
will not give parties any special advantages, or special
role, in the arena of campaign finance.
Burger's dissent in Buckley offers the major
alternative argument to this indifference within the
"natural order" perspective. He sees much greater
disadvantages and dangers for minor parties under the FECA
legislation, and insists that the weight of such concerns
calls the constitutionality of the FECA into question. To a
greater extent than the "natural order" majority, he is
sensitive to the roles played by parties in campaign
finance
.
One of Burger's major concerns is the impact of
contribution disclosure requirements on third parties. He
In arguing against claims that minor parties are
disadvantaged, the justices note that the past
accomplishments of minor parties "in furthering the
development of American democracy were accomplished without
the help of public funds". 424 U.S. at 101-2.
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agrees with the majority that minor parties are generally
very ideological, but he uses this to argue that "the
public can readily discern where such parties stand,
without resorting to the indirect device of recording the
names of financial supporters". 72 He argues that minor
party supporters may be more vulnerable to harassment as a
result of disclosure, thus damaging speech and association.
Burger's dissent in Buckley also argues against the
public financing scheme for presidential elections,
contending that it will have a negative impact on the role
of parties in the process. He cites an amicus brief
argument that the public financing system "affects the role
of the party in campaigns for office, changes the role of
the incumbent government vis-a-vis all parties, and affects
the relative strengths and strategies of candidates vis-a-
vis each other and their party's leaders". 73 In essence,
such a system weakens the role of the parties and is highly
disruptive of the status quo
.
Burger is arguing for a
process in which the role of parties and other forces is
not preempted by a governmental structure.
Burger contends further that the public financing
system "invidiously discriminates against minor parties".
This occurs because public financing favors the current
major parties, an unacceptable bias:
72 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)
.
73 424 U.S. at 247 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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The fact that there have been few drastic
realignments in our basic two-party structure in
200 years is no constitutional justification for
freezing the status quo of the present major
parties at the expense of such future political
movements
.
74
Burger sees "grave risks in legislation, enacted by
incumbents of the major political parties, which distinctly
disadvantages minor parties or independent candidates".
Citing the level of support requirement of Jenness as
acceptable, Burger concludes that the public financing
system exceeds this requirement. 75 He argues too that the
system's support for certain parties constitutes public
favoritism
.
76
In light of their concern in ballot access and
nominations cases, the indifference of the "natural order"
74 424 U.S. at 251 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
75 424 U.S. at 251 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
76 Burger also finds the matching funds requirements
of public financing unacceptable, as they equate financial
and political support, thereby putting poor candidates or
candidates with poor supporters at a financial (and
therefore a political) disadvantage. Burger's treatment of
matching funds, as well as the other issues discussed
above, reveal a strong concern for the interests of
alternative political forces. However, this concern is
explicitly tied to Justice Burger's sensitivity to finance
issues in politics; he cites his opinions in both Bullock
and Lubin in support of these objections in Buckley . 424
U.S. at 252 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
In a broader sense, Burger is also skeptical of the
propriety of public financing of private political
activity. He explicitly questions whether "public financial
assistance to the private political activity of individual
citizens and parties is a legitimate expenditure of public
funds". In his view, the presidential selection process
should not be funded by government; parties and candidates
should compete for private support in the political
marketplace. 424 U.S. at 248 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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justices to minor parties in the area of campaign finance
is somewhat surprising. They give little attention, and
less favorable consideration, to third party claims in
Buckley, and have little to say about these matters in
subsequent cases. Only Burger comes to the defense of
parties, particularly minor parties, in the financing of
presidential election campaigns. In the realm of campaign
finance, parties are just equal players in a crowded field
of competitors.
Standards Of Evidence and Burden
The campaign finance opinions that enunciate the
"natural order" perspective apply the same standard of
review as in the ballot access and nominations decisions,
but differ in the outcomes of that application. In the
ballot access and nomination cases, the "natural order"
justices adopt a standard of "compelling state interest",
and most often find that standard unmet by the statutes at
issue. The same standard is applied in the campaign finance
cases, but the majority of "natural order" justices find
many FECA provisions and a Michigan law to be justified by
a compelling state interest in the prevention of corruption
(Burger, Scalia and Kennedy are the main exceptions)
.
In Buckley , for example, the "natural order" justices
note that the Court of Appeals, in the upholding of most
FECA provisions, found a "clear and compelling interest" in
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"preserving the integrity of the electoral process". 77 The
justices adopt this "compelling state interest" standard,
but employ an additional interest not cited by the Court of
Appeals: the prevention of corruption. They find that the
expenditure limits fail these tests, but they uphold
contribution limits on the basis of the government interest
in preventing corruption. 78
The major example of corruption noted by the justices
is the appearance of improper influence through large
contributions, a "narrow aspect of political association".
The public interest in preventing such influence is seen as
"weighty", while the effect of necessary regulation is seen
as "limited". 79
In addition to corruption, the "natural order"
justices are also sensitive to issues of national
governmental power. In Buckley they note, with respect to
the FECA disclosure requirements, that there are
"governmental interests sufficiently important to outweigh
the possibility of infringement, particularly when the
77 Buckley , 424 U.S at 10.
78 While noting that "governmental action which may
have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is
subject to the closest scrutiny", the justices assert that
" [n] either the right to associate nor the right to
participate in political activities is absolute". If the
government shows "a sufficiently important interest" and
uses "means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement
of associational freedoms", its statutes may be upheld. 424
U.S. at 25, citing CSC v. Letter Carriers , 413 U.S. 548
(1973) .
79 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 27, 29.
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'free functioning of our national institutions' is
involved". 80 These include aiding voters in evaluating
candidates by publicizing the source of their funds;
deterring corruption by publicizing large contributions and
expenditures; and gathering the data necessary to enforce
contribution limitations. 81
Burger's dissent in Buckley on disclosure limits takes
issue with the majority's application of these standards of
review. He argues that the standards are not as strict as
past precedents and the Constitution warrant. Arguing that
greater "precision of regulation" is required, Burger
asserts that "no legitimate public interest has been shown
in forcing the disclosure of modest contributions that are
the prime support of new, unpopular, or unfashionable
political causes". 82 He finds the dangers of corruption to
be outweighed by the potential of adverse impact on such
political causes, a position closer to the "natural order"
stance in the ballot access cases.
Powell's majority opinion in Bellotti also employs the
compelling state interest/"exacting scrutiny" test. But
unlike Buckley , the asserted state interests in active
participation and protecting shareholder rights are not
found to meet this test. While these interests are
80 424 U.S. at 66, citing Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Board , 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
81 424 U.S. at 66-68.
82 424 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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substantial, they are not sufficiently connected to the law
at issue. Powell puts particular emphasis on the lack of
empirical evidence in the record regarding any dominant or
significant corporate role in past referendum votes. 83
Bellotti indicates that the "natural order" justices will
not automatically accept asserted state interests in
protecting competition from corruption, though the dissents
of Brennan and Marshall in the case are evidence of some
division
.
84
Brennan' s opinion in Massachusetts Citizens For Life
reaffirms the use of the "compelling state interest"
standard when First Amendment rights are found to be
burdened, but as in Bellotti and Consolidated Edison , the
facts do not meet the standard. Brennan finds the various
legal and organizational requirements for a "segregated
fund", as well as the requirement itself, to be a
"substantial" restriction on MCFL's speech. These facts
make it "evident" to Brennan
that MCFL is subject to more extensive require-
ments and more stringent restrictions than it
would be if it were not incorporated. These
83 4 3 5 U.S. at 786-88.
84 Justice Powell in Consolidated Edison reemphasizes
this compelling state interest standard, but again finds
that the interests are not implicated by the regulations
involved, and thus not applicable to the case. 447 U.S. at
540-43.
In their application of a standard of review, Bellotti
and Consolidated Edison reflect a greater level of
antigovernment skepticism than other "natural order"
campaign finance opinions; notably, Burger joins the
majority in both of these opinions.
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additional regulations may create a disincentive
for such organizations to engage in political
speech
.
85
With such a burden, "it would not be surprising if at least
some groups decided that the contemplated political
activity was simply not worth it". 86 Since the threat of
corporate wealth corrupting politics is not involved in the
case of MCFL, Brennan finds the "compelling state interest"
standard is unmet. 87
85 479 U.S. at 254.
86 479 U.S. at 255.
87 While noting the long history of regulation of
corporate political activity, and the fact that corporate
treasury funds "are not an indication of popular support
for the corporation's political ideas", Brennan asserts
that such regulation "has reflected concern not about use
of the corporate form per se , but about the potential for
unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes" . MCFL
is not seen to pose those dangers, since it "was formed to
disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital". 479
U.S. at 256-59.
Marshall's opinion in Austin reaffirms that the use of
funds to support a candidate is speech, and cites
Massachusetts Citizens for the proposition that regulations
on independent expenditures and requirements for segregated
funds do burden freedom of association. As a result, the
statute "must be justified by a compelling state interest".
494 U.S. at 657-658. The facts of Austin meet the standard;
the statute is "precisely tailored" to serve the state
interest as well. The distinction of media corporations,
whose "resources are devoted to the collection of
information and its dissemination to the public", is also
viewed as compelling, given their "unique role" in the
political process. 494 U.S. at 666-67.
Scalia's dissent in Austin accepts the "compelling
state interest" standard of the majority, but finds it
unmet by the facts of the case. He argues that the Court
has held "that a direct restriction upon speech is narrowly
enough tailored if it extends to speech that has the mere
potential for producing social harm" . He argues that such a
principle would overturn a variety of past Court
precedents, including NAACP v. Alabama . 494 U.S. at 688-90.
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In contrast to the ballot access and nominations
cases, the application of a strict standard of review in
the campaign finance cases is not used consistently to
invalidate most government action. While the "natural
order" justices hold against some regulations, particularly
those involving direct expenditures, many other statutes
are upheld. The explanation lies in their concern for the
prevention of corruption, an interest to they give great
weight
.
The Role of Government
As the preceding analysis suggests, the majority of
"natural order" justices constitutionally support some
government regulation in the area of campaign finance.
Though the justices tend to give particular weight to
national legislation like the FECA, the Austin decision is
evidence that state regulations will also be treated with
deference under their standards of review. The government
is seen, in many of the cases, as a supportive rather than
a destructive influence on the "natural" competitive order.
The dangers of corruption seem to be the key ingredient
that prompts the "natural order" justices to accept a wider
government role in this part of the electoral process.
The Buckley opinion defends a proper role for the
national government in this area. The constitutional power
of Congress in this area is "well established and is not
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questioned by any of the parties in this case". 88 What is
at issue, then, is not whether Congress has a role, but the
parameters of that role, i.e., how far regulation may
proceed before it impinges upon other constitutional
guarantees
.
A number of actions are viewed as falling outside the
proper parameters of this congressional power. Equalization
of political "voices" by an independent expenditure
ceiling, for example, is not accepted as a legitimate
function of government by the Buckley majority . According
to the opinion,
The concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order
to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment, which was
designed "to secure 'the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources'", and "'to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by
the people' " . 89
Though access to the process should be open, the volume of
voices within that process cannot be artificially
restricted. 90 Even in its moderated treatment of campaign
88 4 2 4 U.S. at 13.
89 424 U.S. at 48-49. Yet, as we have seen, corporate
speech and unlimited contributions to candidates can be
limited
.
90 424 U.S. at 54-55. The same justification used here
to throw out independent expenditure restrictions also
serves to discredit restrictions on expenditure of personal
and family funds; the government cannot burden First
Amendment rights in order to equalize "the relative
financial resources of candidates". The interests in
preventing corruption are not dismissed completely; rather,
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finance regulation, the "natural order" does not fully shed
its skepticism of government involvement in the electoral
process
.
The desire to reduce the rising cost of campaigns is
also not accepted as a justification for limits on
expenditures
:
In the free society ordained by our Constitution,
it is not the government but the people-
-
individually as citizens and candidates and
collectively as associations and political
committees- -who must retain control over the
quantity and range of debate on public issues in
a political campaign. 91
The government cannot artificially limit the political
process in the name of supposed wisdom.
In contrast, the Buckley majority views contribution
limits and disclosure requirements as legitimate exercises
of congressional power, addressing a compelling state
interest in controlling political corruption:
The prevention of corruption and the appearance
of corruption spawned by the real or imagined
coercive influence of large financial contribu-
tions on candidate's positions and on their
actions if elected to office. 92
Contribution limits are seen as a "necessary legislative
concomitant" to dealing with corruption, and disclosure
requirements serve an "informational interest" by helping
"voters [to] define more of the candidates'
they are seen as sufficiently served by the contribution
and disclosure provisions of the FECA.
91 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 57
92 4 2 4 U.S. at 25.
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constituencies". 93 Free competition must be open, not
manipulated by hidden actors or "other people's money".
Congress is also seen by the Buckley majority as
having the power, under the "general welfare" clause of the
Constitution, to decide on expending public money to fund
the presidential selection process. That clause is
interpreted not as a limitation, but rather a grant, of
power. Three "general welfare" purposes are cited from a
U.S. Senate report:
To reduce the deleterious influence of large
contributions on our political process, to
facilitate communication by candidates with
the electorate, and to free candidates from
the rigors of fundraising
.
94
These purposes all involve the protection and promotion of
political competition, an acceptable purpose for the
"natural order" justices. Whether the means are wise is a
decision for Congress to make, not the judiciary. The
legislative decision to set different standards for minor
parties to obtain this public funding is also seen as
within "the permissible range". The funding of national
conventions and the primary processes are supported with
the same logic. 95
93 424 U.S. at 28, 80-81. The justices note that such
disclosure applies only to candidate related spending, and
thus is not impermissibly broad under the First Amendment.
94 4 2 4 U.S. at 90-91.
95 4 2 4 U.S. at 104-8.
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Justice Powell's opinion in Bellotti reasserts the
"natural order" perspective's skepticism of government
regulation of the electoral process. Taking issue with an
assertion by Rehnquist that the reach of the First
Amendment is more limited with regard to state government
power, Powell argues that "the states do not have greater
latitude than Congress to abridge freedom of speech"
. He
notes as well that Rehnquist' s distinction between federal
and state powers over speech has never been the position of
a majority of justices on the Court. 96 In contrast to
national power, the state role in regulation continues to
be scrutinized carefully by the "natural order" justices,
although Austin indicates that some will uphold some state
regulations as well. 97
96 435 U.S. at 780-81.
97 As noted earlier, Scalia argues in the campaign
finance cases for a stricter application of the "natural
order" majority's standard of review. His dissent in Austin
saves its strongest critique for the majority's view of the
proper role of the state in this area. Scalia sees the
majority opinion's critical mistake as
its departure from long-accepted premises of our
political system regarding the benevolence that
can be expected of government in managing the
arena of public debate, and the danger that is
to be anticipated from powerful private institu-
tions that compete with government, and with one
another, within this arena.
494 U.S. at 692
.
Scalia argues that the framers of the First Amendment
would not even see prevention of the "new corruption" as a
" desirable objective", much less a "compelling state
interest". He cites Jefferson and Madison, as well as
Toqueville on the critical role of private associations in
politics, in order to buttress his point. 494 U.S. at 692-
94 .
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As our analysis reveals, the majority of "natural
order" justices will permit a substantial role for
government in the regulation of campaign finance. The
parameters of this role, however, are measured by how each
state or national regulation relates to the government
interest in preventing corruption, the only goal seen to be
sufficiently compelling to override free speech rights.
Those regulations not aimed at preventing corruption are
much more likely to be viewed as unconstitutional. The
"natural order" justices, while friendlier to campaign
finance regulation than other areas of government
involvement, still maintain a high standard for approving
particular exercises of this role.
The "Constructed Order" Perspective
In campaign finance cases, the "constructed order"
justices have been closer to the "natural order" justices
than in other areas of party and electoral jurisprudence.
Both perspectives have been willing to approve some
government regulation of campaign money, but the
"constructed order" perspective stands out for supporting a
wider range of government action and holding government to
a more lenient application of standards of review.
Rehnquist and White, the justices who most consistently
support the "constructed order" perspective in these cases,
argue that the government's role enables, but rarely
damages, the political process.
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Rehnquist's dissent in Bellotti is a good example of
the "constructed order" perspective. While the majority
finds that the Massachusetts statute abridges freedom of
expression protected by the First Amendment, Rehnquist
argues that prohibition of corporate and union spending in
referendum campaigns protects competition and prevents an
imbalance of political influence. 98 For the "constructed
order" justices, government preserves and protects the
competitive process through democratically enacted
regulations, and its judgment should be given great
deference in all cases.
Party Competition And Choice
Like the "natural order" justices, those who favor the
"constructed order" perspective seek to protect political
competition, but are less likely to second-guess government
statutes in order to provide such protection. Their view of
the dangers of corporate corruption is like that held by
the "natural order" perspective, but their definition of
protected speech is more limited, especially in the case of
White, and their deference toward government solutions is
broader. In the "constructed order" perspective, state
decisions to protect competition frequently outweigh speech
rights .
98 Bellotti , 435 U.S. at 822 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)
.
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The "constructed order" justices, who are more
impressed by the threat of financial monopoly, often show
deference to state efforts to control campaign finance.
Blackmun's dissent in Consolidated Edison , joined by
Rehnquist, emphasizes the monopoly status and role
structure of the utilities: "the use of the insert amounts
to an exaction from the utility's customers by way of
forced aid for the utility's speech". Such monopoly power
justifies extensive state oversight." Speech and free
choice is perverted by corporate action, so the state may
legitimately intervene to prevent such distortion.
Most of the "constructed order" justices, however, are
not prepared to accept all restrictions on campaign
finance. This is particularly true of independent
expenditures, as shown in FEC v. National Conservative
Political Action Committee (NCPAC) , which overturned the
$1000 ceiling on independent expenditures by political
committees on behalf of publicly funded presidential
candidates. 100 Direct speech is seen to be implicated, and
the restriction is compared to "allowing a speaker in a
public hall to express his views while denying him the use
99 447 U.S. at 549 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It is
noteworthy that Blackmun describes the effect of monopoly
as "forced aid" to the utility's speech; this element of
coercion is similar to Brennan's concern with "shareholder
rights"
.
100 FEC v. National Conservative Politica l Action
Committee (NCPAC), 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
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of an amplifying system". 101 California Medical
Association is distinguished on the grounds that
expenditures from less powerful persons are involved, and
FEC v. National Right to Work Committee is distinguished as
involving a corporation, not a political committee. 102
An important distinction about corruption is made in
FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee .
Noting that the only compelling state interest in
restricting PAC speech is the prevention of corruption,
Rehnquist argues that NCPAC's independent expenditures are
not implicated by that interest, because independent
expenditures by their nature do not corrupt candidates. 103
Thus, if spending does not promote corruption, state
interests are greatly diminished. With regard to this
issue, the positions of the two perspectives are highly
congruent
.
Rehnquist' s partial dissent in Massachusetts Citizens
For Life
,
joined by Blackmun, White, and Stevens, is
grounded in his unanimous opinion in National Right To Work
Committee . Asserting that the latter decision "unanimously
endorsed the 'legislative judgment that the special
characteristics of the corporate structure require
particularly careful regulation'", Rehnquist argues that "I
101 Note the similarity to the "tank of gas" analogy in
Buckley .
102 470 U.S. at 493-95.
103 470 U.S. at 496-97.
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cannot accept the conclusion that the statutory provisions
[section 441b] are unconstitutional as applied to appellee
Massachusetts Citizens For Life (MCFL) " . He highlights the
history of regulation, the purposes of preventing
corruption and protecting shareholders, and the state-
granted advantages enjoyed by corporations, citing the NRWC
and NCPAC decisions as well as California Medical
Association
.
104 The corruption concern and state ties are
central to Rehnquist's understanding of these issues.
The principal dissenter in many of the campaign
finance cases is Justice White, who adopts the most
government - friendly "constructed order" perspective among
the justices. White's basic argument is that money is not
equivalent to speech, a position that leads him to approve
most government regulation of campaign finance. For White,
the dangers of corruption posed by unregulated campaign and
political money far outweigh any free speech concern posed
by restrictions on that money.
White refuses to agree that money is speech, calling
that argument "entirely too much". In Buckley , he notes
that "money is not always equivalent to or used for speech,
even in the context of political campaigns; there are "many
expensive campaign activities that are not themselves
communicative or remotely related to speech" . On the
positive side, expenditure ceilings "help eradicate the
104 479 U.S.
part)
.
at 266-67 (Rehnquist
,
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C. J. , dissenting in
hazard of corruption". 105 White feels the majority is
insufficiently cognizant of the implications of their
decision in this respect:
The holding perhaps is not that federal candi-
dates have the constitutional right to purchase
their election, but many will so interpret the
Court's conclusion in this case . I cannot join
the Court in this respect. 106
Thus, the chosen legislative purpose preserves, rather than
restricts, the competitive political process.
White's dissent in Buckley sees equal potential for
corruption in contributions and expenditures. He states
that
It makes little sense to me, and apparently made
none to Congress, to limit the amounts an
individual may give to a candidate or spend with
his approval but fail to limit the amounts that
could be spent on his behalf. 107
Like Burger, White is concerned with maintaining and
respecting the logic of congressional intent in
legislation, but he reaches a conclusion opposed to
Burger's. Instead of arguing that the whole law should fall
as a unit, White asserts that it should be upheld as a
unit
.
White's dissent would also uphold the limitations on
personal funds expenditures, supporting that government
effort to preserve the competitive political process.
105 424 U.S. at 262-63 (White, J., dissenting).
106 424 U.S. at 266 (White, J., dissenting); emphasis
added
.
107 4 2 4 U.S. at 261 (White, J., dissenting).
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Arguing that this restriction serves "salutary purposes
related to the integrity of federal campaigns", White
asserts that it forces candidates to demonstrate financial
support among the voters and works in the direction of more
equal access to the political arena. 108 These interests
are supportive of both a more competitive politics and of a
government role in helping to promote that politics.
White's dissent in Bellotti takes on the issue of
competition and choice explicitly, finding the state
statute was legitimately trying to level the playing field
and prevent misuse of corporate funds. He differentiates
corporate speech, citing Thomas Emerson in opposition to
Powell's use of Emerson in the majority opinion, and argues
that corporations and corporate speech do not "represent a
manifestation of individual freedom of choice". 109 The
emphasis is once again on freedom of choice, except that,
here, the state is preserving, not restraining, such
freedom.
Indeed, in Bellotti , White sees the state as
protecting that freedom by seeking to prevent possible
unfair political advantages for corporations. Such
organizations are often in a position of economic
dominance, power which could enable them to dominate "the
very heart of our democracy, the electoral process". As
108 Buckley , 424 U.S. at 266 (White, J., dissenting).
109 4 3 5 U.S. at 805 (White, J., dissenting).
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White notes, "the State need not permit its own creation to
consume it". 110 As noted earlier, Brennan and Marshall
find common ground with White in this particular dissent.
White's dissent in National Conservative Political
Action Committee continues to argue against the proposition
that money is speech. He asserts that the First Amendment
protects "the right to speak, not the right to spend", and
that money is a producer of speech rather than speech
itself. He also argues that the distinction between
independent and coordinated expenditures "blinks political
reality", noting that the movement of persons between PACs
and candidate staffs reflects the reality that "PACs do not
operate in an anonymous vacuum" . He also argues that
contribution limits are pointless without spending
limits . 111
The "constructed order" perspective on campaign
finance and competition, like the "natural order", is not
held in a consistent fashion by all the justices.
Rehnquist, joined on occasion by Blackmun, approves of most
110 435 U.S. at 809 (White, J., dissenting).
111 470 U.S. at 508-11 (White, J., dissenting).
Notably, Marshall dissents from the majority and agrees
with much of White's position, though not with his argument
that money does not equal speech. 470 U.S. at 521
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
White's brief, one sentence dissent in Massachusetts
Citizens joins Rehnquist 's dissent, but also reaffirms his
view that contributions and expenditures should be treated
in the same fashion, citing his previous dissents in
Buckley , Bellotti , and National Conservative Pol itical
action Committee. 479 U.S. at 271 (White, J., dissenting).
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government regulations, but is skeptical of expenditure
limits on campaigns or independent spending. White
consistently argues the "constructed order" perspective,
but is alone in opposing the idea that money is a form of
speech. He is much more suspicious of unregulated political
money than of government regulation of such money. Overall,
however, both Rehnquist and White agree on the positive
role government regulation can play in protecting the
competitiveness of the political process.
Party Structure and Functions
Like the "natural order" justices, the "constructed
order" justices have little to say about political parties
in their campaign finance opinions. They envision no
special role for parties in the campaign finance process,
and most do not give any particular attention to the
interests of parties. The exception is Justice Rehnquist,
who defends the rights of minor parties under the public
financing system of presidential selection. Even Rehnquist,
however, does not defend a particular role for parties.
Like Burger, Rehnquist' s dissent in Buckley focuses
attention on the treatment of minor parties and independent
candidates; however, Rehnquist' s defense of their interests
is premised on different grounds than Burger's. He argues
that the states are properly subject to fewer First
Amendment strictures than the federal government; only the
"general principle of free speech" is incorporated by the
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Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, federal statutes must
meet a higher standard of review, opening the FECA to
stronger First Amendment attacks by minor parties.
Rehnquist thus agrees with Burger on the disadvantage for
minor parties created by public financing, asserting that
the FECA "has enshrined the Republican and Democratic
Parties in a permanently preferred position". 112 Rehnquist
thereby distinguishes his ballot access views on the basis
of state versus federal legislative purposes and
authority
.
113
Beyond this defense of minor parties, however, the
"constructed order" justices, Rehnquist and White, are
silent on the relationship between parties and campaign
finance. Parties are treated no differently than any other
participant in the campaign finance arena. While Rehnquist
does argue that no party should be disadvantaged by federal
government statutes on campaign finance, neither he nor
White (nor any other justice who joins the "constructed
order" perspective) sees parties as playing any distinctive
role in the process. Parties are left to fend for
themselves in the "market" of campaign money.
112 424 U.S. at 291-93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
113 As Chapter 2 noted, Rehnquist is very willing to
judge most state initiatives in the electoral arena by a
lenient standard of review.
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Standards Of Evidence and Burden
While many of the justices who adopt the "constructed
order" perspective in the campaign finance cases adopt the
same "compelling state interest" standard of review as the
"natural order" justices, the discussion of competition in
the previous section indicates that their application of it
is more lenient. Unlike their treatment of the ballot
access and nomination cases, the "constructed order"
justices are more likely to demand a compelling state
interest in the campaign finance cases. At the same time,
they are likely to find a supportable state interest. Thus,
while the standards applied may have changed, the results
of their application are similar.
White's application of standards is the most lenient
among the "constructed order" justices. His dissent in
Buckley argues that expenditure limits should be upheld,
contending that there is "no sound basis" for invalidating
them "so long as the purposes they serve are legitimate and
sufficiently substantial, which in my view they are". He
views such limits as reducing the possibility of
corruption, easing the burdens of fundraising, and
restoring confidence in federal elections. 114 A standard
of legitimate and substantial interests, rather than a
compelling interest, is seen as sufficient to justify
congressional legislation in this area. This is a standard
114 424 U.S. at 264-65 (White, J., dissenting).
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that is much more friendly to the governmental purposes and
grows out of White's argument that money is not a form of
speech
.
Overall, the "constructed order" treatment of campaign
finance statutes does not depart radically from their more
lenient treatment of government regulation of ballot access
and nomination procedures. While they invoke the compelling
state interest standard, they most often find it met. While
White departs from his colleagues in employing a more
lenient standard of review, the only area in which the
results differ are in his approval (and the majority's
disapproval) of various expenditure limitations. Thus, the
importance of standards of review lies both in their
identity and their application.
The Role Of Government
The "constructed order" perspective in the campaign
finance cases approves a strong and positive role for
government regulation of political money, particularly at
the federal level. While this role is not unlimited (only
White, for example, approves the FECA limitations on
expenditures) , it is as broad as the state role allowed in
ballot access and nomination procedures. In a departure
from these areas, the "constructed order" position is more
often joined by the "natural order" justices, out of a
concern that both share about the corrupting effects of
money in politics.
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White's dissent in Buckley is a good example of the
"constructed order" perspective on a strong role for
government in regulating campaign money. White is highly
supportive of the right of Congress to regulate the
election process for federal offices. Citing the precedents
of Ex Parte Yarbrouah and Burroughs v. U.S. . Justice White
asserts that Congress in this area has "the authority to
protect the elective processes against the ' two great
natural and historical enemies of all republics, open
violence and insidious corruption' " . A key source of
possible corruption is money in politics, and particularly
the undue influence of great wealth. 115
White's most visible departure from the majority in
Buckley is his acceptance of FECA expenditure limitations.
He sees both contributions and expenditures as aiding
speech, but contends that the government's "nonspeech
interests" in regulating money in federal elections "are
sufficiently urgent to justify the incidental effects that
the limitations visit upon the First Amendment interests of
candidates and their supporters". The expenditures were
also seen by Congress as having "corruptive potential", and
White does not believe the justices should second guess
this judgment. 116
115 424 U.S. at 257 (White, J., dissenting).
116 424 U.S. at 259-61 (White, J., dissenting).
243
Rehnquist's dissent in Buckley reflects his continuing
deference to state governments in most areas, but it also
reveals some issues on which he does not approve of
governmental action. He asserts, in discussing the
Justices' ballot access opinions, that
If the states are to afford a republican form
of government, they must by definition provide
for general elections and for some standards
as to the content of the official ballots which
will be used at those elections. 117
While this state government involvement in controlling the
ballot is seen as not only permissible but a matter of
"necessity", congressional involvement in public financing
of presidential elections is viewed as lacking "the same
sort of mandate of necessity as does a State's regulation
of ballot access". 118 Rehnquist cannot accept the position
"that because no third party has posed a credible threat to
the two major parties in Presidential elections since 1860,
Congress may by law attempt to assure that this pattern
will endure forever". 119
White's dissent in Bellotti , as in the nominations
cases, emphasizes the evidentiary weight of history and
general political practice in judging the legitimacy of the
Massachusetts restriction. He notes that statutes of this
sort have been on the books for many years and that 31
117 424 U.S. at 292 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
118 424 U.S. at 292-93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119 424 U.S. at 293-94 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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states have similar legislation. He also cites the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act as precedent. White uses this
evidence to argue that the justices have substituted their
judgment for that of the legislature, neglecting the
context of politics, and insists that the legislature
should be left to make such judgments. 120 He also cites
both common law traditions and Securities and Exchange
Commission regulations designed to keep corporations out of
direct political activity. 121 In White's view, past state
practice and general political practice should be respected
as evidence, and state legislatures should not be second
guessed
.
In Bellotti , White finds a permissible state interest,
which he characterizes as "strong", in detaching corporate
investment decisions from politics. 122 This is an
interesting argument on the corporate form, which asserts
that investors are unlikely to favor but have little voice
in preventing corporate funding of political causes.
Brennan, as has been noted, adopts a similar argument in
Austin .
White's main argument in Bellotti is that regulation
of corporate speech is justified by the fact that they have
advantages gained through state laws and state granted
120 435 U.S. at 804 (White, J., dissenting).
121 435 U.S. at 819 (White, J., dissenting).
122 435 U.S. at 805 (White, J., dissenting).
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privileges. These artificial advantages have put
corporations in an economic position they could use to
dominate "the very heart of our democracy, the electoral
process". The state has a right to prevent this. As White
puts it, "the State need not permit its own creation to
consume it". 123 The state created nature of corporations
is thus seen as central to distinguishing their speech
rights and justifies state regulation of their activity. It
does, however, run afoul the fact that a similar rationale
for permitting party regulation has been severely limited
by White's own colleagues on the Court.
White takes an unusually strong position in favor of
the state interests in Bellotti . In challenging the
majority opinion, he argues that
Once again, we are provided with no explanation
whatsoever by the Court as to why the State's
interest is of less constitutional weight than
that of corporations to participate financially
in the electoral process and as to why the
balance between two First Amendment interests
should be struck by the Court. 124
The state interest should be favored in this case so as to
maintain the competitive balance of the electoral process.
Rehnquist's dissent in Bellotti emphasizes the
evidentiary importance of comparative political practice in
judging government statutes. Like White, he notes that
Massachusetts, 30 other states and the U.S. Congress "have
123 435 U.S. at 809 (White, J., dissenting).
124 435 U.S. at 816 (White, J., dissenting).
all concluded that restrictions upon the political activity
of business corporations are both politically desirable and
constitutionally permissible". Such a "broad consensus" was
"entitled to considerable deference from this Court". He
goes beyond the other dissenters, and reaffirms his stance
in Buckley
,
arguing that the application of the First
Amendment to the states is more limited than to the federal
government
.
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Blackmun's dissent in Consolidated Edison also argues
for the legitimacy of a state regulation of corporate
political activity. He finds that the Public Service
Commission has a right to prohibit the inclusion of policy
inserts with monthly electric bills, and asserts that the
state has a legitimate interest in preventing undue
advantages gained by monopoly power. Blackmun notes the
widespread nature of prohibitions on political inserts in
utility bills and of political donations by utility
companies. 126 Empirical data on utility behavior and state
practice is again seen as strong evidence.
White's dissent in National Conservative Political
Action Committee reemphasizes his stance that there is no
valid distinction between contributions and expenditures
and that government interests are sufficient to uphold
restrictions on both, including the limits at issue here.
125 Bellotti , 435 U.S. at 822-823 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)
.
126 447 U.S. at 550-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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He argues that expenditures in this case are more
accurately seen as contributions. He sees their restriction
as part of an "integrated and complex system of public
funding for Presidential campaigns", one which should not
be tampered with lightly. 127
Rehnquist's partial dissent in Massachusetts Citizens
For Life again favors both the choices of a legislature and
the force of precedent. He attacks the majority position by
asserting that it rejects past precedent and "the judgment
of Congress"
.
He goes on to argue that the distinctions
among corporations drawn by Brennan are of degree, not
kind, and are therefore "more properly drawn by the
Legislature than the Judiciary". 128 His statement is clear
in this regard:
Congress expressed its judgment in section 441b
that the threat posed by corporate political
activity warrants a prophylactic measure
applicable to all groups that organize in the
corporate form. Our previous cases have expressed
a reluctance to fine-tune such judgments; I would
adhere to such counsel here. 129
He argues that National Right to Work Committee establishes
a standard of "considerable deference" to Congress on these
questions, and asserts that National Conservative Political
Action Committee recognizes "an acceptable distinction,
127 470 U.S. at 508 (White, J., dissenting).
128 479 U.S. at 267-68 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in
part)
.
129 479 U.S. at 268-69 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in
part)
.
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grounded in the judgment of the political branch," between
corporate actors and other organizations whose noncorporate
status deprives them of state privileges. 130
Rehnquist hammers this point home in his conclusion.
He notes that "the basically legislative character of the
Court's decision is dramatically illustrated by its effort
to carve out a constitutional niche for 'groups such as
MCFL'". He compares such actions to a "council of revision
to modify legislative judgments", and asserts that the
drawing of such modifications should be left to
Congress. 131 It is clear that Rehnquist 's major concern is
to protect legislative judgment, and not turn the Court
into an unelected legislature.
Conclusions
The degree of harmony between the "natural order" and
"constructed order" perspectives in the campaign finance
cases make these opinions somewhat different as a group,
though both perspectives maintain familiar outlines. Many
of the "natural order" justices, in their desire to prevent
corrupting effects of campaign money in the electoral
process, are willing to allow significant government
management of these finances. Similarly, many of the
130 479 u.s. at 269-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in
part)
.
131 Massachusetts Citizens For Life , 479 U.S. at 271
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part).
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"constructed order" justices are willing to strike down
some government regulations, particularly expenditure
controls, in the name of protecting free speech and free
competition
.
Much of the "common ground" between the two
perspectives is reflected in Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
FEC v. National Right To Work Committee (NRWC) , which
upheld an FEC regulation barring corporations from
soliciting political funds from nonmembers . This is the
only unanimous campaign finance decision. 132 Rehnquist,
who advocates the "constructed order" perspective, argues
that the central issue in the case is the legal concept of
"membership". He rejects the NRWC's argument that members
include all those who describe themselves as active and
supportive of the organization, asserting that such an
interpretation would destroy the restriction on nonmembers.
He also notes that NRWC's articles of incorporation state
that it has no members, and asserts that a proper standard
of membership must involve "some relatively enduring and
independently significant financial or organizational
attachment" . 133
132 459 U.S. 197.
133 459 U.S. at 201-4. Examples of such attachment,
according to Rehnquist, could include operation or
administration of the corporation; election of officials;
membership meetings; control over expenditure of
contributions; and official membership. He seems to find
all of these lacking in the instant case.
250
The necessity of meaningful attachment for full free
speech protection of political funds solicited by
corporations is congruent with the "natural order"
perspective on the corruption of politics by unconnected,
untraceable corporate funds, but also with the "constructed
order" concern with standards of group membership. The
agreement in this case is similar to the demand for a "show
of support" in the unanimous ballot access case, Jenness v.
Fortson
.
In both cases, all the justices involved agree
that the government can legitimately set standards of
support or commitment in regulating portions of the
electoral process. With regard to the "natural order" view
of campaign finance, this restriction is permissible
because it prevents corruption by "other people's
money" . 134
The fulcrum of concern for both perspectives is the
danger of corruption and the impact of corporate entities
on politics. These concerns have a long history in American
political rhetoric, but have been voiced with particular
frequency since the Progressive Era, when reformers
spotlighted the financial corruption of politics by large
corporations, wealthy individuals, and political
"machines". Both sides echo this Progressive suspicion of
money in politics, but the "constructed order" appears more
134 This is another reflection that the "compelling
state interest" standard can be satisfied for the "natural
order" justices.
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prepared to accept government efforts to limit such
corruption, particularly with regard to corporations. While
both perspectives seek to prevent the corruption of
politics, the "natural order" is still more wary of
government regulation as a prophylactic for such corruption
than is the "constructed order"
.
The views of both perspectives in these opinions are
also marked by their relative indifference to political
parties. The majority of justices pay little attention to
either major or minor parties in their opinions. This
silence seems due in part to the fact that they do not see
parties as indispensable players in campaign finance, but
due also to the absence of parties as plaintiffs or
defendants in the cases. The end result is to ignore an
institution which, thanks to the innovations of the
national Republican Party, is again playing a major role in
the financing of political campaigns. 135 Only Burger and
Rehnquist actively defend the interests of parties,
particularly minor parties, in the campaign finance
process .
In considering why the differences between the two
perspectives are more muted in this area of decisions, the
aforementioned absence of parties as litigants or centers
of controversy in most of these cases is an important
135 For an account of the strengthened role of parties
in campaign finance in the 1980' s, see Herrnson, Party
Campaigning In The 1980'
s
.
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factor. Most of the litigants are associations or
corporations; parties have generally chosen not to pursue
campaign finance issues through judicial challenges,
particularly in the Supreme Court, but have instead relied
on legislative changes to existing laws. 136 As a result,
justices have not been called upon to address the roles and
rights of parties in campaign finance, and the differing
attitudes toward the scope of party freedom do not come
into play as directly.
The focus of this litigation on private associations
and corporations also helps to explain the measure of
"agreement" between the two perspectives in these opinions.
The "natural order" perspective, except for Burger and
Scalia, views the rights of neither "group" with the same
level of constitutional deference as party organizations.
This is particularly true of business corporations. The
associational and speech freedoms of these organizations
are found to be outweighed in many cases by the danger of
136 Associational litigants have included the
California Medical Association, the National Right To Work
Committee, and the National Conservative Political Action
Committee. "Corporate" litigants have included the First
National Bank of Boston, the Commonwealth Edison Company,
the Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc., and the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce. Only in Buckley was a challenge to
campaign finance law brought by a candidate, Conservative
Party Senator James Buckley of New York.
A good example of how the role of parties has been
increased by legislative change is the 1979 amendments to
the FECA, which enabled the flow of largely unregulated
"soft money" through party organizations.
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large, unrestricted, and undisclosed contributions, i.e.
"other people's money", corrupting the political process.
When combined with a history of restrictions on direct
corporate funding of candidates and a focus on direct
speech as the critical right involved, associational
concerns are given only secondary attention. 137 The right
of association is asserted in these cases mainly to defend
direct expenditures, an issue on which the "constructed
order" takes a more anti- regulatory stance than in other
areas examined in this work. Thus, the right of association
is a less divisive and less visible doctrine in these cases
because of the nature of the litigants, the broad agreement
on protecting direct speech, and the largely shared concern
about the corrupting effects of "other people's money". The
absence of broad disputes in these cases over freedom of
association is another explanation for why political party
concerns receive less attention in their discussions.
The relative absence of parties from the opinions is
due in part to the fact that most of them have dealt with
provisions of the FECA, a federal statute. An examination
of state campaign finance laws reveals important variations
from the federal approach, particularly with regard to the
137 The campaign finance opinions of both perspectives
are notable for their almost exclusive grounding in the
First Amendment, with very limited citation to freedom of
association and other party and election opinions. In
addition, few citations are made to social science research
on campaign finance, in contrast to the numerous citations
in ballot access, nomination procedures, and (as Chapter 5
will detail) patronage opinions.
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role of parties. Currently, fifteen states give public
money to parties. Of these, ten give money from tax
surcharges or checkoffs to a taxpayer-designated party. 138
Five states determine the allocation of funds from such
checkoffs or charges without taxpayer designation. 139
Thus, nearly one- third of state governments have some
method for publicly funding party activity, which indicates
that a significant number of states envision an important
role for parties in financing the electoral process, a role
largely ignored by the justices' jurisprudence.
Ultimately, the campaign finance opinions of the
justices demonstrate that the division between a "natural
order" perspective and a "constructed order" perspective
does not preclude points of agreement and common ground
between them. With campaign money, most of the justices
agree on the propriety of some role for government in
preventing corruption from the free and unregulated flow of
"other people's money". The divisions arise over how far
government can appropriately proceed in that direction
without running afoul of First Amendment protections.
"a Federai Election Commission, Campaign Finance Law
92 (Washington, D.C. : FEC, 1992), tax+public finance
provision tables. The states involved are Alabama, Arizona,
Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah,
and Virginia.
139 ibid . The five states are California, Indiana,
Minnesota, North Carolina, and Ohio. Indiana uses revenue
from personalized license plates, while North Carolina will
appropriate separate funds for special elections and
contributor tax refunds.
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Free speech means free competition, not equal results,
to the justices from both perspectives. While to the
"natural order" such competition means ballot access for
party candidates and respect for party nomination
procedures, money in politics is a commodity not tied
solely to parties. As a result, neither perspective defends
any special treatment for parties. Rehnquist (on the
"constructed order" side) and Burger (on the "natural
order" side) do argue that minor parties should not be
disadvantaged by government action, but no justice argues
for the interests of parties as a key player in the
campaign finance process. While many justices do see a key
role for parties in other parts of the electoral process,
they are left to fend for themselves in the contest for
money, the so-called "mother's milk of politics".
Ironically, it may be the relative absence of party
concerns in the campaign finance opinions that is the most
important "fact" for understanding the opinions'
implications for parties. During the period of these
decisions (1976-1990) , both major parties asserted
themselves organizationally by a more aggressive role in
raising and disbursing campaign funds. 140 This role was
140 This history is well treated in a variety of works.
Some of the most notable are Herrnson, Party Campaigning In
The 1980'
s
; Sabato, The Party's Just Begun ; and Brooks
Jackson, Honest Graft . One should also note, however, Frank
Sorauf's cautionary note about who benefits from this new
campaign finance role: "As always, it is not the whole
political party, but only a part of it, that is
strengthened by adaptation". Frank J. Sorauf and Scott A.
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encouraged indirectly by the 1979 FECA Amendments which led
to the rise of "soft money" funneled through parties. In
essence, the parties have been largely able to avoid the
judicial forum in dealing with issues of campaign finance.
While the justices may give no special role to parties in
their lexicon of campaign finance, the parties have
established just such a role through their own efforts.
Party associational freedom in this arena has thus far not
needed or "requested" judicial defense. 141
Wilson, "Political Parties and Campaign Finance: Adaptation
and Accommodation Toward a Changing Role", in L. Sandy
Maisel, ed., The Parties Respond: Changes In American
Parties And Campaigns , 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1994)
.
141 What this also means, however, is that many
questions involving the scope of party freedom of
association in the campaign finance process have yet to be
fully addressed by the justices, leaving the door open for
future interpretation.
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CHAPTER 5
THE COURT AND PATRONAGE: JOBS, GOVERNMENT, AND
THE HEALTH OF PARTIES
From their earliest days as functioning organizations,
American political parties have utilized government
employment as a tool for recruiting and retaining party
workers, who in turn help the parties turn out votes.
Political patronage had its roots in the first presidential
administrations, but it truly came of age during the
administration of Andrew Jackson, when it became known as
the "spoils system". This partisan use of the "spoils" that
government jobs represented was both widespread and
minimally regulated, at both the state and federal levels,
for most of the nineteenth century. 1
Following the Civil War, however, pressure began to
build for reform of the "spoils system" in the name of
better administration of government. This pressure for a
nonpartisan civil service was increased by public disgust
at the excesses of New York's Tammany Hall and other
political machines. The 1881 assassination of President
James A. Garfield by a disappointed office seeker, and the
public's reaction to it in the 1882 elections, led the
Congress to pass the Pendleton Act of 1883, which forms the
1 Sorauf, Party Politics In America , p. 82.
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foundation of the modern federal civil service system. This
Act was the first significant limitation of patronage. 2
The Pendleton Act has been followed by more than a
century of civil service expansion in the federal and state
governments, greatly reducing the number of patronage
positions available to parties. Progressive era efforts to
professionalize municipal government, the passage of the
Hatch Acts in 1939 and 1940, and socioeconomic changes are
among the many factors which have led to a decline in both
the opportunities and demand for patronage. The public
administrative philosophy of a neutral public service is
now widely accepted by the public at large and is a
particularly potent inhibitor of any resurgence of
patronage
.
3
Despite these legal and cultural forces, patronage has
not been eliminated from the political landscape,-
opportunities for non-civil-service hiring still exist. The
extent of this remaining patronage is debated. Some
commentators see patronage as extremely limited4 ; others
assert that it "remains a significant basis for recruiting
2 See Carl Russell Fish, The Civil Service And The
Patronage (New York, NY: Russell and Russell, 1963 -reprint
of 1904 edition), pp. 209-28.
3 Sabato, The Party's Just Begun , pp. 230-31, and Key,
Politics. Parties And Pressure Groups , 5th ed. ; pp. 355-59.
4 Sorauf, Party Politics In America ; Sabato, The
Party's Just Begun .
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political workers", particularly at the state level. 5
Limited or not, it is still a campaign issue in many
places. Patronage charges were levelled by Christine Todd
Whitman, for example, against Jim Florio in the 1993 New
Jersey gubernatorial campaign. 6 Whatever its status,
patronage remains a political reality, as witnessed by
three major patronage cases decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the last two decades.
The majority opinions of the justices in these cases
accord patronage a decidedly hostile reception. In Elrod v.
Burns
, the justices upheld injunctive relief for four
employees of the Cook County, Illinois Sheriff's
Department, who claimed they had been discharged solely due
to partisan affiliation. 7 In Branti v. Finkel
,
injunctive
relief was upheld for two Assistant Public Defenders in
Rockland County, New York who had been threatened with
dismissal due to their partisan affiliation. 8 Finally, in
their most recent patronage decision, Rutan v. Republican
5 Bibby, Politics, Parties And Elections In America ,
p. 108.
6 Michael Aron, Governor's Race: A TV Reporter's
Chronicle of The 1993 Florio/Whitman Campaign (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994), p. 56.
7 Elrod v. Burns , 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Ironically, the
sheriff involved, Richard Elrod, had "inherited" his
patronage office from his father, Arthur Elrod, who was
appointed by Chicago political boss Ed Kelly in the 1930' s.
Michael Barone, Our Country: The Shaping Of America From
Roosevelt To Reagan (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1990),
p. 138.
8 Branti v. Finkel , 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
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Party of Illinois, the justices ruled that a group of
Illinois state government employees had stated a valid
legal claim in asserting that they were denied promotion,
transfer, recall, or hiring on the basis of partisan
affiliation; this extended the Elrod\Branti dismissal rule
to those areas of the personnel process as well. 9 Although
the justices did not ban all uses of political affiliation
in the personnel process, these decisions have further
constricted the government positions available for
patronage
.
Examining these opinions from the same vantage point
as the ballot access, nomination, and campaign finance
opinions, one finds the majority justices favoring a
nonpartisan government service in the name of freedom of
speech and association, looking to prevent the current
major parties from "monopolizing" the political process and
stifling alternative views by means of employment
pressures. The dissenting justices, in contrast, see
patronage as a pivotal party function and an historically
legitimate part of the process of politics. Thus, while the
parallels are not exact, concerns about a "natural order"
and a "constructed order" are very much present in these
opinions, though the "construction" here is not directly
statutory in nature. These two perspectives also divide on
9 Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois , 497 U.S. 62
(1990) .
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their views of parties, standards of review, and the role
of states in the political process.
The "Natural Order" Perspective
The central concern of the "natural order" perspective
is, as we have seen in earlier chapters, the fear that the
two parties are monopolizing the political system through
statutes. Here, the fear is similar: patronage is seen as a
device through which the party in control of government
preserves its power and monopolizes the electoral and
ideological landscape. This appears to be the pivotal
concern driving Brennan, Marshall, White, Stevens, and
Blackmun, who compose the core of the majorities in these
cases
.
The critical nexus between the justices' understanding
of patronage and "monopoly" is evident in the majority
opinion in Branti, authored by Stevens. Stevens asserts
that the central issue in the case is "orthodoxy", a
monopoly of thought; patronage is seen as leading to such a
restriction of thought and expression through the pressures
of employment . Stevens found a precedent for striking down
government actions that encouraged such orthodoxy in the
famous "flag salute" case of Board of Education v.
Barnette . 10 The price of patronage is seen as a self-
enforcing monopoly of support and ideas for the party in
10 445 U.S. at 514, citing Board of Education v.
Barnette , 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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power. This view colors and relates to the justices' views
of party functions, the proper standard of review, and the
proper role of the states in governing such issues.
Party Competition and Choice
The impact of patronage on competition and democracy
is seen as highly negative by the "natural order" justices.
One of their central objections to patronage is that it
distorts electoral democracy. Brennan's opinion in El rod
views patronage as effecting a strong impairment of "the
free functioning of the electoral process". He uses very
pointed language to describe this impairment: patronage
holds the "power to starve political opposition", and its
practice "tips the electoral process in favor of the
incumbent party". 11 He also characterizes patronage as
leading to "the entrenchment of one or a few parties". 12
In essence, patronage gives a heavy advantage in political
resources (money, volunteers, etc.) to those who control
it, and leaves opponents at a comparative disadvantage.
Stevens's concurring opinion in Rutan also stresses
the danger of "entrenchment". He points out that Scalia's
dissent in that case (discussed in section II of this
chapter) is "devoid of reference to meaningful evidence
that patronage practices have played a significant role in
11 427 U.S. at 356.
12 427 U.S. at 369.
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the preservation of the two party system" . Stevens argues
that patronage instead functions solely to protect the
power of entrenched majorities. 13 He supports this
argument with a footnote citing his own discussion of a
monopolized party system in Anderson v. Celebrezze
.
14
This language of monopoly and entrenchment, with its
underlying suspicion of the parties in power, is strongly
reminiscent of the majority opinion in Williams
. which is
in fact quoted in support of these themes in Brennan's
Elrod opinion. 15 The language of Elrod describes
patronage as "inimical to the process which undergirds our
system of government and... 'at war with the deeper
traditions of democracy embodied in the First
Amendment'". 16 The "natural order" justices' concern with
monopoly is strongly rooted in the First Amendment.
Brennan's opinion in Rutan expands on this point,
giving examples of the adverse effects of affiliation
pressures on the beliefs and political activities of public
employees. Brennan quotes his Elrod opinion to emphasize
that "a democratic system requires the unfettered judgment
of citizens", a judgment which is infringed by the
13 497 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., concurring).
14 497 U.S. at 92 (Stevens, J., concurring).
15 427 U.S. 357. The opinion quotes Justice Black's
Williams opinion, at 393 U.S. 32: "competition in ideas and
governmental policies is at the core of our electoral
process"
.
16 427 U.S. at 357.
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political orthodoxy of ideas that patronage encourages. 17
His Elrod opinion also makes pointed reference to the fact
that patronage has been employed to support such
totalitarian regimes as Nazi Germany, a strongly negative
association between patronage and orthodoxy. 18
In Branti
.
Stevens emphasizes the connection between
patronage and coercion, asserting that sponsorship does
constitute coercion. He also asserts that such coercion
does not need to be "proven" ; all that needs to be shown is
that someone has been discharged solely for reasons of
political affiliation. 19 Brennan in Rutan emphasizes that
the claims of promotion, transfer and recall decisions
having no effect on belief and association are not
credible; "dead end positions" exert a very real pressure
to change behavior to escape such situations. 20 Stevens'
concurring opinion in Rutan argues that the claim of
insignificant burden is contradicted by the "harsh reality
of party discipline at the center of Justice Scalia's
theory of patronage". 21
Linked to this disapproval of monopoly is a finding
that patronage and the consideration of partisan ties in
17 110 S. Ct. at 2736-37.
18 427 U.S. at 353.
19 445 U.S. at 516-17.
20 497 U.S. at 73
.
21 497 U.S. at 89 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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personnel decisions serve no useful governmental purpose.
Stevens's Branti opinion asserts that party affiliation has
"no relevant ties" to the effective performance of an
assistant public defender's job. Only confidential and
policymaking positions are sufficiently related to party
platforms and functions for such ties to be legitimate
employment criteria. 22 For all other positions, partisan
affiliations are "not relevant to government in its
capacity as an employer", according to Justice Brennan in
Rutan
.
23
It is also argued that there is a strong association
between partisan government and poor administration. In
Elrod, Brennan cites United Public Workers v. Mitchell and
CSC v. Letter Carriers to substantiate the point that
"actively partisan government threatens good
administration". 24 This sounds very much like the
Progressive dichotomy between politics and administration,
though no direct citation is made to this literature.
Brennan supports this view of patronage by emphasizing the
history of the Hatch Act, which has limited the political
activities of federal employees. CSC v. Letter Carriers is
cited as approving the Act as a method of preventing
improper influence over the political process:
22 445 U.S. at 519.
23 110 S. Ct. at 2735.
24 427 U.S. at 367.
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The judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the
country appears to have been that partisan
political activities by federal employees must be
limited if the Government is to operate
effectively and fairly, elections are to play
their proper part in representative government,
and employees themselves are to be sufficiently
free from improper influences. 25
Thus, patronage and partisan influence of or by government
employees are seen as two sides of the same coin, that
being the corruption of politics and government by a
monopoly of views and parties. In Elrod, Brennan refers to
the gain provided to representative government by the Hatch
Act. 26 The recent revisions in the Hatch Act by the 103rd
Congress would seem to weaken this argument somewhat,
though not at all fatally.
Despite these objections, the majority finding against
patronage practices requires cause, and is not automatic.
The justices see the appropriateness of such practices in
regard to policymaking positions, even though the
definition of that term has been troublesome to many. In
addition, they emphasize that not all burdens on the First
25 427 U.S. at 354, quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers ,
413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973) .
26 427 U.S. at 370. Sidney Milkis argues that the Act
"short-circuited any effort on the part of Roosevelt and
the New Dealers to develop a national party machine based
on federal government spending and organization", but "was
not so clearly a political defeat for President Roosevelt"
FDR was more interested in building an Executive Branch
favorably inclined to liberal public policy, in Milkis'
interpretation. As a result, FDR helped reduce the role of
parties in politics. Milkis, The President And The Parties
pp. 93, 138.
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Amendment will make an action or statute unconstitutional;
according to Brennan in Elrod
. "restraints are permitted
for appropriate reasons". 27 There is room for compromise
and dialogue. Stevens follows this position in Branti
.
asserting that party may be an acceptable requirement for
some offices in order to support government effectiveness
and efficiency. 28
But the ultimate conclusion is clearly stated by
Brennan in the beginning of Rutan -, "to the victor belong
only those spoils that may be constitutionally
obtained". 29 The constitutional disability of patronage
is thus seen not as the party tie per se, but its use as a
dismissal or disqualifying mechanism. These justices are
concerned with preventing monopoly and promoting a neutral
civil service; a patronage -dominated system is seen as
detrimental to government and democracy.
Party Structure and Functions
Both implicitly and explicitly, the "natural order"
patronage opinions have much to say about parties as
organizations. Parties are understood as more than job-
oriented, job-dependent entities; "political parties are
nurtured by other, less intrusive and equally effective
27 427 U.S. at 360.
28 445 U.S. at 517.
29 497 U.S. at 64.
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methods"
,
according to Brennan in Elrod . 30 Solidary and
purposive incentives can be as effective as material
incentives in promoting and sustaining political parties.
Brennan does not accept the position that patronage
preserves the democratic process and is the price of the
party system, a position for which the respondents quote
V.O. Key. Brennan vehemently disagrees, stating that
"partisan politics bears the imprimatur only of tradition,
not the Constitution". In fact, he feels parties function
better without patronage. 31
This point is made even more explicitly in Rutan.
Brennan cites Larry Sabato's Goodbye to Good-Time Charlie:
The American Governorship Transformed and a 1959 article by
Frank Sorauf to argue that many parties have "thrived"
despite the decline of patronage. 32 Parties, in Brennan'
s
view, have no required need to use material incentives in
order to survive and prosper. An examination of the sources
cited, and the broader work of both scholars, leads to a
more complex conclusion.
3U 472 U.S. 372-73.
31 427 U.S. at 368-69. The V.O. Key citation is from
Politics. Parties. And Pressure Groups , 5th ed., p. 369.
Key argues succinctly that parties continue to use and
demand patronage, but also states that "fortunately, not
all political organizations are corrupt, and over the long
run the spoils system has come to operate within narrower
bounds". This is the position more of a realist than an
enthusiastic supporter of patronage.
32 497 U.S. at 74-75.
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Larry Sabato's work does note that patronage has
declined across the nation, and cites the effect of Elrod
on that process. He also notes that many governors support
Brennan's viewpoint and have strengthened civil service in
their states. While noting that patronage can lead to
poorly qualified appointees, he emphasizes that political
accountability is often reduced by a civil service system.
Overall, patronage is more a burden than an advantage for
governors
.
33
Sabato's position in Goodbye To Good-Time Charlie can
be seen as reluctantly supportive of Brennan, but his other
writings are much friendlier to patronage. In The Party's
Just Begun
, Sabato calls for an increase in patronage in
order to build stronger parties. He argues that "in the
postpatronage age American political parties have become
more structurally skeletal in character than before"; less
patronage has weakened parties as organizations. In
addition to the Progressive reform tradition, Sabato puts
the "blame... for the modern continued decline of patronage"
directly on the Court. A revival of patronage would, in
Sabato's view, "involve more people in the party
organizations". 34 Brennan's citation of Sabato's
particular work supports his argument, but Sabato's later
33 Larry Sabato, Goodbye To Good -Time Charlie: The
American Governorship Transformed , 2nd ed. (Washington,
D.C.: CQ Press, 1983), pp. 67-69.
34 Sabato, The Party's Just Begun , pp. 229-32.
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writing opposes Brennan's view; the latter' s citation is
thus less than convincing.
Brennan's citation of a work by Frank Sorauf also
raises questions. While noting state and local parties that
have thrived without patronage, Sorauf 's 1959 article
"Patronage and Party" also makes an argument for why many
parties have "needed" patronage:
Above all, patronage has generally been the
political way of life and the political ally of
the local centers of power in their losing battle
for political superiority in America. It survives
to a great extent in their protest against the
growth of national politics and centralized
parties in the United States. 35
The decline of patronage is seen by Sorauf as leading to
more nationalized parties, a point he makes explicitly in
his 1960 article "The Silent Revolution in Patronage", in
which he argues that parties will not be destroyed by less
patronage, but will be more nationalized and
disciplined. 36 Thus, while he does not call for more
patronage, Sorauf views its disappearance as changing
parties to more national entities. It is just such national
parties that the "natural order" justices seem to favor.
Thus, while raising questions, this citation also supports
the majority's view of parties.
35 Frank Sorauf, "Patronage and Party" . Midwest Journal
of Political Science 3 (1959), p. 126.
36 Frank Sorauf, "The Silent Revolution In Patronage",
Public Administration Review 20 (1960), pp. 33-34.
If the provision of material rewards through patronage
and other means is not a pivotal function of parties, what
do parties do? The answer is clearly reflected in the
majority opinions: they focus on policy and ideas. The only
jobs for which party is seen as an appropriate requirement
or consideration are those that entail policymaking and
confidentiality; this point is made in Brant
i
and
reaffirmed in Rutan
.
The center of the "natural order" perspective's view
of parties and their functions is a vision of parties as
based in ideas and policies, not material employment and
rewards. Therefore, appeals to the historical usage of
patronage have minimal appeal to these justices, and are
not seen by them as strong items for consideration. Parties
can and should survive on more than a promise of "you
scratch my back, I'll scratch yours". However, the
scholarship they cite, and the wider range of scholars, do
not necessarily support their viewpoint
.
Standards Of Evidence and Burden
The "natural order" perspective adopts a standard of
strict scrutiny in the patronage opinions. Brennan's
opinion in Elrod cites the Court's opinions in Buckley v.
Valeo and the NAACP cases to support a standard of
"exacting scrutiny". The claims of the Illinois employees
against their patronage-based dismissals are found to meet
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that standard. 37 Such a standard tends to favor those
challenging patronage practices.
In Branti
,
Stevens expands on the Elrod standard. The
proper question to ask in such patronage cases is whether
party is "essential to the discharge of the employee's
governmental responsibilities". More precisely, the hiring
authority must "demonstrate that party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of
the public office involved"
. In the particular
circumstance, Stevens sees no such relationship between
party affiliation and the responsibilities of an assistant
public defender. 38
The "natural order" justices have also responded to
the "constructed order" justices' reliance on history,
custom and tradition as standards of evaluation. In his
Rutan concurrence, Stevens emphasizes that the standard is
not one simply of history and tradition in the political
realm, as Scalia asserts. Instead, "the tradition that is
relevant in this case is the American commitment to examine
and reexamine past and present practices against the basic
principles embodied in the Constitution". 39
The standard of the "natural order" justices is one
that favors a neutral civil service and individual freedom
37 427 U.S. at 362-63 .
38 445 U.S. at 518-20.
39 497 U.S. at 92 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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of belief. Parties do have a limited and proper role in
this system, but the use of partisan affiliation as a
criterion in personnel processes must be strictly
scrutinized
.
The Role of Government
It is clear that the "natural order" majority in the
patronage cases is more strongly inclined to favor claims
of constitutional infringement and national interests than
they are the avowed interests of state and local
governments. In discussing political question and
separation of powers objections to the Court's adjudication
in Elrod , Brennan emphasizes that these questions are
relevant to disputes between coordinate branches of the
national government, not to disputes between the
Constitution and state governments. Implying that
constitutional guarantees limit the power of states,
Brennan asserts that "where there is no power, there can be
no impairment of power". 40 This is certainly a nationally
oriented position.
This position is also evident in the treatment of
state interests in Elrod . To the assertion that patronage
insures effective government and the efficiency of public
employees, Brennan responds that patronage is a
disincentive to such outcomes, resulting in frequent
40 427 U.S. at 351-52.
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turnover and hostility bred by the prospect of dismissal.
In addition, the argument is violated by the continuance of
some employees if they can find sponsorship, and the
inadequate training of new employees. 41
With regard to the defense of patronage using
governmental interests, Stevens in Rutan asserts that this
defense "obfuscates the critical distinction between
partisan interest and the public interest". 42 This is the
concern that ultimately lies at the heart of the whole
"natural order" position: a concern with a neutral public
interest and civil service that promotes maximum political
competition and effective government.
The "Constructed Order" Perspective
In contrast to the "natural order" view of patronage,
which has held a thin majority on the Court, has been a
"constructed order" viewpoint contained in strong and
passionately argued dissenting opinions by Powell ( Elrod ,
Branti ) and Scalia ( Rutan ) , who have been joined
consistently by Rehnquist . These dissents stress the
important role of patronage in American political history,
and its benefits for the political system. Beyond their
view of patronage, they argue that questions regarding its
propriety are the proper purview of elected representatives
41 427 U.S. at 364-65.
42 497 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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and the people, not the judiciary. They also favor a
reading of the Constitution which supports state authority
in this area. Thus, for reasons of tradition and deference
to elected branches of government, these justices support a
different treatment of patronage.
Party Competition and Choice
The "constructed order" justices evince little concern
about the threat of monopoly to competitive democracy.
Instead, there is a sense that the current system and
traditional practices play important roles in preserving
democracy. Powell's dissent in Elrod calls patronage "a
practice as old as the Republic" that has been a critical
democratizing influence in American politics. He traces
patronage not to the Jacksonian period, as Brennan does,
but to the Washington Administration; patronage in the
Adams and Jefferson Administrations, as well as New York
and Pennsylvania state governments, are noted with a
citation to Carl Fish's The Civil Service And The
Patronage . 43 Powell's dissenting opinion in Branti
reinforces this view, noting that "patronage is a long-
accepted practice that has never been totally eliminated by
civil service laws and regulations". To support this
43 427 U.S. at 376-78 (Powell
,
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J. , dissenting)
contention, he cites Eric L . McKitrick's essay on Lincoln's
use of patronage in the Civil War years. 44
Fish's work is generally supportive of Powell's view
of the history of patronage. Fish notes that as the first
parties began to emerge, "Washington became more of a party
man" and was determined to favor only Federalists for
appointments. John Adams is also portrayed as removing a
number of government personnel "for party reasons".
However, Fish argues that the spoils system as such had not
yet come into existence at this time; Jefferson is
portrayed as its true progenitor. 45 As for the democratic
benefits and necessity of patronage, Fish is relatively
equivocal
.
46
Eric McKitrick's essay on Civil War party affairs also
supports Powell's argument. McKitrick emphasizes the lack
of an opposition party in the South as a critical factor in
weakening its war effort, while party competition in the
North "was on the whole salutary for Lincoln's government
and the Union cause". 47 With regard to patronage, the
absence of political opposition in the Confederate system
44 449 U.S. at 522, and n. 1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
45 Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage , pp. 13-
14, 19, 27, 51.
46 Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage , p. 235.
47 Eric L. McKitrick, "Party Politics And The Union
and Confederate War Efforts", in William Nisbet Chambers
and Walter Dean Burnham, eds . , The American Party Systems:
Stages Of Political Development , 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1975), p. 121.
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enabled President Davis to more easily ignore patronage
demands
--a costly luxury in terms of political support,
in McKitrick' s view, since "one administration [Lincoln's]
had an intricate set of standards for appraising energy and
rewarding it... which was not available to the other". 48
Patronage is seen as part of the political glue which
enables the Union to win the Civil War.
More interestingly, Powell in Elrod discusses the
"strengthened parties" that result from patronage in the
context of civil service reforms. He cites David
Rosenbloom, also cited by Brennan on the history of civil
service, to argue that corruption, inefficiency, and the
power of professional politicians were the concerns that
drove the civil service movement; "perceived impingement on
employees' political beliefs was not a significant impetus
to these reforms". 49 Thus, the argument implies, major
campaigns against patronage have not been waged on free
speech grounds. Similarly, Powell concludes his Branti
dissent with the remark that "the First Amendment does not
incorporate a national civil service system". 50
In a somewhat different approach, Scalia's Rutan
dissent also takes issue with the majority's view of
patronage and politics. Scalia's opinion begins with the
48 McKitrick, "Party Politics", pp. 132-33.
49 427 U.S. at 379 (Powell, J., dissenting).
50 445 U.S. at 534 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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assertion that judicial appointments have themselves been
political and patronage related since the Founding, citing
the facts of the landmark Marbury v. Madison case. Seeing
such patronage even on the bench, Scalia comments on the
majority opinion: "something must be wrong here, and I
suggest it is the Court". 51
Scalia' s Rutan dissent speaks to the place of
patronage and its relation to the merit principle at the
heart of the "neutral civil service" concept of public
administration. While he admits that the merit principle
has generally been favored by events and the American
public, he contends there is another point of view, one
favoring patronage. He quotes its classic spokesperson,
George Washington Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, on its
political necessity:
I ain't up on sillygisms, but I can give you some
arguments that nobody can answer. First, this
great and glorious country was built up by
political parties; second, parties can't hold
together if their workers don't get offices when
they win,- third, if the parties goes to pieces,
the government they built up must go to pieces,
too,- fourth, then there'll be hell to pay. 52
This is a cogent summation of the "constructed order" view
of patronage. These justices are not dismissing civil
service, but rather, according to Scalia, the choice
between civil service and patronage is simply not clear
51 497 U.S. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52 497 U.S. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting), quoting
William Riordon, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1963) , p. 13
.
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enough to put forward a single, inflexible constitutional
proposition such as the majority's. 53
Scalia also takes issue with the majority's view of
the First Amendment, and advances a more restricted view in
this context. "The provisions of the Bill of Rights",
Scalia writes, "were designed to restrain transient
minorities from impairing long-recognized personal
liberties. They did not create by implication novel
individual rights overturning accepted political norms".
Patronage is seen by Scalia as such a norm, facing an
ambiguous constitutional text. In his view, then, the First
Amendment does not constitute an absolute protection for
political speech; the context of such speech must be
considered
.
54
Complementary to this history are some strong benefits
that patronage is seen as providing to the American
democratic system. According to Powell in Elrod , patronage
(1) stimulates political activity, (2) strengthens parties,
(3) gives a needed boost up to minority ethnic groups
(Samuel Lubell's The Future Of American Politics is cited
to support this point) , and (4) builds stable,
nonfragmented parties (the Court's Storer opinion is cited
to support this point) . The majority, seen as "simply
53 449 u.S. at 94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54 497 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As noted
in Chapter 4, Scalia will take a strong view of the First
Amendment when he views the conduct as more private and the
regulation or practice overriding political norms.
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disparaging" these interests, is viewed as insensitive to
political realities. 55 This emphasis on political
considerations is evident throughout the dissenting
patronage opinions.
Lubell's work is an appropriate citation, but his full
viewpoint is more nuanced than Powell portrays. He does
argue that patronage has aided the process of
"Americanization" and advancement of immigrants, noting
that the early demands of groups are often satiated
initially by "an appointment as assistant district
attorney" (assistant public defender positions were at
issue in Brant
i
) . He correctly notes, however, that the
same system "obstructs as well as advances minority
progress" . He also notes the declining influence of
patronage brought about by federal largesse and
socioeconomic advancement of immigrants. 56 Thus, Powell's
use of this argument may be outdated by events.
Justice Powell in Elrod also cites the issue of
suppression of political belief as a red herring. Past
cases cited by the majority, such as Barnette , deal with
the danger of eliminating political beliefs. In contrast,
dismissal decisions and the patronage system in general
have not resulted in elimination of beliefs; voting has
55 427 U.S. at 382-83 (Powell, J., dissenting).
56 Samuel Lubell, The Future Of American Politics, 3rd
ed. revised (New York: Harper Colophon, 1965), pp. 76, 85-
86 .
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been protected since the advent of the Australian ballot,
and patronage has in historical fact supported vigorous
ideological competition. 57 Once again, differences
between the "natural order" and "constructed order"
perspectives appear to center not on the inherent value of
competition, but on what political practices nurture such
competition
.
Party Structure and Functions
To the "constructed order" justices, the practice of
patronage is a key function of political parties. Powell's
Elrod dissent states: "we deal here with a highly practical
and rather fundamental element of our political system , not
the theoretical abstractions of a political science
seminar". 58 This reveals the justices' view of the role
of material rewards in politics, as well as their
separation of political science "theory" and the practical
needs of functioning parties. The "natural order" issue-
centered conception of parties and politics is seen as not
grounded in the concrete challenges of encouraging
political activity and support.
In Brant
i
, for example, Powell cites patronage as a
primary function of political parties, since parties are
formed to place people in positions of power. On this
57 427 U.S. at 387-88 (Powell, J., dissenting).
58 427 U.S. at 381-82 (Powell, J., dissenting);
emphasis added.
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score, he cites James Jupp's Political Parties . 59 Jupp's
view of the "power" of American patronage is more cautious
than Powell's. While he notes that it has been an
"essential feature" of American politics, he also notes
that the loose party discipline and membership of the
American system have avoided machine control that some such
as Ostrogorski had feared. He also notes that the
patronage-based machines have lost much of their power in
the U.S. as a result of "the spread of affluence and the
professionalisation [sic] of bureaucracies". 60 Jupp's
work is generally supportive of Powell's argument, but is
more skeptical regarding the current role of patronage and
the reach of its disciplinary powers.
Political competition and survival among parties are
also as much a concern of the "constructed order" justices
as of the "natural order" justices; however, they take very
different roads to reach that goal and hold different
visions of how it looks. According to Powell in Elrod ,
without patronage, candidates would not be able to acquire
the time and money of volunteers, friends and cadres at the
local level. 61 Former U.S. Senator Paul Douglas is quoted
on this score:
59 445 U.S. at 528 (Powell, J., dissenting).
60 James Jupp, Political Parties (London: Rout ledge
and Kegan Paul, 1968), pp. 26-27.
61 427 U.S. at 384 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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If we [liberals in Congress] are to survive we
need some support rooted in gratitude for
material favors which at the same time do not
injure the general public. 62
In other words, practical politics runs on material
rewards, not just ideas.
This position is reasserted in Powell's Branti
dissent
.
According to him, "patronage appointments help
build stable political parties by offering rewards to
persons who assume the tasks necessary to the continuing
functioning of political organizations" . In addition,
patronage helps to avoid factional splintering and builds
loyalty to the party; the Court's decision in Storer is
cited in support of this assertion. 63
The "constructed order" justices are highly suspicious
of the majority's general view of parties. Powell's Elrod
dissent asserts that "one cannot avoid the
impression ... that even a threatened demise of political
parties would not trouble the plurality. In my view, this
thinking reflects a disturbing insensitivity to the
political realities relevant to the disposition of this
case". 64 In his Branti dissent, he pointedly emphasizes
the same concern: "until today, I would have believed that
62 Former Senator Paul H. Douglas (D-IL) , letter to
the New Republic , July 14, 1952, p. 2, quoted at 427 U.S.
384 .
63 445 U.S. at 527-28 (Powell, J., dissenting).
64 427 U.S. at 383 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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the importance of political parties was self-evident". 65
The majority justices are seen as being implicitly hostile
to job-oriented parties and the role of material rewards in
parties and politics.
Other pivotal functions of parties are also cited and
discussed by the "constructed order" justices. Parties
serve as a linkage mechanism, a device that enables our
separation of powers system to work. Powell in Branti
highlights this point with regard to the elected branches
of government
:
Over the decades of our national history,
political parties have furthered - if not assured
- a measure of cooperation between the Executive
and Legislative Branches. A strong party allows
an elected executive to implement his programs
and policies by working with legislators of the
same political organization. 66
Parties are the enablers of the democratic system, and must
be allowed to function and support themselves by patronage
if the democratic system is to survive.
Looking at current conditions, Powell in Branti sees
the linkages provided by party falling apart. Legislators
are now frequently free agents, a phenomena that the
"constructed order" justices have connected to the decline
of patronage. This failure of discipline "has been traced
to the inability of successful political parties to offer
patronage positions to their members or to the supporters
65 445 U.S. at 528 (Powell, J., dissenting).
66 445 U.S. at 530-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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of elected officials". Edward Costikyan's Behind Closed
Doors: Politics In The Public Interest- is cited to support
this assertion. The decline of patronage is the reason why,
as Powell claims, the majority's decision will "decrease
the accountability and denigrate the role of our national
political parties". 67
Costikyan's work, which conveys his experiences as a
Democratic leader in Manhattan during the 1950 's and
1960's, generally supports Powell's positive view of
patronage. Costikyan argues that patronage is a critical
factor in the ability or inability of parties or executives
to control legislators of their party, and notes that
supporters expect rewards for their work. 68 He also
argues that anti-political party good government has
failed, and that party government should be tried to
improve the cities and their governance. 69 However,
Costikyan does not favor blind party discipline, opposing
both reformers and regulars who demanded such discipline in
the party. Instead, he favors "small d democracy",
moderation, and compromise. 70 This is not quite the same
67 445 U.S. at 531 (Powell, J., dissenting).
68 Edward Costikyan, Behind Closed Doors: Politics In
The Public Interest (New York: Harcourt Brace And World,
1966)
, pp. 253-55 .
69 Costikyan, Behind Closed Doors , p. 352.
70 Costikyan, Behind Closed Doors , pp. 33-39.
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vision of party and patronage held by Powell and the other
"constructed order" justices.
Scalia's Rutan dissent also sees harmful consequences
for parties and democracy in the decline of patronage. He
acknowledges the troubled history of political machines,
but is also impressed by the fact of contemporary
complaints of helplessness voiced by elected officials
facing highly cohesive interest groups pushing their narrow
agendas. The practice of patronage supports strong parties
that can serve as a counterweight to such pressures, and
because of this, the practice of patronage should be given
the "benefit of the doubt", and its fate should be left to
popularly elected representatives of the people. 71
These dissenting justices see patronage as a key
component of a democratic system, particularly with regard
to small offices and little known candidates. They give
such candidates and parties much needed support, and a
fighting chance at the polls. To restrict this is to weaken
the democratic process, which they Charge the majority is
doing; by getting voters to vote, patronage performs a
public service. 72
Powell's opinion in Elrod also responds to the charge
that patronage biases or reduces the information received
by voters. He portrays it as a source of information that
71 497 U.S. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72 Branti , 449 U.S. at 528-529 (Powell, J.,
dissenting)
.
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adds to, rather than detracts from, political discourse. It
also enables parties to continue a series of essential
functions: maintenance of precinct organizations, voter
registration, and political favors for citizens. Such
functions are not driven simply by ideas, "some academic
interest in 'democracy' or other public service
impulse"
.
73
Standards Of Evidence and Burden
The "constructed order" justices take the position
that the standards of the majority in the patronage cases
have been too stringent and strict. Objecting to the
standard set forth in Elrod, they were even more opposed to
the Branti approach of demanding that party affiliation be
an appropriate requirement for the position in question;
Powell correctly views this as a "new, and substantially
expanded, standard". 74 As Powell points out, under that
standard it is not enough to show that a position is
confidential or policymaking; a nexus between political
affiliation and the job must be proven. This standard is
"framed in vague and sweeping language certain to create
vast uncertainty". 75 A study of post-Branti court
decisions by Susan Lorde Martin, cited by Scalia in his
73 427 U.S. at 385 (Powell, J., dissenting).
74 445 U.S. at 522 (Powell, J., dissenting).
75 445 U.S. at 524 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Rutan dissent a decade later, seems to bear this out.
Martin examines post- Branti Circuit Court decisions
involving patronage dismissals, and finds confusion, with
different Circuits offering conflicting interpretations of
the Brant
i
precedent. 76
In Branti, Powell also disputes the precedents cited
for the majority's standard. The pivotal cases cited by the
majority, i.e. Barnette
. Kevishian , and Perry
, did not
involve patronage. Nor does the majority address the major
governmental interests at stake in the case. 77 Scalia in
Rutan also questions the majority precedents, arguing that
the "strict scrutiny standard finds no support in our
cases". 78 Both Scalia and Powell see the majority's
argument as being built on faulty precedents. As an
alternative, they propose a standard weighted toward the
states and their asserted interests.
Powell's Branti opinion asserts such a state-friendly
standard as follows: "no constitutional violation exists if
patronage practices further sufficiently important
interests to justify tangential burdening of First
Amendment rights". 79 Scalia in Rutan proposes a similar
standard, arguing that there should simply be a rational
76 Martin, "A Decade Of Branti Decisions", cited in
497 U.S. at 111 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77 445 U.S. at 526-27 (Powell, J., dissenting).
78 497 U.S. at 98 (scalia, J., dissenting).
79 445 U.S. at 527 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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connection between the use of partisan affiliation and the
government's function as an employer. 80 Scalia expands on
this standard later in the Rutan opinion, drawing his
argument from the Court's opinion in United Public Workprs
v. Mitchell. Under Scalia' s standard, the action involved
must be reasonably deemed by the legislature to further a
legitimate good. 81 This is a relatively easy standard for
a state to meet
.
The Role of Government
The "constructed order" view is strongly inclined to
favor state interests involving patronage. One of the
pivotal issues for these justices in the patronage cases is
the fact that the patronage system is being struck down by
the judiciary, not popularly elected officials. Powell in
Elrod states:
This ad hoc judicial judgment runs counter to the
judgments of the representatives of the people in
state and local governments, representatives who
have chosen, in most instances, to retain some
patronage practices in combination with a merit
oriented civil service. One would think that
elected representatives of the people are better
equipped than we to weigh the need for some
continuation of patronage practices in light of
the interests above identified [footnote
omitted] , and particularly in view of local
conditions [footnote omitted]". 82
o 497 U.S. at 98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81 497 U.S. at 102 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 300 U.S. 75 (1947)
82 427 U.S. at 386 (Powell, J., dissenting)
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The positions of elected officials, particularly when
supported by long tradition, are not to be taken lightly.
At the end of Elrod, Powell states that "we should not
foreclose local options in the name of a constitutional
right perceived to be applicable for the first time after
nearly two centuries". 83
Powell's opening statement in his Branti dissent
speaks directly to the same point: "the Court today
continues the evisceration of patronage practices begun in
Elrod v. Burns "
.
84 A footnote in that opinion bears out
his attitude toward patronage and its management: "a
strength of our system has been the blend of civil service
and patronage appointments, subject always to oversight and
change by the legislative branches of government". 85
Powell proceeds to assert that the Court is unjustifiably
removing such decisions from legislative and executive
discretion
.
86
By removing this authority, the majority justices
damage the ability of elected officials and their parties
to govern effectively. According to Powell in Branti ,
strong parties aid governance by enabling implementation of
ideas and platforms, implementation which could be stymied
3 427 U. S . at 389 (Powell, J., dissenting).
4 445 U S . at 521 (Powell, J., dissenting).
5 445 U S . at 525, n. 5 (Powell, J., dissenting)
6 445 U S . at 525-26 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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by a bureaucracy constituted completely by a civil service
system. The majority standard would "impose unnecessary
constraints upon the ability of responsible officials to
govern effectively and to carry out new policies"
. Powell
quotes Charles Peters of The Washington Monthly in this
regard
.
87
Scalia in Rutan also stresses this concern. The
majority standard is seen as highly intrusive; "government
office could not function if every employment decision
became a constitutional matter", and a wide degree of
deference should thus be given to the government
.
Affiliation as well as speech are reasonable grounds for
dismissal if reasonably necessary to enable effective
government
.
88
Conclusions: Patronage And Party
An examination of the patronage opinions of the
justices reveals a fundamental and consistent division
regarding the practice of patronage. While the "natural
order" is prone to restrict patronage, the "constructed
order" is much more likely to view patronage positively,
and leave patronage decisions to be made by the democratic
process and elected institutions.
87 445 U.S. at 530 (Powell, J., dissenting).
88 497 U.S. at 99-100 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
The "natural order" view of patronage is highly
negative, and seeks to reduce its role in the operations of
government. This view is rooted in a concern that favors
political competition and fears the possibilities of
monopoly, a concern that also translates into a vision of
parties as entities not dependent on material incentives.
In addition, these justices hold patronage to a high
standard of review and put little stock in the state
interests advanced to support the practice of patronage.
All of these positions are centered in a First Amendment
conception of democracy that is grounded in maximum
competition and political opportunity.
Despite its consistent majority on the Court in recent
decades, this view of patronage has not been the only one
among the justices. There has been a consistent
undercurrent of three and four- justice dissents, which have
defended the practice of patronage at length as part of the
historical fabric of American politics. Their "constructed
order" view is rooted in very different assumptions about
democracy, parties, and state governments.
Like the "natural order" perspective, the "constructed
order" perspective's concern with patronage is both a
product of and a foundation for particular views of
democracy, parties, and the role of the states. The
"constructed order" has a positive view of job oriented
parties and the role of material rewards in politics. As a
result, they evaluate patronage practices by a more lenient
293
standard. They also favor the authority of elected
representatives to decide the ultimate political parameters
of patronage practices. In sum, the "constructed order"
view takes a sanguine view of the political status quo, and
argues for minimal judicial interference in this realm.
Beyond the divisions on the Court, one must also ask
how the opposing views of patronage hold up under the
microscope of political science. Here one finds many of the
same divisions. On the one hand, a number of political
scientists appreciate the importance of material rewards in
building strong parties; Larry Sabato is particularly
forthright in that regard. 89 But a number of political
scientists have also pointed out the down side of patronage
and the fact that the decline of parties is rooted in more
than a loss of patronage.
Factually, the pro-patronage view may well have the
better argument. The survival of a functioning party
organization is substantially aided by the promise of jobs,
even if parties can survive in some form without such
incentives. Few if any political scientists have taken a
position as ideological and extreme as that of the "natural
order" justices.
With regard to entrenchment and the stifling of
alternative views, the "natural order" justices present
little or no evidence to build their case against
89 Sabato, The Party's Just Begun , pp. 230-32.
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patronage. While successful machines have certainly
employed patronage to their advantage, it does not
necessarily result in party entrenchment. Those with
patronage have been thrown out by outsiders in many cases.
Thus, while the "natural order" view may be correct, it is
by no means an iron law; the entrenchment is vulnerable to
collapse. The "constructed order" justices are also largely
correct in their assertion that the moves to reform
patronage have had much more to do with "effective
government" concerns than they have with efforts to protect
speech and alternative views.
The "natural order" justices make significant use of
political science literature in their opinions. Brennan in
Elrod cites Susan and Martin Tolchin's To The Victor as
well as works by Fish, Rosenbloom, and Friedrich and
Brzezinski 90
,
while Stevens' concurrence in Rutan cites
Richard Hofstadter's classic work The Idea Of A Party
System on the Founders' view of parties as a pathology, not
a political norm. But the "constructed order" justices cite
an equally wide literature, and appear to have the better
of the argument
.
In conclusion, the patronage opinions evince a strong
division among the Justices, one which reflects very
different understandings of the workings of parties and
politics. To this point, the dominant view has been one
90 427 U.S . at 353
.
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that sees patronage as leading to monopoly and corruption
and is a view decidedly unfriendly to job oriented parties,
yet one that finds much support in the public psyche. The
dissenting view, however, probably has the better grasp of
political realities. It may also find its way to a majority
in future cases before the justices, as the majority of
justices who joined the Elrod, Branti , and Rutan
majorities, i.e., Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White,
have now departed from the Court. However, it is unlikely
to find itself in a majority in the "court" of public
opinion any time soon. A good case is made for patronage by
the "constructed order", but the momentum of public opinion
appears to favor the negative view of patronage espoused by
the "natural order" justices.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS -THE " NATURAL ORDER", THE "CONSTRUCTED ORDER",
AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTIES AND POLITICS
This dissertation has examined a series of Supreme
Court opinions involving ballot access, party organization
and nomination procedures, campaign finance, and political
patronage, and found that divisions within the opinions
reflect two "schools of thought" regarding parties and
electoral competition. This chapter evaluates the
implications of that finding. It first assesses the
significance of these schools of thought for efforts to
build stronger parties, using the criteria specified in
Chapter 1. It then examines the patterns of judicial voting
in the cases, in order to consider the short and long term
future of each school of thought in the deliberations of
the Court. The next section weighs the current literature
in this area in light of the findings here. The final
section measures the overall significance of the schools of
thought and the justices' opinions for electoral
regulation, the future of political parties, and American
politics as a whole.
Assessing The Perspectives: Do Thev Strengthen Parties?
Most of the scholars who study political parties share
a belief that parties play a critical role in American
democracy and are concerned with the health of the party
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system. 1 The strong party attributes assessed here are
derived from the work of James Ceaser and Larry Sabato,
supplemented by questions designed to give greater
definition to the basic attributes.
The interpretations of the justices are also critiqued
from the perspective of the "responsible party" model, an
important variant of the "strong party" model. Those who
advocate for "responsible parties" believe that parties
should take clear and differentiated policy stances,
nominate candidates who share those stances, and work to
enact those policies when their nominees are elected to
office. In sum, they believe the primary function of
parties should be programmatic, not simply electoral. 2
The critique reveals that the differences between the
justices represent a debate between direct democracy and
less direct representative processes, as the "natural
order" doubts most government efforts to shape partisan
organization or electoral procedures for the good of the
"beneficiaries'", while the "constructed order" puts
greater faith in the decisions of elected representatives.
Their debate is less over the outcome of politics per se ,
than over the processes used for political choice. In this
regard, the "natural order" creates more favorable
opportunities for parties to strengthen themselves.
1 Sabato, The Party's Just Begun , p. 2.
2 See APSA, Towards A More Responsible Two Party
System , for the classic statement of this perspective.
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Ultimately, however, neither perspective creates a fully
supportive environment for stronger parties.
The Linkage of Citizens and Government
The first attribute of a strong party is a clear and
continuing role in linking citizens with their
government. 3 Such linkage involves questions of citizen
opportunity to participate in and influence the parties, as
well as the perceived legitimacy of the electoral process.
Do parties have full opportunity to offer themselves to the
voters? How should citizens participate in party
decisionmaking? How should parties be accountable to
citizens? Do citizens feel the electoral process is
legitimate? The perspectives diverge in their answers and
their understanding of the role parties should play in
linking citizens and government.
The ability of parties to offer their candidates to
voters is essential to their role as linkage mechanisms. If
this avenue is blocked, parties cannot perform this
function effectively. The "natural order" is very sensitive
to this issue, demanding full opportunity for all parties
to compete at the voting booth, with Justice Marshall the
strongest advocate of this position. The "constructed
order", in contrast, asks whether a statute provides
3 For example, John Bibby calls the linkage function
"the fundamental role of parties in a democratic society".
Bibby, Parties and Politics , p. 5.
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sufficient opportunity for serious candidates with
substantial public support to gain a place on the ballot.
As long as the elected representatives of citizens have
allowed for such opportunities, minor parties that fail to
qualify for ballot position are not seen as being unfairly
disadvantaged. The two perspectives disagree as to what
constitutes sufficient support ("constructed order") or
sufficient opportunity ("natural order") for party
candidates to be placed on the ballot.
The history of widespread regulation of candidate (and
therefore party) access to a ballot position reflects a
triumph of the "constructed order" perspective's emphasis
on demonstrated public support. Ballot access regulations
were first enacted in part to enhance the legitimacy and
stability of the existing political system. The use of
party-printed ballots for much of the nineteenth century
had made voting subject to much documented fraud and
intimidation. 4 The enactment of secret ballot laws, while
reducing such corruption, also introduced standards of
access, standards that could be used to disadvantage minor
parties seeking a place on the ballot. 5 While the
4 Frank Sorauf, Party Politics In America , p. 227.
V.O. Key emphasizes the concern with secrecy as a pivotal
factor in the pressure for a government -printed ballot.
Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups , 5th ed., p.
639 .
5 J. David Gillespie, Politics At The Periphery: Third
Parties in Two-Party America (Columbia, SC: University of
South Carolina Press, 1993), p. 81. See also Key, Politics,
Parties, and Pressure Groups , 5th ed., p. 641. Key notes
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legitimacy of such practices is contested in both the Court
and politics, many restrictive statutes remain on the
books. Thus, parties must demonstrate public support before
they can win a place for their candidates on the ballot.
Parties may also link citizens and government through
citizen participation in party decisionmaking. The
opportunity for such participation is influenced by the
structure of party organization and nominating processes,
and by what entity has the authority to shape those
structures. The "natural order" perspective argues that
parties, particularly national party organizations, should
have the authority to control their own structures and
processes, since governance by states could distort the
will of the party. As the justices' decisions demonstrate,
however, this rationale can approve both restricted ( La
Follette ) and expanded ( Tashi ian ) participation in party
affairs. The "natural order" has no single model of
intraparty participation.
The "constructed order" perspective takes a different
approach to questions of citizen participation in parties.
The main emphasis is on maintaining a stable and orderly
electoral system which does not confuse the voters or make
party labels meaningless. This emphasis views government as
the proper authority to regulate party affairs and
nomination procedures; those who challenge such regulations
that both organizational and signature requirements can be
used to disadvantage minor parties.
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have the legal burden of proof in contesting them. Like the
"natural order", however, there is no one participatory
model. In dissents, justices with this view have supported
both open primaries ( La Follette ) and closed primaries
( Tashi ian )
.
The avenues of citizen participation in party
decisionmaking, and the locus of authority for shaping
these avenues, are intimately related to a third linkage
issue: how parties are to be accountable to citizens. The
"natural order" believes accountability is best insured by
leaving the decision to the parties. The "constructed
order", in contrast, views elected representatives as the
most legitimate and effective locus of accountability for
citizens, and entrusts them with the power to regulate
party organization and nomination procedures. Government,
not a national or state party committee or convention, is
the proper decisionmaker for ensuring that the party system
is accountable to its citizens.
In recent decades, the "natural order" view of parties
as the proper center of authority and accountability in
regard to party organization and nomination procedures has
held sway among the justices, but its fortunes in politics
have been less clear. While the justices' decisions have
generally favored substantial deregulation of parties and
nomination procedures and the nationalization of the
presidential selection process, extensive state regulation
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of parties persists. 6 Thus, the "constructed order"
approach of government management, which dominated politics
from the Progressive Era through 1968, has not disappeared,
though the justices' decisions and the presidential
selection process reforms of 1968 and beyond have placed it
on the defensive. 7 Neither perspective, however,
unequivocally favors expanded citizen participation; both
6 Larry Sabato, while noting with optimism the
positive implications of decisions like Tashi ian for party
freedom, still wrote the following in 1988: "In this era
when 'less government' is the premiere political mantra, it
is appalling to discover how overregulated the parties are
in most states"
. He cites tabular data on state laws
compiled by the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental
Relations (ACIR) to support this assertion. Sabato, The
Party's Just Begun , pp. 201-5. As noted in Chapter 1, Leon
Epstein, Jerome Mileur, and other scholars are also
skeptical of how much farther the Court will proceed in
deregulating parties and nomination procedures.
7 The history of the Wisconsin open primary and the
national Democratic Party is indicative of the political
limits of party deregulation. While the national party was
successful in contesting the principle of national control
over state primary rules in Democratic Party v. Wisconsin
ex rel La Follette . which allowed the Party to prohibit
Wisconsin from choosing its presidential selection
delegates through an open primary, they have been led to
compromise in practice . While Wisconsin Democrats had to
choose delegates by closed caucus procedures in 1984
(Bibby, Politics and Parties , p. 66), by 1988 the Party had
reversed itself and decided to permit Wisconsin's continued
use of the open primary. Jewell and Olson, Political
Parties And Elections In American States , 3rd ed., p. 271.
A full account of the genesis of the Wisconsin controversy
is provided in Gary Wekkin, Democrat versus Democrat : The
National Party's Campaign To Close The Wisconsin Primary
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1984)
.
For broad discussions of the 1968 reforms, and
critiques of their impact, see Austin Ranney, Curing The
Mischiefs of Faction ; Ceaser, Reforming the Reforms; and
Nelson Polsby, Consequences of Party Reform (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1983) . The retreat from the early
reforms in more recent years reflects the continuing
contest between the two viewpoints examined here.
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ultimately allow the favored decisionmaker to choose either
expansion and contraction of participation in party
organization and nominating procedures, possibly limiting
the linkage between citizens and government.
All of the issues above shape how citizens perceive
the legitimacy of the current party system, the ultimate
test of how well a political system is linking its citizens
and government. For the "natural order" perspective, a
legitimate electoral system provides full opportunity for
parties to offer themselves to the voters as governing
coalitions and vehicles for citizen participation. 8 This
view questions the legitimacy of a state-controlled party
system and electoral process. It contends that many
regulations are enacted by state legislatures dominated by
the two major parties, domination verging on monopoly. This
monopoly can lead to regulations that discriminate
invidiously against minor parties or the bearers of
unpopular ideas. As a result, the "natural order" questions
how accurately the current system links citizen desires
8 This solicitude does not , however, extend to the
practice of party patronage. The "natural order" sees
patronage in personnel decisions involving nonpolicymaking
employees as illegitimate, since it stifles the free speech
of personnel and hires people on the basis of party and not
competency, which is seen as leading to less effective
governance. For this perspective, patronage is not
democratic and does not lead to fairly administered (read
nonpartisan), legitimate government. Instead, it biases and
monopolizes government employment and policy. In contrast
to their other positions, the "natural order" does not view
parties in a positive light when it comes to linking
citizens and government through patronage.
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with political outcomes, raising issues of systemic
legitimacy
.
Elected and representative legislatures, not parties,
are the heart of systemic legitimacy and citizen linkage
with government for the "constructed order". For this
perspective, government interests in protecting the
integrity of the political system and preventing voter
confusion are intertwined with the preservation of a
legitimate system. Parties are seen as less accountable to
citizens, and thereby are less reliable sources of systemic
legitimacy than popularly elected representatives of the
people
.
9
The campaign finance system is an area in which both
perspectives find common ground regarding the legitimacy of
representative processes structuring how campaign money is
contributed and spent. The perspectives do not, however,
endow this governmental role with equal power and
legitimacy. The "natural order" sees regulation as a proper
way to ensure a democratic electoral process only where the
9 Patronage practices are an exception to this
skepticism. The "constructed order" sees patronage as a
proper tool of democratic governance, one with long
historical roots. Patronage helps the government to
represent the people who elected the government, and
increases governmental legitimacy by providing opportunity
for a wide range of individuals to serve in the government.
In this area only, the "constructed order" favors a
stronger opportunity for parties to link citizens and
government . This perspective has been in the minority among
the justices, however, and has not been favored by recent
historical trends. Thus, patronage is currently not a
viable major strategy for parties to strengthen themselves
as linkage agents between citizens and government.
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danger of corruption clearly exists: such danger is present
in corporate wealth and large contributions to a political
candidate. 10 The "constructed order" perspective accepts a
wider government role, being willing to allow government
regulation of all but direct political expenditures (and
White will even accept that level of regulation) in order
to protect the electoral process.
The question of the legitimacy of parties and the
electoral system has been a lively one throughout American
history, and the debate is more active than ever today.
Americans have long had a love-hate relationship with
parties, both participating in and distrusting their
activities. While the "natural order" perspective on party
legitimacy has held sway on the Court, modern public
opinion is dominated by the strong suspicion of parties
first nurtured in the Progressive Era. As a result, parties
are not likely to be seen as fully legitimate centers of
authority over the electoral process, and are unlikely to
gain complete autonomy in structuring themselves to link
citizens and government. 11 Thus, neither perspective has
10 The use of money in general is not seen as
corrupting, but as a form of free speech. Parties as
institutions are seen as legitimate actors in the process,
but the "natural order" does nothing to guarantee any
special campaign finance role for them.
11 For a pessimistic view of public opinion on
parties and its implications for party "deregulation", see
Sabato, The Party 7 s Just Begun , p. 132. The historical
record reveals that the general public has also been
concerned with the legitimacy of campaign finance practices
in recent decades, spurred on by many public interest
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dominated the debate over the legitimacy of the party
system and the electoral process.
Ultimately, both perspectives argue that their
positions on the structuring of parties and the electoral
process help to ensure the linkage of citizens and
government. The "natural order" is grounded in a view that
favors maximum opportunity for largely autonomous parties
to reach voters and choose their own structures and
procedures, but also favors partially regulated money and
nonpartisan governance as characteristics of a legitimate
political system. Their ballot access and nomination
positions (the former often in dissent) generally favor the
strengthening of parties as linkage agents, but their
campaign finance opinions can be seen as neutral, and their
patronage decisions resist that avenue of "linkage". 12
organizations like Common Cause and the Center For
Responsive Politics; witness the popularity of books such
as Philip Stern's The Best Congress Money Can Buy (New
York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1988) . The calls for continued
reform indicate that the problem of legitimacy in this area
is far from solved; reform efforts are likely to engender
long term constitutional conflict with the First Amendment
free speech guarantee.
Party patronage has also been in heavy disrepute since
the Progressive Era. With regard to the decline of
patronage in recent decades, see Sabato, The Party' s Just
Begun
,
p. 231. For an argument that a significant amount of
patronage persists, even after the Rutan decision, see Anne
Freedman, Patronage: An American Tradition (Chicago, IL:
Nelson-Hall, 1994) .
12 As noted, the ability of parties to choose their
procedures may be a double-edged sword in terms of linkage;
some parties may expand citizen opportunities, while others
may restrict them.
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The "constructed order" views controlled opportunity,
state managed party organizations and nomination processes,
and well regulated money as reflective of a legitimate
democratic system. Parties are not given a great deal of
freedom as linkage agents, except in the area of patronage,
which a number of analysts do see as critical to building
parties and democracy. 13 While the "natural order"
perspective has generally had the advantage in modern
political debates and practice, the "constructed order"
perspective has strong and persistent roots.
In overall terms, the ability of parties to serve as
agents of popular linkage is generally enhanced by the
"natural order" perspective, although the possible
exception of patronage is an important one. Nonetheless,
parties must take advantage of the freedom provided by the
"natural order", and must also cope with the increased
restriction of patronage. The "constructed order" position
limits the linkage ability of minor parties at the ballot
box, and has seen elected representatives as the more
legitimate fulcrum of linkage between citizens and
government, except where patronage is concerned. Party
ability to link citizens and government has thus been both
enhanced and compromised by the justices.
13 Larry Sabato is the most visible spokesman for this
cause, calling for an increase in patronage positions in
government. Sabato, The Party 's Just Begun, pp. 229-32.
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The Contesting of Elect inns
In addition to linking citizens and government, strong
political parties actively contest elections. What types of
candidates do the parties offer to the voters? Is there an
opportunity for all parties to compete for support? Do
parties have sufficient resources to contest elections? The
two perspectives among the justices come to different
conclusions as to the viability of the political status quo
in providing full opportunities for parties to contest
elections. The "natural order" is generally skeptical of
the current state of party competition, while the
"constructed order" has a positive view of the party
system.
The "natural order" is most concerned about the
ability of legitimate candidates and parties to gain a
place on the ballot. Limits on who voters may select
constrain the range of individual character and talent, and
political parties, available for election. The "natural
order" views these limits as an unfair monopoly for the
major parties, since alternative candidates and minor
parties are both disadvantaged by ballot access
restrictions. This perspective would give more parties the
chance to compete for electoral support, creating a
positive environment for stronger party competition.
The "constructed order" views the ability of
candidates and parties to win access to the ballot under
current regulations in a more positive light. Restrictions
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on ballot access ensure a stable and orderly electoral
process by preventing damaging candidacies and favoring
candidates with strong public support and good
qualifications. Impeding certain candidacies and parties,
however, weakens their ability to gain strength by
contesting elections.
Clearly, ballot access regulation reduces the range of
candidates and parties who may contest elections. Whether
such regulation is responsible for the failure of third
parties and the persistence of a "monopoly" two-party
system in America is debated by the justices and students
of politics. 14 In practice, however, such regulations
remain, supported by the majority of justices and the
political system.
The choice of candidates to contest elections is also
at the center of the party organization and nomination
procedures opinions, and the debate between the two
perspectives is focused on the question of what entity has
14 Many leading scholars contend that there are
multiple causes for two-party dominance, including their
capacity to absorb protest movements, the existence of the
direct primary, ideological eclecticism, and coalitional
flexibility. Bibby, Politics and Parties , pp. 39-43. As
Bibby notes, Leon Epstein makes a strong argument for the
primacy of the direct primary as an explanatory factor.
Epstein, Political Parties In The American Mold , pp. 241-
44. For arguments that put greater, though not exclusive
weight, on ballot regulations as a causal factor, see
Joseph F. Zimmerman, "Fair Representation for Minorities
and Women", in Wilma Rule and Joseph F. Zimmerman, eds . ,
United States Electoral Systems: Their Impact on Women and
Minorities (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 3-11,
and Gillespie, Politics At The Periphery.
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the authority to structure candidate choice. The "natural
order" views the choice of candidates as best left to the
party organizations, particularly in the case of
presidential selection. This perspective would clearly
enhance potential party ability to contest elections by
opening the door for a stronger party role in nomination
procedures and candidate choice. 15
The "constructed order", in contrast, argues that
giving state or national parties more control over
candidate choice and nomination procedures will produce
candidates who do not reflect the choice of the citizens,
and are therefore less representative in character and
behavior. Their main concern is that candidates are chosen
by citizen-authorized procedures; for the "constructed
order" , the character and behavior of candidates is more of
a public
,
governmental concern. The choice of candidates by
parties should not be a fully autonomous process.
The historical record reflects the fact that states
have been active in structuring parties and the nominating
process since the Progressive era. Many politicians and
political scientists have taken issue with this control on
the grounds that it undermines parties and produces
candidates who have fewer party ties or loyalties; they
15 This opportunity does not guarantee increased party
influence, however, since the current electoral system is
likely to remain centered on individual candidates, not
parties. Party organizations do have an uphill fight in
this area, even with the deregulation enabled by the
justices
.
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argue that returning control to parties will help to
"renew" parties as organizations, producing better
candidates and government. 16 The public mood, however,
favors the continuance of the direct primary and government
regulation of the nominating process. Thus, despite the
increased party autonomy enabled by the recent decisions of
the justices, the future appears to favor only a limited
resurgence of party influence in candidate selection.
The ability of parties to contest elections is also
fundamentally shaped by their ability to obtain and utilize
essential electoral resources, particularly money and
campaign workers. With regard to campaign finance, both the
"natural order" and "constructed order" perspectives
perceive a need for government regulation, to protect the
electoral process from corruption by unregulated
contributions to candidates from secret sources. While the
"natural order" is still less willing than the "constructed
order" to entrust government with regulatory power, neither
perspective advocates a stronger or more explicit role for
parties in the campaign finance arena; they are neutral at
best to the historical changes that have reduced the role
of parties as institutions in fund raising.
An examination of modern campaign finance regulation
reveals that the system has reshaped the pathways of
16 For examples of these arguments, see Sabato, The
Party' s Just Begun , pp. 205-12 and passim ; Sorauf, Party
Politics In America , pp. 220-24; and the publications of
the Committee For Party Renewal
.
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campaign funds, but not the fundamental dominance of money
m political campaigns; campaign contributors have found
alternate avenues for their financial support. 17 While
parties have taken on an expanded role in recent decades
through "soft money" and congressional campaign committees,
they still have fewer resources for contesting elections
than the now-dominant candidates, who raise most of their
campaign funds from individual contributors or political
action committees (PACs) . 18 The only notable impact of the
justices' decisions has been indirect: the "soft money"
loophole, which has led to a larger party role in campaign
finance, can be seen as a result of the FECA restrictions
upheld by the Court
.
The issue of patronage is intimately related to the
availability of another resource which parties have
historically needed to contest elections, campaign workers.
The lure of a government job has frequently been an
attractive incentive for an individual to help a party
17 Frank Sorauf emphasizes the quick pace of
"political learning" by participants in the post-FECA
campaign finance environment, and the resulting shifts in
campaign money, in Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and
Realities .
18 Sorauf notes, for example, that in 1989-90
congressional candidates received 53% of their
contributions from individuals and 32% from PACs. Party
committees contributed only 1% of the total. Sorauf, Inside
Campaign Finance , pp. 30-31. The power of the party
committees is still significant, however, in their
strategic contributions to particular candidates. In this
regard, see Herrnson, Party Campaigning in the 19801s , and
Herrnson, "The Revitalization of National Party
Organizations"
.
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campaign and get out the vote on election day. The "natural
order" is very skeptical of this partisan use of government
personnel positions to obtain campaign support. They argue
that hiring for all but high policymaking positions should
be based on merit, since good government is a product of
neutral competence. This restricts a traditionally
important campaign resource for many parties.
The "constructed order" perspective takes a
diametrically opposed view of the desirability of
patronage. Patronage is seen as a historically legitimate
practice, and party ties are seen to be helpful in the
selection of government personnel, a way of enabling the
government to carry out the platform of the party in power.
On the Court, however, this pro-patronage position has not
held the day.
In historical terms, patronage has been practiced
throughout American history, though its reach has been
dramatically reduced by state and federal civil service
systems. These systems are the product of fierce criticism
of patronage hiring by reform movements since the late
nineteenth century, critiques which continue to the present
day and are supported by public opinion. 19 In this regard,
the "natural order" is probably more in line with public
sympathies in its desire for a nonpartisan government
19 Sabato, The Party's Just Begun .
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service, but the "constructed order" still stresses the
usefulness of patronage in dissenting opinions. 20
In summary, the "natural order" argues that parties
should have maximum opportunity to appeal to the voters and
the power to determine their own electoral strategies and
procedures, both of which would aid parties in contesting
elections. With regard to other resources, however, parties
are given no special role in campaign finance contests, and
party campaign workers are reduced by the restrictions on
patronage. The "constructed order" perspective, in
contrast, approves of structuring parties and their ability
to contest elections. Partisanship is, however, seen as a
legitimate consideration in personnel decisions, giving
some comfort to parties. Thus, while the "natural order"
argues for greater party ability to contest elections, both
perspectives support some type of increased role for
partisanship in the political process.
The Management of Political Conflict
Beyond linkage and the contesting of elections lies
another institutional attribute of a "strong party": the
ability to manage political conflict by aggregating
interests and enabling needed political change. The
perspectives disagree over what level of party competition
20 With a decreased reliance on individual volunteers
in modern high-tech campaigns, the decline of patronage may
not be as serious a resource deprivation for parties as it
would have been in earlier, pre- television decades.
315
promotes a healthy level of conflict resolution and
political change. While the "natural order" argues that
third parties play an essential role in achieving these
goals, the "constructed order" asserts that the current
two-party system has been effective in promoting compromise
and change
.
Party organizational structures and nomination
procedures, by shaping the character of party
decisionmaking and candidates, strongly influence how
parties aggregate interests and enable change. The "natural
order" argues that the capacity of parties to manage and
guide conflict is damaged by state- imposed organizational
requirements for parties and nomination procedures. Parties
must be free to structure themselves and choose candidates
for office if they are to evolve politically and serve as
effective managers of changing public demands and political
conflicts
.
The "constructed order", in contrast, argues that
state party organization and nomination procedure statutes
have a positive, not a negative, effect on the ability of
parties to unite interests and enable change. These
statutes implicitly reflect the political choices of state
citizens , choices that would be impeded by unregulated
party activity. For the "constructed order", the main locus
of conflict resolution and change is representative
government, not political parties.
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In historical terms, the survival and evolution of the
two-party system suggests to many students of parties that
their organization and nomination systems have been roughly
effective in uniting conflicting interests and promoting
necessary political change. The "natural order" argues
against this view, asserting that dissenting candidates and
ideas, as well as the true wishes of parties, can be
stifled by state- imposed structures, thereby warping the
shape of interest aggregation and change. While this view
has dominated the Court, significant state management of
the nomination system persists in the form of the direct
primary
.
21
The issue of ballot access goes to the heart of
interest aggregation and the opportunities for political
change. The "natural order" perspective argues that limits
on ballot access, like state-constructed nomination
procedures, can stifle dissenting opinions and alternative
perspectives, in this case by obstructing the access of
minor party candidates to a place on the ballot. This
limits the range of interests addressed by the party
system, and affects the amount of political change. As a
21 The dominance of the political system by the
Democrats and Republicans since 1860 is viewed as a sign of
political monopoly by a number of commentators, including
Gillespie, Politics at the Periphery . Most political
scientists, however, appear to agree with Howard Penniman,
Sait's American Parties , that the dominance of the two
parties, and the weakness of most third parties, is a
result of political forces, not legally constructed
monopoly status
.
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result, the ability of the party system to manage conflict
can be impaired.
The "constructed order" asserts that government
management of the ballot promotes the uniting of interests
and needed political change, by providing voters with a
meaningful choice of alternative candidates, rather than a
clutter of numerous candidates. From this viewpoint, third
parties damage rather than enhance the ability of the
political system to aggregate conflicting interests in an
orderly fashion. As earlier chapters have noted, this
perspective is more concerned with promoting stability than
encouraging change
.
Historically, it has become more difficult for minor
party candidates to gain a place on to the ballot and offer
voters an alternative group (ing) of interests and platform
for change. This is in part a consciously sought result of
Progressive era electoral reforms, which were responding to
the growing strength of the Socialist Party and other third
parties at the turn of this century. 22 With regard to
political change, however, a strong argument can be made
that the perspectives of third parties have in many
instances been adopted by one of the major parties in later
22 Gillespie, Politics at the Periphery , pp. 34-35.
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years, allowing for significant change under the existing
system. 23
Party campaign finance and patronage practices also
shape the scope and direction of political change. For the
"natural order" perspective, both areas can be properly
regulated in order to prevent corruption that would pervert
political speech, political choices, and long-term
political change. The "constructed order" perspective,
however, sees patronage as enabling, rather than
perverting, government policy and healthy long-term
political change. Partisanship is seen as offering a clear
program, endorsed by the voters, which can structure the
choice of government personnel to effect the changes sought
by voters
.
While the regulation of campaign finance has been
relatively neutral to parties as agents of change, the
restriction of patronage does limit the ability of parties
to influence change, by restricting the partisan character
of government service. The historical record on patronage
argues for both perspectives, from different vantage
points. The "natural order" perspective seems confirmed by
the corruption and entrenchment that patronage can enable
23 V.O. Key asserts that minor parties often reflect
tensions within the major parties over issues, and that the
issues are ultimately addressed by the major party. Key,
Politics. Parties, and Pressure Groups , 5th ed., pp. 280-
81. Sorauf questions the idea that third parties "force"
major parties to address issues, asserting that public
pressure and readiness is the causal factor for major party
action on issues. Sorauf, Party Pol itics In America, p. 48.
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in the form of political machines. 24 Such machines were
frequently not known for their political openness. At the
same time, the "constructed order" perspective correctly
reflects that patronage has also performed positive
functions, including the enactment of political positions
into government programs, enabling political change. 25
In sum, the two perspectives differ notably on the
role that parties should play in managing political
conflict and change. The "natural order" is skeptical of
government management of the ballot and party procedures,
seeing them as blocking or perverting the ability of
parties to aggregate interests and manage change. With
regard to campaign finance and patronage, however, the
"natural order" sees a lesser role for partisanship in
governmental administration, and a greater danger to long-
term changes desired by the public. The "constructed order"
is much more sanguine about the amount of interest
aggregation and change enabled by our partially state-
constructed system, particularly as expressed by elected
24 For historical background on the relationship
between patronage, political machines, and corruption, see
Steven P. Erie, Rainbow 1 s End: Irish-Americans and the
Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840-1985 (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988);
Freedman, Patronage: An American Tradition . For the classic
arguments in favor of patronage, see Riordon, Plunkitt of
Tammany Hall .
25 See Riordon, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall ; Sabato, The
Party's Just Begun , pp. 229-32.
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representatives; parties have a more controlled role,
except in the area of patronage.
The Guidance of Government and Public Policy
Once a party has succeeded in electing its candidates
to office, it faces the task of trying to govern the
political system. In this regard, a strong party is one
which offers a platform, elects officeholders who work to
enact the platform, and supplies individuals to staff
government and implement the platform. While the two
perspectives considered here are both concerned with this
aspect of party affairs, they do implicitly support
different aspects of "party government". The "natural
order" emphasizes the ideological role of parties, while
the "constructed order" emphasizes the role of partisanship
in governance
.
The "natural order" argues for a multiparty system
where governing power is not monopolized and parties stand
for particular ideas and policies. The issue of ballot
access reflects this concern with achieving a
nonmonopolized governmental system. A system open to all
candidates and parties is likely to represent a broader
range of ideas than the current two-party system, and
platforms will be more meaningful. The stress is on
platforms rather than their implementation.
The "constructed order" puts less stress on platforms,
but more emphasis on the choices made by democratically
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elected partisan officials, even if those choices do not
rigorously adhere to party platforms. Ballot access
regulation, for example, is viewed as essential to an
effective democratic system. Parties in this perspective
are given the chance to govern only if they can demonstrate
credible public support.
The different types of party systems nurtured by these
views of ballot access result in different patterns of
power sharing and opportunities for parties to govern. The
"natural order" perspective makes it easier for more
parties to pursue governing power, while the "constructed
order" encourages more controlled access to governing
authority. In so doing, the former perspective presents
more opportunity for parties to strengthen themselves in
this area.
Government regulation of party organization and
nomination procedures also shapes the type of party
governance we receive. The ways in which parties structure
themselves and candidates seek their nominations shape the
party platform, the skills of those elected to office, and
the connections between the two. The "natural order"
perspective argues that allowing parties to choose their
own structures and have a major voice in nominating
procedures will produce a more unified party position and
more effective governance. For the "constructed order",
state power in this area is tied to the ability of citizen
to structure their politics through the choices of
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legislators. A state- structured process will ensure that
the results accurately reflect public choices, and thereby
produce the type of public officeholders and policy
platforms that the public desires. Parties are seen as
properly having an important, but ultimately subordinate,
role in that structuring process.
Historically, the choices of party structure and
nomination procedures have had a major effect on
governance. As James Ceaser has argued, the modern
selection process tends to weaken the tie between
Presidents, other party officeholders, and parties, thereby
making party governance more difficult. 26 The "natural
order" perspective, which favors more party control, and
the "constructed order" deference to state control both
offer the opportunity for stronger party government, but
the former gives parties more freedom to use that
opportunity
.
The practice of patronage is intimately related to the
issue of governance and the role of political parties. The
"natural order" sees patronage as an obstacle to effective
government administration and an infringement on the free
speech of government personnel. Thus, parties have a role
in advocating and working to enact policy platforms, but
partisanship stops at the door of administrative
26 Ceaser, Reforming the Reforms , p. 109.
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implementation; party government does not extend beyond
policymaking
.
The "constructed order" is more sanguine about
patronage, seeing it as a positive force for carrying out
the platform of the party in government. In contrast to its
views on ballot access and nomination procedures, the
"constructed order" supports a role for partisanship and
parties in choosing government personnel. Partisan control
and authority is proper if it is embodied in democratically
elected officeholders, rather than mere organizations
contesting to control government. In this way, their stance
is consistent with the "government -centered" deference of
their other positions.
The role of parties in governance is of great import
to the perspectives examined here. The "natural order"
argues that the best government will come from a
nonmonopolized, free electoral process with a disclosed
financial base, a process whose government is run by a
nonpartisan public service for nonpolicymaking functions.
The corruption caused by a possible monopoly of power by
particular parties and ideas is their critical concern. The
"constructed order" asserts that effective party governance
does not occur naturally, but must be ensured by government
regulation controlling the ballot, nomination procedures,
and campaign finance. Once in office, use of partisan
considerations is a part of proper governance in a party
system. Thus, both perspectives create obstructions as well
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as opportunities for the realization of a stronger party
role in governance. This role is at the heart of the
"responsible party government" model, and examining the
implications of both perspectives for this model is our
next task.
The "Responsible Party Government" Model
The relationship between parties, ideas, and public
policy has been a longstanding concern among students of
parties. The most notable model of how this relationship
should be structured is known as the "doctrine of
responsible party government"
. The arguments over the need
for "responsible parties", and the character of such
parties, have recurred in the literature on American
politics and parties from the turn of the century to the
present day. 27 The classic statement of the doctrine,
however, is the 1950 report of the American Political
Science Association (APSA) Committee on Political Parties,
Towards A More Responsible Two- Party System .
A number of features characterize a "responsible"
political party. Such a party must:
1. Evolve and enunciate a reasonably explicit
statement of party programs and principles
.
2 . Nominate candidates loyal to the party program
and willing to enact it into public policy if
elected
.
27 For a historical treatment of these arguments, see
Ranney, The Doctrine of Responsibl e Party Government. For a
recent perspective, see White and Mileur, eds . , Challenges
.
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3
.
Conduct its electoral campaigns in such a way
that voters will grasp the programmatic
differences between it and its opposing party and
make their voting decisions substantially on that
basis
.
4. Guarantee that public officeholders elected under
the party label will carry the party program
into public policy and thus enable the party to
take responsibility for their actions in
office
.
28
The distinguishing feature of this model is its explicit
focus on the party as an organization whose members and
officeholders are held responsible for enacting substantive
public policy objectives. As Frank Sorauf notes, a
responsible party "is concerned with capturing and using
public office for predetermined goals and not merely for
the thrill of winning, the division of patronage and
spoils, or the reward of the office itself "
.
29
A "responsible party" would also possess the
attributes of a strong party that we have considered here.
This issue-oriented party would serve as a more effective
policy link between citizens and government. It would
increase the substantive importance of election contests,
and make the aggregation of interests and competing visions
of political change more explicit. Most notably, it would
make party government an effective reality. Thus, a strong
argument could be made that the responsible parties would
also be stronger parties.
28 Sorauf, Party Politics In America , 4th ed., p. 374.
29 Ibid . , p. 375; emphasis added.
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Does either perspective support or encourage the
growth of responsible parties? The "natural order" appears
to offer notable support for such parties, while the
"constructed order" is more satisfied with the party status
guo. The "natural order" emphasis on parties as vehicles of
ideas is certainly congruent with the issue orientation of
"responsible parties". The view that parties should control
their own organization and procedures is also a necessary
step for parties to take explicit and consistent policy
stances, in line with this model. Thus, the "natural order"
perspective would appear to be very hospitable to
"responsible parties".
The "natural order" justices can only offer an open
door, however, to the achievement of "responsible parties"
and "responsible party government". While they endorse a
greater role for ideas and more freedom for parties to
control their own organizations and candidate selection,
parties themselves must take consistent platform stances
and use these newfound freedoms. Even if parties actively
work to become more responsible, however, they face the
hurdle of the American political climate. Public opinion on
parties is very negative, and direct primaries, which
reduce party control over candidate selection, are held in
high esteem. 30 Given the power of public opinion, it would
seem that E.E. Schattschneider ' s 1942 assessment of the
30 Sabato, The Party's Just Begun , p. 207.
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future of responsible party government is even more
accurate in the 1990' s: "The greatest difficulties in the
way of the development of party government in the United
States have been intellectual, not legal". 31 The justices
have opened the door for responsible parties, but only the
parties and the public may walk through it.
Conclusions: No Guarantee for Stronger Parties
In sum, the analysis above reveals that the "natural
order" perspective will generally provide more
opportunities for parties to develop the attributes of a
"strong" party. This is particularly true with regard to
the linkage of citizens and government, the contesting of
elections, and the management of conflict. Neither
perspective, however, offers any guarantee that parties
will develop or emphasize these functional attributes.
Parties can only become stronger through their own efforts
as the development of national party fundraising capacitie
indicates. The "natural order" justices have opened up
opportunities for party self-government, but they cannot
build parties by opinion; only political effort can
strengthen parties effectively.
31 E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government , p. 209,
quoted in White and Mileur, eds . , Challenges, p. 15.
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"Natural" Vs. "Constructed" Order
This analysis of the ballot access, party and
nomination procedures, campaign finance, and patronage
opinions of Supreme Court justices has shown that they
comprise two general perspectives on the nature of
electoral democracy. The allegiance of particular justices
to each perspective needs to be assessed to determine the
consistency with which the position of each is held. This
will enable us to identify the "predictable" and the
"swing" justices. This analysis reveals that, across the
spectrum of cases considered here, the justices have been
split between a small core of "predictable" votes and a
larger number of "swing" votes, whose support for each
doctrine has been qualified. These "swing" justices have
been an important "brake" on the reach of the "natural
order" perspective in Court jurisprudence.
A critical step in assessing the influence of a
particular intellectual perspective is to determine who are
its consistent proponents. The "natural order" perspective
is most consistently asserted by Justices Brennan and
Marshall; only in considering campaign finance do they back
away from a strong skepticism of governmental activity in
the electoral process. Even this seeming inconsistency is
explained by the fact that their main concern is
unchanging: the prevention of political monopoly and
corruption. The difference with campaign finance is that it
is the only area where they feel government statutes
329
prevent more corruption than they create. They are often
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Kennedy, whose
only consistently departures from the "natural order"
viewpoint are in the patronage decisions. 32
The "constructed order" perspective has found its most
loyal foot soldier in (Chief) Justice Rehnquist. He has
consistently given great deference to various state
statutes in these areas, viewing them as proper expressions
of the voice of the people expressed through democratically
elected state legislatures. He is usually joined by
Justices O'Connor and Scalia, who regularly depart from the
perspective only in the area of campaign finance.
The remaining justices who have been involved in a
significant number of the cases at issue have been "swing"
justices, shifting between the perspectives between and
within each area of cases. Justices Powell, Stewart,
Blackmun, Stevens, and White fall into this group. Powell
and Stewart lean toward the "constructed order"
perspective, favoring it in ballot access, patronage, and
some of the nominations decisions; they were more convinced
by the "natural order" only in the area of campaign
finance. 33 Blackmun also leans toward the "constructed
32 It should be noted that this placement of Kennedy
is based on a small number of decisions (5) : Rutan, Austin,
Burdick , Norman , and Eu. These cases do, however, cover the
spectrum of issue areas examined here.
33 Given the pro-regulatory tilt of the "natural
order" in the campaign finance cases, Powell and Stewart
could be viewed as largely consistent supporters of the
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order", favoring it in the nomination and ballot access
cases; he is split in the campaign finance opinions, and
supports the "natural order" position only in the patronage
opinions. Stevens, in contrast, leans to the "natural
order" perspective, supporting it in the patronage and
ballot access opinions; only in some of the nomination and
campaign finance cases does he favor the "constructed
order" position. White is the only justice who is
consistently split: he favors the "natural order" in the
patronage and nominations cases, but supports the
"constructed order" in ballot access and campaign
finance
.
34
The "swing" justices are thus not as clear cut in
their positions as Brennan, Marshall, Burger, Kennedy,
Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia. A rough grouping, however,
reflects that all but White can be placed close to one of
the two perspectives. The "constructed order" view has seen
Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia joined with regularity by
Powell, Stewart, and Blackmun, while the "natural order"
perspective has seen Brennan, Marshall, Burger, and Kennedy
joined in many decisions by Stevens.
There are two major implications that may be drawn
from these patterns of support. First, the patterns
"constructed order" perspective.
34 White appears to view government involvement in the
electoral process as appropriate, but is less approving of
partisan bias in government or government control of
partisan decisions.
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indicate that both perspectives have had to "fight" for
supporters among the justices, since a number of justices
have shifted between the two perspectives. More
importantly, the "natural order" would now seem to be at a
critical disadvantage in this search for support on the
Court. The three most consistent advocates of the "natural
order" perspective -- Brennan, Marshall, and Burger -- have
all left the Court, while the three most active supporters
of the "constructed order" perspective -- Rehnquist,
O'Connor, and Scalia -- remain on the Court. This is not an
encouraging state of affairs for those who might be
considering constitutional challenges to party and
electoral regulations.
"Natural" and "Constructed" Orders in Scholarly Context
Having analyzed the "natural order" and "constructed
order" perspectives using a set of institutional criteria,
we now understand the justices' views of parties in a wider
perspective. A further question remains, however. How do
these findings and arguments mesh with previous scholarly
literature on parties and the law? This section addresses
the arguments of the literature discussed in Chapter One in
the light of the dissertation's findings.
The "natural order" focus on the parties as the proper
decisionmakers for structuring their own procedures
resonates with the analyses of Gottlieb, Geyh, Lawson,
Sabato, Price, and Mileur. These works are united in their
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contention that parties, not governments, are the best
decisionmaker for party and electoral decisions. In fact,
the concern of both perspectives examined here is less with
a particular substantive result and more with the identity
of the institution that structures the process. The
"natural order" seeks to leave such decisions to the
parties and citizens, while the "constructed order" trusts
the government to make such decisions. This group of
scholars supports the former position.
The analyses of Pierce, Weisburd, and Porto are also
accurately reflective of judicial thinking in this area,
and all appear to implicitly support the "natural order"
trend on the Court. While Pierce's call for the justices to
explicitly disavow the "political question" doctrine has
not been heeded, our analysis reveals that the justices are
now fully engaged in the full range of political decisions
in this area, and are not likely to remove themselves at
this point. The contention of Pierce and Weisburd that the
"state action" doctrine has been negated by recent Court
decisions also appears validated. 35 Porto correctly
perceives the dominance of a state-friendly, "constructed
35 Nonetheless, the state-friendly viewpoint of the
"constructed order" would seem to leave the door open for
possible future state intervention in party affairs. Add to
this the standing precedent of Smith v. Allwright, which
allowed intervention in party affairs to prevent invidious
discrimination, and the face of "state action" might rear
its head again in the right case. Note too, however, that
Justice Marshall explicitly differentiated Smith v.
Allwright from the current freedom of association cases m
U.S. v. O'Brien.
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order" standard of review in recent ballot access cases,
but echoes the "natural order" minority's call for stricter
standards of review to protect minor party interests.
Unlike the analysts above, other scholars take
stronger issue with the justices' decisions, and echo the
"constructed order" at times. Guttman's argument that the
justices have shifted too far in favor of freedom of
association claims can find reassurance in events that
followed her analysis and the findings of this
dissertation. The "constructed order" perspective has
offered a continuing alternative to expanded freedom of
association, limiting the scope of the Tashi ian opinion and
dominating recent ballot access decisions. The justices now
seem in no danger of giving carte blanche to freedom of
association claims, a fact which Leon Epstein's work
correctly reflects.
The articles by Cammorosano and Brinkley also argue
that an imbalance exists in the Court's jurisprudence,
specifically in the justices' patronage decisions. Their
work correctly portrays the dominance of the "natural
order" disdain for patronage, but gives insufficient
credence to the long term influence of the dissenting
strain that the "constructed order" perspective represents.
The analysis of Daniel Lowenstein, in arguing for greater
legislative authority in party and electoral areas, goes
even farther than the "constructed order" justices have
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been prepared to go, calling for a judicial "hands off"
policy
.
The historical\quantitative analysis of Hadley and
Epstein covers a wider range of cases than this
dissertation, but its findings seem roughly borne out by
the findings here. While some minor parties do not fare
well in the ballot access cases, others do (Wallace's
American Independent Party, Anderson's National Unity
Campaign)
,
and the dominant viewpoint in the other areas,
the "natural order", is highly sensitive to minor party
concerns. Minor parties do appear to have been generally
well treated by these judicial opinions.
Clifton McCleskey ' s assertion that the justices'
jurisprudence in this area is "confused" is not supported
by the dissertation's findings, but this conflict may be as
much semantics as substance. The division McCleskey sees in
the ballot access cases between Anderson and a number of
earlier cases like Storer and American Party does, in fact,
reflect the arguments of the "natural order" \" constructed
order" debate posited in this dissertation. 36 The justices
are seen as "confused" on freedom of association in the
pre- La Follette organization/nomination opinions, but the
divisions again reflect the contending schools of thought
posited here. 37 With regard to patronage, McCleskey argues
36 McCleskey, "Parties at the Bar", pp. 352-53.
37 McCleskey, "Parties at the Bar", p. 361.
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that the justices have applied differing and confusing
bases for evaluating the use of partisan criteria in
government personnel decisions, but this differences is one
of degree, not kind; it is consistent with the findings
here. 38 While some of McCleskey's critiques of judicial
policymaking have validity, this dissertation takes issue
with his claim that "judicial review has obscured more than
it has clarified". 39
John Moeller's contention that the justices' opinions
reflect not confusion but a contest between three competing
visions of politics is the clearest alternative model to
the schools of thought explicated in this dissertation.
Moeller posits these three visions as contesting in the
justices' opinions: "fair politics" (equal access to the
political system) , "First Amendment politics" (protection
of associational rights) , and "Madisonian politics"
(politics as an open conflict of forces) , with "First
Amendment politics" (mixed with "fair politics") dominating
the justices' jurisprudence. 40 While the visions Moeller
presents have many similarities to the "schools of thought"
posited here, their focus is ultimately distinct. This
dissertation argues that the justices divide not only over
the type of politics (and Moeller makes a strong case for
38 McCleskey, "Parties at the Bar", pp. 363-66.
39 McCleskey, "Parties at the Bar", p. 366.
40 Moeller, "The Federal Courts".
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his view)
,
but over what constitutes a legitimate political
system: a state- structured system (the "constructed order")
or an unregulated party politics (the "natural order")
. The
issues are related but distinct.
"Natural" and "Constructed" Orders: Political Implications
The opinions of the justices have significance for the
regulatory environment of the current electoral system and
for efforts to strengthen political parties. Their
decisions also shape the broader character of American
democracy: their concrete actions change or reinforce the
existing system, while the arguments in the opinions
influence the parameters of debate about the system. The
opinions thus have both theoretical and practical
implications
.
The justices' opinions have altered the regulatory
structure of electoral politics in a number of ways. The
ballot access opinions, dominated by the "constructed
order" perspective, have supported a continuance of
extensive state discretion over what a candidate must do to
gain a place on the ballot. The state role in regulating
nominations, in contrast, has been severely reduced by the
"natural order" majority, opening up more choices for
parties. In campaign finance, much of the FECA has been
upheld by the "natural order" as an appropriate device to
prevent corruption of the electoral process. Finally, a
government's ability to use partisan criteria in personnel
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decisions has been virtually eliminated, enabling
government personnel to be less inhibited in holding
alternate political views.
In terms of the justices' effects on efforts to
strengthen parties, we saw in Part I of this chapter that
the dominant "natural order" perspective does more to
promote stronger parties. Nonetheless, it does limit the
party role in personnel decisions. The "natural order" is
also very suspicious of government management of the
electoral process, a suspicion grounded in a concern of
political monopoly. The danger in many ballot access,
nomination, and patronage regulations is that the party or
parties currently dominating the system will structure such
regulation to their own advantage. This monopoly lies at
the heart of what the "natural order" seeks to prevent: an
artificially restricted political process.
The "natural order" also favors promoting the
programmatic functions of parties, as part of their concern
with monopoly. If the states and parties in power can
structure the processes of politics, they can reduce the
opportunity for alternate views to be heard. Promoting
ideas is seen as a critical function of parties, one that
should not be limited.
The "constructed order", in contrast, offers in great
measure a maintenance of the political status quo. States
could continue to limit access to the ballot in the name of
order and stability, limiting this point of participation.
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State laws could also continue to regulate the nominating
process, even if party organization could not be specified;
participation could also be restricted. Campaign finance
could be regulated to prevent corruption. Finally, partisan
considerations could be properly used in government
personnel decisions, allowing a greater role for party
allegiance in this area.
The "constructed order" sees the major parties as
performing the work of democracy with great effectiveness,
with the contesting of elections being the central
contribution of parties. The structuring of the system is
accomplished by democratically elected legislators;
monopoly exists only if a system is blatantly
discriminatory. State laws are in fact seen to promote, not
reduce, meaningful competition, with the process open but
performing a proper winnowing function.
Such a "constructed" system also has positive and
negative implications for parties and politics. Government
control of nomination procedures limits the parties'
ability to determine an important part of their public
character. On the other hand, the major parties would
continue to benefit from their current ballot access
advantages, as well as the ability to engage in some
patronage practices. Thus, the "constructed order" would in
some ways allow for more party power in politics than the
"natural order"
.
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The justices are ultimately divided by how they view
the parameters of democracy. The "natural order" argues
that both party competition and voter choice should be as
wide as possible, subject to very limited restriction;
state imposed restrictions could result in a system where
politics, electorally and ideologically, is monopolized.
The "constructed order" argues that democracy is much more
fragile, and that democratic representatives can properly
construct a series of rules to structure the electoral
process in order to preserve it.
The debate also speaks to the ongoing development of
an American "administrative state" at the national level.
While the solicitude of the "natural order" towards
national power and processes is certainly in line with the
nationalization of American politics, the "constructed
order" view reveals that the state oriented view of a
federal system has not disappeared. In addition, the
granting of autonomy to parties can be said to reduce the
administrative state's control, while the disapproval of
patronage practices reinforces the trend toward a
nonpartisan "administrative state"
.
The structuring of political institutions in the
electoral process is also seen differently by the two
perspectives. The "natural order" envisions parties as the
best decisionmakers of their own procedures, and views
ideas as an important component of their identity. The
"constructed order" views the major purpose of parties as
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electoral, not ideological. Neither perspective has a fully
consistent position on whether democracy should occur
within or between the parties.
While they have expanded opportunities for parties to
make their own choices in practice, neither the majority
opinions of the justices or the many dissenting opinions
offer a great deal of support to parties in theoretical
terms. While the "natural order" perspective certainly
looks favorably on the interests of minor parties, this
grows more out of their concern for giving voice to all
political voices than it does out of a concern for parties
as parties. The "constructed order" perspective shows some
more concern for the role of partisan considerations in
governance, but it envisions no guaranteed political role
for parties as a group.
Neither perspective argues directly for more
responsible parties or a more party-centered system.
Ultimately, what the justices debate is more democracy and
the electoral process, not the exact shape or functions of
parties. "Strong parties" are in no way guaranteed by
either perspective.
What is important theoretically for parties is that
the justices have taken on the power to make such choices.
The questions are not dismissed due to their "political"
nature, but are heard. What this means is that the Court is
now an active player in defining these questions. Thus, the
possible directions its decisions might take will add an
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important voice to ongoing theoretical debates on the
broader questions of democracy, a voice that will only
speak when asked to but will then speak with meaningful
practical authority.
Parties have been emancipated from government control
of their internal choices, but their interests beyond their
own affairs are not as clearly favored. The ballot is still
restricted for minor parties, campaign finance is candidate
centered, and patronage has been drastically limited with
little concern for the impact on parties. Thus, parties
cannot be said to have been greatly advantaged in practical
terms by the jurisprudence of either perspective. They are
freer to guide and shape their own identity, but they are
given little special treatment in the political process in
which they contest for power. While control over one's own
household is certainly important, this newly regained
autonomy does not change the fact that parties are a
weakened player in the fiercely competitive arena of
politics; the ballot access, campaign finance and patronage
opinions offer them little assistance in rebuilding their
strength
.
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